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Résumé
La thèse est composée de trois chapitres traitant des déterminants du choix de secteur
d’emploi et de filière d’études ainsi que du chômage d’équilibre. Nous nous intéressons
plus particulièrement à l’effet du salaire et de la durée de chômage sur ces choix. Dans le
premier chapitre, nous développons un modèle endogène de choix de secteur d’emploi
pour une économie composée de deux secteurs. Un travailleur préfère l’emploi dans le
secteur qui maximise son revenu à vie actualisé. Nous montrons comment le chômage en
attente d’un emploi dans le secteur à salaire élevé est une fonction croissante de l’écart
salarial entre les deux secteurs employeurs, et une fonction décroissante de l’écart des
durées de chômage espérées ainsi que du taux d’escompte personnel. Le résultat principal
est que lorsque l’écart salarial est substantiel et/ou le taux d’escompte est faible, certains
travailleurs préfèrent demeurer en chômage à la recherche d’un emploi dans le secteur qui
paie les salaires élevés au lieu d’accepter l’emploi dans l’autre secteur. Nous confrontons
ensuite notre modèle aux données de l’enquête marocaine sur la population active en
considérant le secteur public comme étant celui qui paie les salaires élevés et le secteur
privé comme étant le secteur à bas salaires. Nous utilisons les données d’un échantillon de
1609 diplômés universitaires et considérons un modèle structurel dans lequel nous
estimons conjointement (1) la décision de chercher un emploi dans le secteur public vs.
privé, (2) la détermination des salaires, et (3) la durée de chômage dans les deux secteurs.
Les résultats empiriques principaux sont que le taux d’escompte intertemporel personnel
est de l’ordre de 15% et que l’écart salarial en faveur du secteur public est très élevé (plus
de 80%). Nous discutons ensuite l’implication des résultats pour des politiques visant à
attirer les diplômés universitaires vers le secteur privé. Nous trouvons que les travailleurs
préfèreront l’emploi dans le secteur public même s’il paie le même niveau salaires que le
secteur privé. Ceci résulte du fait que les travailleurs marocains sont peu sensibles aux
changements de salaires et de durées de chômage lorsqu’ils choisissent un secteur
d’emploi.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous analysons de manière détaillée la situation sur le marché
de l’emploi au Maroc. Comme plusieurs autres pays en voie de développement, le Maroc
connaît une montée importante du chômage des diplômés dont particulièrement ceux issus
des universités. L’éducation réduit sérieusement les chances d’accès à l’emploi bien que le
nniveau d’éducation de la population soit assez faible. Le taux d’analphabétisme parmi la
population adulte approche 50%. En 2000, le taux de chômage agrégé était de 13.6%, mais
il est était quatre fois plus élevé parmi les détenteurs de diplômes comparativement à ceux
n’ayant aucun niveau d’instruction. Dans ce chapitre Nous essayons de trouver une
explication valable à cette situation en se référant notamment à la littérature sur le sujet.
Cependant, notre thèse est que le chômage des diplômés universitaire au Maroc est en
partie un chômage d’équilibre qui s’explique par le fait que ces diplômés souvent préfèrent
attendre un emploi dans le secteur public plutôt que d’en chercher dans le secteur privé.
L’élément justificatif de cette thèse est que la détérioration l’emploi des diplômés
universitaires s’est produite en parallèle avec la réduction de l’emploi dans la fonction
publique à partir de 1983, date de mise en place du programme d’ajustement structurel.
Nous exploitons alors les résultats du premier chapitre pour formuler des suggestions en
vue de stimuler l’emploi des diplômés.
Dans le dernier chapitre, nous développons un modèle endogène de choix de filière
d’études en utilisant les mêmes outils développés dans le premier chapitre. Dans ce
modèle, le choix de filière est une fonction du revenu et de la durée de chômage espérés
après la graduation ainsi que du taux d’escompte personnel. Pour l’application empirique,
nous considérons cinq grandes filières et utilisons des données de l’enquête nationale
canadienne auprès des diplômés. L’échantillon est constitué de 15124 individus ayant
complété avec succès leur programme d’études dans un collège communautaire canadien
(CEGEP au Québec) en 1990 et 1995. Durant cette période, les rendements (salaires et
durées de chômage) à certaines filières comme « Santé » ont baissé relativement aux autres
filières comme « Sciences ». Ceci constitue une bonne occasion pour identifier l’effet des
revenus et durées de chômage sur le choix de filière d’études. Les résultats indiquent que la
probabilité de choisir une filière particulière au collège dépend significativement des
revenu et durée de chômage espérés dans cette filière relativement aux autres filières. Nous
trouvons également que les femmes mettent moins de poids sur le revenu et la durée de
chômage comparativement aux hommes. Enfin, il ressort que les personnes qui détenaient
un emploi avant de commencer leurs études au collège favorisent le revenu et se soucient
moins du chômage après la graduation lorsqu’elles choisissent leur filière d’études.
Mots clés: secteur public, éducation, chômage, filière d’études, revenue à vie, taux
d’escompte, biais de sélection, Maroc, Canada.
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Ç Abstract
The thesis is organized in three essays on the determinants of employment sector and field
of study choices. I specifically focus on the effects of eamings and unemployment duration
gaps on those choices.
In the first chapter, I develop a model of endogenous choice of employment sector in an
intertemporal context for a two-sector economy. A worker prefers employment in the
sector that maximizes his or lier discounted lifetime income. I show how unemployment
duration while awaiting employment in the high-wage sector is an increasing function of
the wage differential between sectors, a decreasing function of the expected differential in
unemployment duration and a decreasing function of the individual discount rate. When
the wage differential is substantial andlor if the discount rate is low, some workers
rationally choose to remain unemployed instead of accepting employment in the low-wage
sector. I test and fmd empirical support for this argument using data from the 199$
Moroccan labour force survey, with the high wage sector being the public sector, and the
low-wage sector being the private sector. I use data from a sample of 1,609 universiW
graduates and consider a structural model estimating simultaneously (1) the decision to
work (or to seek employment) in the public versus pnvate sector, (2) the wage equation in
each sector, and (3) the unemployment duration equation in each sector. Ihe main
empirical results of this study are that the individual intertemporal discount rate is about
15%, and that the public sector pays high hourly wages (over 80% than those in the private
sector). I also discuss the implications of the results for policies that could help atfract
university graduates to the private sector. I find that workcrs prefer the public sector even
when it pays the same as the private sector and despite the high risk of unemployment. In
fact, the probability of preferring employment in the public sector is flot very sensitive to
wages or unemployment durations variations. As a result, the modification of the workers’
behaviour necessitates extreme changes in those variables.
In the second chapter, I present a detailed analysis of the Moroccan labor market. Like
many developing countries, Morocco bas experienced a significant rise in the
unemployment rate among educated workers, principally among those holding university
degrees. In addition, average educational achievement is very low. However, at the same
iv
time education reduces the probability ofbeing employed. The illiteracy rate is about 50%
for the population sector aged 15 years and older, while one out of two workers has neyer
attended school. In 2000, the aggregate unemployment rate was 13.6%, but it was four
times higher among educated workers than uneducated workers. In the second chapter, I
n-y to explain this situation in light ofthe literature on the subject. My thesis is that the high
unemployment rate among the highly educated workers in Morocco is partly an
equilibrium, since some workers prefer to wait for employment in the public sector instead
of seeking employment in the private sector. An important piece of evidence supporting
this thesis is that the unemployment rate of highly educated workers started to rise
precisely when the public sector stopped hiring large numbers of educated workers in the
1980s. I then exploit the results from the first chapter and formulate suggestions on how to
reduce the unemployment rate among university graduates.
In the last chapter, I develop a model of endogenous choice of the field of study by using
methods similar to those presented in the first chapter. In this model, field choice is a
function of expected eamings, unemployment duration and personal discount rate. for the
empirical application, I consider five broadly defined college fields of study and use data
from the Canadian Survey of Graduates of 15,124 individuals who successfully completed
their programs at Canadian community colleges (CEGEPs in Quebec) in 1990 and 1995.
Over this period, the retums (eamings and unemployment duration) to fields such as liealth
declined relative to other fields such as science and engineering. This provides useful
leverage for identifying the impact of eamings and unemployment duration on the choice
of field of study. The results indicate that the probability of selecting a specific college
field of study depends signfficantly on expected eamings and unemployment duration in
that field relative to other fields. I also find that women put less weight on eamings and
unemployment durations than men when choosing a field of study, while individuals who
were employed pnor to starting college put more weight on eamings but less weight on
unemployment duration.
Key words: public sector, education, unemployment, field of study, lifetime eamings,
discount rate, sample selection bias, Morocco, Canada.
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Introduction Générale
Plusieurs pays en voie de développement (PVD), notamment en Afrique, connaissent une
montée importante du chômage des diplômés, particulièrement ceux issus des universités.
Cette situation semble se produire en parallèle avec la mise en place par ces pays de
programmes d’ajustement structurel dont l’une des principales composantes était la forte
réduction du recrutement dans le secteur public. Malgré ce changement dans la politique
du secteur public, celui-ci demeure toujours très convoité par les diplômés à la recherche
d’emploi.
L’emploi dans le secteur public est réputé pour sa stabilité, ses conditions et surtout pour
ses salaires élevés comparativement au secteur privé (Smith, 1976a et 1982; Gunderson,
1979; Gaag et Vijverberg, 1988; Gelb, Knight, et Sabot, 1991 et Gunderson, Hyatt et
Riddell, 2000). Cette segmentation du marché de l’emploi est plus marquée dans les PVD
où fleurissent les activités informelles. Ceci suggère que le chômage des diplômés
universitaires pourrait être un chômage d’équilibre. En effet, certains travailleurs peuvent
rationnellement choisir de demeurer en chômage à la recherche d’un emploi dans le secteur
public plutôt que d’accepter un emploi dans le secteur privé. Cet argument est similaire à
celui avancé par Harris et Todaro (1970) pour expliquer le chômage urbain dans les PVD.
Selon Hams et Todaro, ce chômage trouve son origine dans l’écart salarial substantiel
entre les milieux urbain et rural. Ainsi, cet écart salarial attire les travailleurs ruraux vers le
marché d’emploi en milieu urbain en nombre que ce marché ne peut insérer. Le taux de
chômage urbain intervient comme force d’équilibre dans cette migration. Les travailleurs
qui se trouvent en chômage le sont volontairement puisqu’ils refusent l’emploi dans le
milieu rural.
Cependant, ce type d’explication pour le chômage n’a jamais été testé formellement pour
les PVD. Pour le faire, nous développons dans le premier chapitre un modèle de choix de
secteur dans une économie à deux secteurs employeurs payant des niveaux de salaires
différents. Les travailleurs sont exposés au chômage dans les deux secteurs, mais le sont
davantage dans le secteur à salaire élevé. Un travailleur préfère l’emploi dans le secteur qui
maximise son revenu à vie escompté. Dans le modèle développé, le chômage en attente
d’un emploi dans le secteur à salaire élevé est une fonction croissante de l’écart salarial
2entre les deux secteurs employeurs, et une fonction décroissante de l’écart des durées de
chômage espérées ainsi que du taux d’escompte personnel.
Nous confrontons ensuite le modèle théorique aux données d’un échantillon de 1,607
diplômés universitaires tiré de l’enquête marocaine sur la population active de 199$. Dans
cette application le secteur public est celui qui paie les salaires élevés. Le Maroc constitue,
en effet, un cas idoine pour tester notre modèle. En 2000, le taux de chômage parmi les
travailleurs éduqués au Maroc (tous niveaux confondus) était de 27.5% contre 7.1%
seulement parmi les travailleurs non éduqués. Depuis 19$3, année de mise en place du
programme d’ajustement structurel, le nombre de nouveaux postes d’emploi dans la
fonction publique a été ramené à moins de 15000 par année contre 30000 à 51000 entre
1976 et 19$2. Toutefois, le secteur public reste toujours très convoité par les diplômés
universitaire comme en témoignent leurs manifestations presque quotidiennes réclamant ce
qu’ils pensent être leur droit à l’emploi dans le secteur public.
Pour l’application empirique, nous élaborons un modèle structurel dans lequel nous
estimons simultanément l’équation de sélection qui représente la décision de travailler (ou
de chercher un emploi) dans le secteur public versus secteur privé, l’équation de salaire et
la durée du chômage dans chaque secteur. Les résultats empiriques principaux sont que le
taux d’escompte intertemporel des individus est de l’ordre de 15% et que l’écart salarial
public-privé est substantiel (plus de $0%). De plus, les travailleurs sont peu sensibles aux
écarts de salaire et de durée de chômage. En effet, il ressort que même si les deux secteurs
paient le même niveau de salaires, les travailleurs continueront de préférer l’emploi dans le
secteur public. Les travailleurs mettent plus de poids sur les facteurs non pécuniaires.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous analysons de manière détaillée la situation sur le marché
de l’emploi au Maroc. En 2000, le taux de chômage parmi les diplômés de l’enseignement
supérieur dépassait 30% (plus de 40% parmi les détenteurs d’une licence universitaire).
Cette situation survient alors que ces diplômés représentent seulement 10% de la force de
travail au Maroc et qu’un travailleur sur deux n’a jamais fréquenté l’école.
Plusieurs facteurs expliquent l’abondance du chômage au Maroc et dans les PVD. Les plus
communément évoqués sont liés à l’accroissement démographique et à la faible
performance de l’économie. Dans le cas des diplômés, d’autres facteurs s’ajoutent tels que
3l’augmentation rapide du nombre dc diplômés, l’inadéquation entre l’éducation et l’emploi,
et surtout la réduction de l’emploi dans le secteur public. Concernant ce dernier facteur, la
part des diplômés de l’enseignement supérieur dans la population urbaine en chômage au
Maroc a commencé à augmenter immédiatement après la mise en oeuvre du programme
d’ajustement structurel en 1983. Ainsi, cette part est passée de 3,1% en 1984 à 23,2% en
1997. Cependant, en dépit de la réduction considérable de l’emploi dans le secteur public,
les diplômés continuent de convoiter l’emploi dans ce secteur, ce qui n’arrange pas leur
situation. En effet, certains travailleurs préfèrent demeurer en chômage en attente d’un
emploi dans le secteur public au lieu d’en chercher dans le secteur privé. La préférence
pour l’emploi dans le secteur public est si grande que Bougroum, Ibourk et Trachen (1999)
considèrent tous les diplômés au Maroc comme demandeurs potentiels et permanents d’un
emploi dans le secteur public.
Nous analysons également les politiques d’emploi poursuivies par le gouvernement
marocain au cours des trois dernières décennies et montrons comment ces politiques ont
contribué au comportement des diplômés en matière de recherche d’emploi.
Ç Nous formulons ensuite des propositions visant à intéresser les diplômés à l’emploi dans le
secteur privé comme solution à leur chômage. Il s’agit en premier lieu d’améliorer les
opportunités d’emploi dans ce secteur pour les diplômés aussi bien quantitativement que
qualitativement. Ceci requiert un niveau de croissance économique élevé qui soit
générateur d’emploi dans le secteur privé formel. La croissance économique sera
davantage favorisée si les diplômés s’insèrent massivement dans le secteur privé. Le
secteur public a été pendant longtemps le seul employeur des diplômés universitaires qui,
de ce fait, s’engagent massivement dans des emplois non productifs. Par conséquent, le
taux de rendement à l’éducation est élevé pour les individus mais, en même temps, la
contribution de l’éducation à la croissance économique est très faible (Orivel, 1995).
Nous suggérons également que les politiques actuelles de recrutement et de rémunération
dans le secteur public soient réformées. La satisfaction des besoins réels du secteur public
en travail, en quantité et en qualité, devra graduellement remplacer la politique actuelle
dont l’objectif principal est la lutte contre le chômage.
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4Nous traitons également le problème de l’éducation au Maroc. Le faible investissement en
capital humain (un adulte sur deux est analphabète) limite le développement socio
économique durable du pays. Or, l’investissement en capital humain stimule la croissance
économique et par conséquent l’emploi, ce qui favorise, en retour, l’investissement en
capital humain (Cahuc et Zylberberg, 1996). De plus, l’amélioration du niveau d’éducation
de la population contribuera à réduire la part du secteur informel dans l’économie en
faveur du secteur organisé offrant des emplois décents au niveau des aspirations des
diplômés.
Dans le dernier chapitre nous étudions les déterminants du choix de filière d’études au
Canada. Plusieurs études confirment l’importance des facteurs monétaires dans ce choix
(Wilkinson, 1966; Weiss, 1971; Polachek, 197$; Berger, 19$8; Paglin & Rufolo, 1990; et
Montmarquette, Cannings et Mahseredjian, 2002). Cependant, ces études ignorent souvent
l’effet du risque de chômage associé à chaque filière dans le choix en question. L’étude de
Finnie (1999b) montre que le taux de chômage parmi les diplômés des universités
canadiennes varie grandement d’une filière d’études à l’autre, ce qui, à notre avis, ne
manquerait pas d’affecter le choix des étudiants.
D’autre part, nous constatons que la majorité des études sur le choix de filière d’études en
Amérique du Nord utilisent des données américaines, alors que les études utilisant des
données canadiennes sont souvent descriptives et/ou ignorent le biais de sélection associé
au choix de filière (Wilkinson, 1966; Dodge et Stager, 1972; Vaillancourt, 1995; et Finnie,
l999b). Finnie (1999b) fournit une étude empirique détaillée sur la situation des diplômés
canadiens sur le marché de l’emploi par filière d’études, mais il reconnaît que ses résultats
ne peuvent servir pour élaborer des politiques. En effet, l’étude ne tient pas compte du
processus de choix de filières d’études par les étudiants.
Par conséquent, le principal objectif de ce chapitre est d’utiliser des données canadiennes
pour analyser les déterminants du choix de filière d’études. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons les
mêmes outils du premier chapitre pour développer un modèle endogène de choix de filière
d’études. Dans ce modèle, les principaux déterminants du choix sont le revenu et la durée
de chômage espérés après la graduation ainsi que le taux d’escompte personnel.
5Pour l’application empirique, nous utilisons des données de l’enquête nationale canadienne
auprès des diplômés. L’échantillon est constitué de 15124 individus ayant réussi leur
programme d’études dans un collège communautaire canadien (CEGEP au Québec) en
1990 et 1995. Notre analyse inclut également une variété de variables socio-économiques
susceptibles d’influencer le choix des étudiants.
L’utilisation des cohortes 1900 et 1995 permet d’évaluer l’effet des évolutions qu’ont
connues certains secteurs d’activité pendant la période séparant les deux cohortes. Par
exemple, les dépenses publiques dans les services sociaux (incluant le secteur de la santé)
ont significativement baissé, alors que les nouveaux secteurs technologiques (incluant le
secteur de la biotecimologie) ont connu un essor important. Ces chocs sont très utiles pour
l’identification des effets du revenu et du chômage sur le choix de filière d’études.
Empiriquement, l’équation de sélection est estimée en quatre étapes. Les équations de
salaire corrigées du biais de sélection sont estimées en utilisant la nouvelle méthode
proposée par Bourguignon, Foumier et Gurgand (2001). Cependant, les paramètres estimés
de l’équation de sélection restent comparables lorsque les salaires sont estimés à l’aide de
la méthode proposée par Lee (1983). Les résultats indiquent que le revenu et la durée de
chômage espérés dans chaque filière d’études ont un effet significatif sur la probabilité de
choisir cette filière. Les probabilités de choisir la filière «Affaires et Commerce» ou la
filière «Sciences» sont les plus sensibles aux variations du revenu. A l’opposé, la
probabilité de choisir la filière « Sciences Sociales » est celle qui dépend moins de ces
variations. Nous trouvons également que les femmes mettent moins de poids sur le revenu
et la durée de chômage comparativement aux hommes. Ce résultat concorde avec celui des
études précédentes (voir par exemple, Montmarquette, Cannings et Mahseredjian, 2002).
Enfin, il ressort des résultats que les personnes qui détenaient un emploi avant de
commencer leurs études au collège favorisent le revenu et se soucient moins du chômage
après la graduation lorsqu’elles choisissent leur filière d’études. Cependant, nos résultats
montrent que les probabilités de choix associées à chaque filière d’études sont
généralement inélastiques relativement au revenu et à la durée de chômage, ce qui limite
l’efficacité de toute politique visant à modifier significativement la distribution actuelle des
diplômés sur les filières en se basant sur des ajustements du revenu et/ou de la durée de
chômage. Enfin, il ressort que d’autres facteurs sont également déterminants dans les choix
des étudiants.
Chapitre 1
Employment Sector Choice in a Developing
Labour Market
1.1 Introduction
Many developing counfries, particularly in Africa, have expencnced a significant rise in
unemployment among educated workers, principally among holders of university degrees.
This worsening unemployment problem appears to be linked to a slowdown ofrecruitment
in the public sector, the principal employer for educated workers in developing countries.
In Morocco, for example, the unemployment rate among educated workers in 2000 was
27.5%, as opposed to 7.1% among non-educated workers. This detenoration in
employment rates is particularly important for workers with Bachelor’ s degrees, for whom
the unemployment rate is currently above 40%. Under structural adjustment policies
imposed by the International Monetary fund, recruitment in the public sector has dropped
sharply since 1983. New employment positions created in recent years do not exceed more
than 15,000 annually, as opposed to between 29,000 and 51,000 in the 1970s. However,
the public sector is stiil coveted by workers, particularly those holding university degrees,
as evidenced by their almost daily demonstrations claiming their “right” to employment in
the public sector. Data from the 1998 Moroccan urban labour force survey show that about
haif of highly educated unemployed workers desire employment exclusively in the public
sector. In addition to job stability, the public sector generally offers higher wages as
compared to the private sector. This suggests that the unemployment of educated workers
could be an equilibrium since some workers rationally prefer to remain unemployed while
waiting for employment in the public sector. A similar argument was advanced by Harris
7and Todaro (1970) to explain high urban unemployment in developing countries. Because
of a substantial wage differential between urban and rural areas, some rural workers choose
to migrate to urban areas in search of high-wage employment. However, the number of
migrants often exceeds the number of vacant employment positions in urban areas,
resulting in a positive urban unemployment rate. The continuation of such migration in
spite of high risk of unemployment constitutes a rational choice on the part of migrants
looking to improve their economic situation. Yet this explanation for rising unemployment
has not been tested formally for developing countries.
In order to test this hypothesis, we develop a model of sectoral choice in an intertemporal
context for a two-sector economy, where sectors pay different levels of wages (see Section
1.3.1). Workers are exposed to unemployment in the two sectors (with high-wage sector
being more exposed to unemployment than the low-wage sector), and choose their sector
by maximizing the present value of their expected lifetime income. We then show that
unemployment while waiting for employment in the high-wage sector is an increasing
function of the wage differential between sectors, a decreasing function of the expected
gap in unemployment durations and a decreasing function of the individual discount rate.
The main outcome of the model is the conclusion that when the wage differential is
substantial and/or the individual discount rate is low, some workers rationally choose to
remain unemployed instead of accepting employment in the low-wage sector.
hi order to evaluate the mode! empirically, we use data from a sample of 1,609 university
graduates drawn from the 1998 Moroccan labour force survey (see Section 1.4), where the
high-wage sector is the public sector and the low-wage sector is the private sector. We
consider a structural model estimating simultaneously (1) the decision to work (or to seek
employment) in the public versus private sector, (2) the wage equation in each sector, and
(3) the unemployment duration equation in each sector (see Section 1.3.2).
The main empirical resuits of this study are that the individual intertemporal discount rate
is about 15%, and that the public sector pays high hourly wages (over 80% than the private
sector). Our results also indicate that the probabilily of preferring employment in the public
sector is not very sensitive to wages and unemployment durations variations, which
suggests that any policy aimed at modifying significantly the workers’ behaviour will
require extreme changes in those variables. As a result, workers would prefer employment
8in thc public sector (for non-pecuniary reasons) even if this sector paid the same as the
private sector and despite the high risk of unemployment in this sector.
1.2 Brief Survey of Literature on Sector Choice
The analysis of workers’ behaviour in the labour market has constituted the subject of an
abundant body of literature seeldng to explain phenomena such as unemployment. Several
models have been developed, ofwhich the best known is that ofHarris and Todaro (1970).
The Hams-Todaro model focuses on the wage gap between areas as responsible for
migration in less developed countries which resuits in high level of urban unemployment.
More precisely, according to this model, in rural areas the economy is based on the
agricultural sector offering free access to employment but paying low wages, while in
urban areas the manufacturing sector pays higher wages but is limited in its employment
capacity. Migration from rural to urban areas is caused by the wage gap, as many rural
workers seek to improve their economic situation and move to urban areas, but the number
of migrants exceeds the number of vacant positions in urban areas, creating a positive
C urban unemployment rate. Thus, the decision to migrate depends on the wage gap and the
probability of finding employment in urban areas. The employment rate in urban areas acts
as a force of equilibrium in this migration, halting it when the expected wage in urban
areas is equal to the wage in rural areas. When the equilibrium is reachcd migration stops.
Howevcr, certain workers who had already migrated to urban areas remain unemployed,
whereas they could have been employed in rural areas if they had stayed there. The
existence of such migration in spite of a high urban unemployment rate constitutes a
rational economic choice on the part of migrants looking to improve their welfare. Workers
are thus “voluntarily unemployed.
In subsequent models the urban sector is segmented into a protected modem sector, where
wages are institutionally fixed above the market level and which is characterized by
entrance restrictions, and a non-organized (traditional) sector, to which access is free and
where wages are determined by the market (see for example Stiglitz, 1974 and 1976; Eaton
& Neher, 1975; Fields, 1975 and Cole & Sanders, 1985). The same factors explaining the
allocation of the labour force between urban and rural areas in the Harris and Todaro
model explain the workers’ choice of employment in the fraditional sector or
9unemployment during the search for employment in the protected sector. Moreover, fixing
wages at levels significantly higher than those dictated by the market involves equilibrium
with a high urban unemployment rate. Additionally, Stiglitz (1974) treats urban wages as
an endogenous variable. However, his conclusions are the same as those of Harris and
Todaro. Migration resuits mainly from a significant wage differential and not from a
surplus of labour in rural areas. Stiglitz also suggests the role that the govemment could
play in reducing this migration and consequently urban unemployment. The govemment,
for example, could directly control the size of the public sector localized mainly in urban
areas as wclI as the wages in this sector and in urban areas in general, thus maldng the
public sector and urban areas less attractive for rural workers. In a mixed economy (public
private), the govemment could adapt the size of the public sector in urban and rural areas,
its technology (intensity of labour), and the level of wages to reduce the expected urban
wages for rural workers.
The principal conclusion of the above-mentioned models conceming the causes of
unemployment is weIl summarized by Eaton and Neher (1975): “The unemptoyed have
Q ‘onÏy themselves to bÏame,’ so to speak, in the sense that they have made a rational
— calcuÏation to improve their econoinic position. They are voluntariÏy ttnemployed.
There have been developed other models, known as job-search models. They generally
concentrate on the process of acceptance of employment by workers. Some job seekers
(employed or unemployed) reject some job offers before finally accepting employment
(see for example Blau (1992) in the case ofthe United States). Workers generally know the
wage distribution for their ability level when they receive employment offers. An offer is
accepted when the wage is higher than the reserve wage. Thus, at any given moment, the
probability of being employed is equal to the probability of receiving an offer times the
probability of accepting this offer (i.e. the related wage is higher than the reserve wage). In
general, high-wage jobs are less accessible, so workers with high reseiwe wages are likely
to remain unemployed for a long time. However, they are generally rewarded by high
wages (see for example Bames, 1975; Maani & Studenmund, 1986, and Sandell, 1980, for
empirical applications.)
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( Altematively, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) have proposed the theory of efficient wages
according to which some firms pay higher wages as compared to wages of the market in
order to encourage greater effort from their workers. This policy, which also aims at
retaining or attracting skilled workers, is more likely to be observed when other methods of
productivity improvement - such as supervision and monitoring of workers - are expensive
or inefficient. This policy involves a slowdown in the labour demand and an increase in the
labour supply, and thus the appearance of involuntaiy unemployment. Job loss becomes
costly for workers paid at efficient wages since their wages are higher as compared to those
of the market. Moreover, these workers face unemployment risks if they are laid off. The
higher the unemployment rate, the longer the duration of the job search and, consequently,
the higher the cost of shirking. The labour market is then segmented into a primary sector
which pays high wages and a secondary sector which pays Iow wages. This situation is
similar to that represented in the Harris-Todaro model. Some workers prefer seeking or
waiting for employment in the primary sector rather than working in the secondary
industries. Workers’ behaviour will depend on the wage gap between the primary and the
secondai-y sectors as weIl as the probability of finding employment in each sector.
Lastly, many authors were particularly interested in the choice between the public sector
and the pnvate sector for employment. The public sector constitutes an important employer
in all counfries, developed or developing. Its share in the total employment is
approximately 21% in the OECD countries and 23% in the developing countries (TLO,
1999) and its wages are, on average, higher as compared to those of the private sector. This
corresponds to what is commonly known as the ‘twage premium’ of the public sector (see
for example Smith, l976a and 1982; Gunderson, 1979; Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988; Gelb,
Knight and Sabot, 1991; and Gunderson, Hyatt and Riddell, 2000). This premium is more
significant in developing countries whcre the informai sector is important and is more
profitable for women and less qualified workers (Gunderson, Hyatt and Riddell, 2000, and
Orivel, 1995). In order to explain why the public sector pays high wages, Gunderson, Hyatt
and Riddell (2000) argue that the govemment is under political pressure to act as an
exemplary employer, at least with regard to compensation. Thus, the surplus of labour
supply in the public sector is often seen as a consequence of the search for high wages
(Gelb, Knight and Sabot, 1991); however other studies suggest that non-pecuniaiy factors
also play a significant role in this case (Blank, 1985; Gaag and Vijverberg, 198$; Smith,
1976b; Ophem, 1993; and Stelcner, Graag and Vijverbeg, 1989). Employment in the public
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sector is generalÏy desired for its stability, which attracts risk-adverse workers (Bellante
and Link, 1981). Thus, equal wages in public and pnvate sectors wilI flot necessarily
reduce the excess of labour supply for the public sector.
1.3 Endogenous Sector Choice Mode!
1.3.1 Theoretical Framework
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the schooling level of workers to be exogenous (i.e.
the schooling choice is independent of the sector choice). We also assume that workers
have an infinite planning horizon starting when they enter the labour force. The utility level
in penod t depends on consumption c(t) during this period. This utility is equal to
where u(.) is an increasing concave function. For ease of exposition, and with
application in Section 4 in mi, we assume that there are only two employment sectors,
sector 1 and sector 2. The discounted lifetime income in sectorj, is equal to W , j],2.
The discounted lifetime utility conditional on a given consumption profile is:
U(c(t)) ru(c(t))e’dt (1)
where p is the worker’ s subjective discount rate.
We assume that a worker can borrow or lend frecly at a fixed interest rate R ‘. Hence, the
intertemporal budget constraint conditional on employment in sectorj is:
fc(t)e_Rtdt=wj. (2)
Thus, conditional on employment in sectorj, the optimal consumption path maximizes:
H(c(t),j) = U(c(t))+[ - f c(t)e tdtl (3)
‘The equivalent of this assumption for some workers in a developing country would be that these
workers are sponsored by their families during their unemployment spell. Once employed, workers
in remm help their families.
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Assuming that u(c(t)) Ïn(c(t)), and p = R , first order conditions imply that the
optimal consumption path is e * (t) = RJJ’,.. At each period t, the worker consumes a
constant share of his or lier discounted lifetime income. Consequently, optimal utility at
each period t is constant as well: u * (c(t)) =Ïn(W)_ln(R).
Since R is fixed, maximizing u(c(t)) amounts to maximizing w = Ïn(W). Therefore, a
worker will prefer employment in the high-discounted-lifetime income sector.
In order to determine w, we suppose that workers are exposed to unemployment risks in
each sector. The unemployment duration in each sector is a random variable of which the
density function is well known for ail workers. We also suppose that there is no income
during the unemployment phase, and that the job search process is costless. Thus, for a
worker with S units of schooling (S O) and seeking employment in sector j, j = 1,2,
the log of the discounted lifetime income is given by:
w=ln(W) = ln[ f. (S,t _)etdt1
I) O is the length of unemployment prior to finding employment in sector j, j=1,2.
Y(S,t) is the real wage paid by sector j to a worker having completed S units of
schooling and possessing t units ofexperience (t O). R is the worker’s discount rate.
Since the unemployment duration T is random, w is random as well. The expected value
for w isgivenby:
E(wj)__EÏn[Yj(S,t_Tj)etdt 2
The worker wiii prefer employment in the sector which maximizes lis or lier expected
lifetime income. Thus, lie or she will prefer employment in sector j if
2 this case, the expected utility at period t is E(u(’t»=E(w,)+ln(R,).
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E(w)=inax{E(w1),E(w,)} ,jJ,2. He or she will be indifferent to employment sector
if the same level oflifetime income is expected in both sectors.
We should mention that the worker’s decision depends only on the unemployment
durations and wage levels in the two sectors. Other factors such as job stability,
monitoring, social advantages, etc. are ignored.3
Sector choice as presented is done at the time of entry into the labour force. However, the
chances of finding a job could depend on the duration of time spent unemployed. Indeed, if
the hazard rate increases over time, the chances of finding employment increase with the
duration of time spent unemployed, which is not the case if that rate decreases over time.
Thus, the duration of unemployment pnor to funding employment could be decreasing or
increasing (for example, it could be decreasing in one sector and increasing in the other
one). Unemployment could also cause a depreciation of human capital, which would lead
employers to prefer recruiting first among recent graduates. This would make it difficult
for long-term unemployed workers to find employment. Thus, at any time t, when the
worker is stili unemployed the discounted lifetime income is re-calculated in relation to the
duration of time spent unemployed. If at time t (t O) the worker is stiil unemployed, the
expected log of this discounted lifetime income for the remainder of his or lier life cycle
when seeking employment in sector!, j],2, up-dated at time t0 is:
(4)
with E(w)=E(w i >o).
We define an intertemporal function V (t) representing the expected-discounted lifetime
income differential between the two sectors:
V(t)rrE(wj]>t)_E(w,IT. >t), tO (5)
However, in the econometric model estimated later, we control for the education leve and gender
and introduce a random term likely to collect the non-observed variables.
‘ Under the assumptions we formulate later in the paper, we can show that the expected discounted
lifetime income gap between the two sectors is independent on the tirne this gap is up-dated.
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This function expresses the dynamics of the worker’s preference. At any time t, the
worker’s decision is to prefer employment in sector 1 if V(t)> O, and in sector 2
otherwise. He or she will be indifferent if V(t) = O.
Tri order to model the worker’s behaviour in a more explicit way, we make the additional
following assumptions.
Assumption 1: In addition to being exogenous, the worker’s schooling level remains
constant during the life cycle. There is no possible retum to school after entering the labour
force. This condition appears to be restrictive, but facts show that few people retum to
school after dropping ont; even if they do, they remain in school for a short period of time
(Card and Lemieux, 2000b). In addition, in Section 1.4 we restrict our empirical
application to university graduates, who ai-e relatively less likely to go back to school after
entering the labour force as compared to other workers with below university level.
Assumptîon 2: Once hired, the worker keeps his or herjob for the remainder ofhis or her
tE’ life cycle. There is no risk of layoffs in this case. We also assume that workers cannot take
a low-wage job whule seeking employment in the high-wage sector. This assumption
matches the situation of the Moroccan labour market, where employment in the public
sector (high-wage sector) mainly aims at reducing unemployment among educated
workers. In addition, major operations of recruitment in the public sector are often
preceded by censuses of unemployed graduates. Consequently, unemployed workers
looking for their first jobs are more likely to be hired as compared to workers who already
have a job in the private sector. This is, therefore, about an institutional constraint.
Assumption 3: The log of wages is an additive and separable function of education and
years of experience in each sector:
Y,(S,t)=f(S)ïz1(t) j=1,2,tO, h.(o)=1 (6)
So: y (S,t) ln(Yj (S,t)) = ln(f (s)) + ln(Ïi (t)).
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Assumption 4: Wages grow at a constant rate O: h1 (t) = e’, t O. In order to ensure
that the 10g of discounted lifetime income is finite, we impose g. <R.
Under these assumptions, the expected 10g of the discounted lifetime income in sector j,
j=1,2, simplifies to:
(f.(s)EtWiI1;>t)=inJ_gjJ_R.E(TJTi>t) (7)
The quanti in [ fJ(S) = in y (S, t)e_Rt dt is the log of the discounted lifetime
income in sector j when the worker does flot experience unemployment, i.e. when access
to employment is ensured for ail workers seeking employment in this sector (T = O).
Therefore, the quantity R.E(TJ i > t) O represents the expected loss in the log of the
C discounted income due to unemployment. This loss increases with the discount rate and the
duration of time spent unemployed ( R.E (T T > t) / R O and
aE(I i >t)/8tO).
The discount rate plays a significant role, since it represents the weight allocated by
workers to the unemployment factor. Indeed, for a worker with a high-discount rate, the
discounted lifetime income drops quickly as the unemployment duration increases. Then,
the worker’s first concem will be minimizing this loss while maldng haste to find
employment. On the other hand, for a low-discount rate worker, starting date of
employment does not maffer much, since his or her expected lifetime income is only
slightly affected by it. The worker could wait until he or she finds high-paid employment.
In the same way, by regarding R as the interest rate, the above resuits imply that workers
with easy access to credit (or from affluent families) can endure long periods ofjob search
and can hold out for high-paying employment. On the other hand, those who cannot get
financial help have no choice but to acccpt any job, regardless of remuneration.
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The expected log of discounted lifetime income differential between sector 1 and sector 2
at time t, given by the function v(t), becomes:
V(t)=ln1tn2t8R[E(TJ T >t)-E(T T? >t)1
= ln[ -ln1-R[E(Tj T >t)-E(T2 T2 >t)](8)
The discount rate allows workers to arbitrate between well-paying employment with
possible longer unemployment duration and low-paid employment with possible shorter
unemployment duration.
Some important remarks should be formulated at this point.
Remark 1: The worker can make a choice between (or have a preference for) the two
sectors only if his or her probability of finding employment in each sector is higher than
nu. In other words, if a worker lias no chance to be hired in one or both sectors, there is no
choice to be made. Jndeed, if the probability of finding employment in sectorj is equal to
zero, the unemployment duration T is infinite, and consequently the discounted lifetime
income IJ’ is simply equal to zero. Sector choice is thus allowed only for workers who are
potentially ‘employable’ in both sectors.
Remark 2: Although the expected discounted lifetime income differential V(t) depends
on the personal discount rate, this rate affects the worker’s preference (or more precisely
the sign of V(t)) only if the high-wage sector is that which is more exposed to
(f1(S) (f2(S)
unemployment of the two. This occurs when in I I — in I and
R—gj) R—g2J
[E(1 i > r) — E(T, T, > t)] have the same sign. In the case where the high-wage
sector is that in which the access to employment is easier than in the low-wage sector, the
worker will always prefer employment in this sector, whatever the value of bis or her
(j1(s) (f2(S)discount rate. Indeed, if mi I> titi — and at the same time
R—gjJ 1R—g7J
E(I I i > t) < E(T, T, > t), then V(t)> O for any value of the discount rate R.
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The following remarks are minor, but deserve to be mentioned.
Remark 3: Unemployment has no effect on sector choice if a worker’s discount rate is
equal to zero. In this case, the worker seeks high-paying employment for any
unemployment duration. Ail future incomes have the same present value regardless oftime
when they are received.
Remark 4: Unemployment bas no effect on sector choice if the distribution of
unemployment duration is the same in both sectors. In this case, sector choice is
determined by the wage differential, regardless of the value ofthe discount rate.5
Taking into account these remarks, we assume that a worker is potentially ‘employable” in
both sectors, and remuneration in sector 1 is better; however, sector I is more exposed to
unemployment than sector 2. This is included in the following additional assumptions:
Assumption 5: 0 <T <co ,j=],2.
(f1(s) (f2(S)
Assumption 6: in I I > in -
R-gj) R-g,
These two assumptions make it possible for the function V(t) to take positive as well as
negative values, according to t and the personal discount rate value.
Since the second term of V(t), that is [E(T1 I 1 > t) — T. > t)], depends on t, the
worker’s preferred sector could change over time. In the example when the variables 1
and T, have exponential density functions, the worker will, however, prefer employment
in the same sector during his or lier entire unemployment speil.
In this case, we have E(TI)TI >!)—E(T,IT, >t)= O, and therefore
R-gj) R-g7
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C Indeed, if ) >0, j1,2, then E( >t)=±+t, and
I > t)— E(T, T, > t) =1_1. V(t) is constant, since it does flot depend on t.
R is important to discuss the relationship between sectoral preference and job search. In the
Hams-Todaro model (Harns and Todaro, 1970) this relationship is obvious since the two
employment sectors are located in different geographical areas. Rural workers who prefer a
job in urban areas must move to those areas to seek employment. In other words, workers
can seek employment in one and only one sector at any one time, depending on their
physical location. In our model, the situation is different (and also more complicated) since
the two employment sectors could be located in the same area. If we assume that workers
seek employment only in the sector they prefer, this will greatly simplify the situation since
the sector where a worker seeks employment will be exactly the preferred one. This also
means that for employed workers, the current employment sector is that one they preferred
prior to employment (i.e. while unemployed). 6 In such a context, we construct the
empirical model presented in Section 1.3.2 with some adjustments to take into account
C some specificities of the labour market in Morocco, where the public sector is sfrongly
coveted by all unemployed workers. Indeed, given the huge wage gap between the public
and private sectors as well as the institutional constraint mentioned in the assumption 2
above (workers who accept employment in the private sector may flot be eligible to
employment in the public sector), we assume that workers preferring employment in the
public sector seek employment in that sector only. On the contrary, workers preferring
employment in the private sector will focus their search on this sector, but they will also
neyer miss an occasion of finding employment in the public sector. They will thus
constantly keep an eye on this sector as well.
Now, let us suppose that instead of searching for employment opportunities, workers
receive job offers from the two sectors, including from the one that they do flot prefer. If at
a moment t of the unemployment spell, the worker reccives an offer from sector j, the
unemployment duration for this sector becomes known (i.e. not random any more, T = t).
The lifetime income in this sector becomes determined, and the value of the function V(t)
6 Altematively, we could suppose that workers focus their job search on the sector they prefer and,
consequently, are more likely to find jobs in this sector and less in the opposite sector.
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is modified. In ail, one of the four following situations can arise at any moment t while the
worker is stili unemployed:
• The worker does flot receive any offer of employment. In this case, the mode of
calculation of V(t) does not change.
• The worker receives an offer of employment ony from sector 1. Thus ] t, T, > t
(j1(s) (f7(S)
and V(t) =Ïnj —lnj
—R[t—E(T? j T >iR—gjj iR—g7}
In fact, when the offer emanates from sector 1, unemployment does flot have any effect on
sector choice. The worker will not hesitate to accept the offer since it maximizes his or her
((sfl (f2(S)discounted lifetime mcome (liii i> mi i).(R—gjJ R—g2J
• The worker receives an offer only from sector 2. Thus, T1 > t, T, = t and
vQ)=mn[h1-ln[-R[E(T](T]>t)-t].
• The worker receives an offer of employment from both sectors at the same time. Thus,
(f1(s) (j2(s)
1 =1’, =t and V(t)=lnj 1>0.
R—gj) R—g,)
The worker will prefer employment in sector 1 when the sign of V(t) is positive.
Otherwise, lie or she will prefer employment in sector 2.
We can thus derive some important resuits relating to worker’ s behaviour during his or her
unemployment speli.
Result 1: At any moment during unemployment, if a worker receives an offer from the
preferred sector solely, lie or she will certainly accept the offer. However, if lie receives
offers from both sectors at the same time, he or she will prefer employment in sector 1
even if he or slie would prefer sector 2 to unemployment.
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Indeed, let us suppose that at the moment t the worker prefers sector 2:
V(t)=in’-Ïn-R[E(TJT1>t)-E(TT2>t)1<O.
If at this same moment, the worker receives an offer of employment only in sector 2, then
he or she will accept it, since
V(t) Ïn _in[f2_R[E(Ti I Tj >t)—tl <O. This rises from:
E(T2 1T2 >t)>t.
If the worker receives offers of employment from both sectors at the same time, he or she
will choose employment in sector 1 even if he or she previously preferred sector 2
(V (t) = in [ — in [ 2 > O). This implies resuit 2 below.R-gj R-g7
Result 2: The worker will neyer refuse employment in sector Ï even if he or she does notQ prefer it when unemployed. The worker’s objective is aiways to maximize his or her
lifetime income.
Resuit 3: A worker who prefers employment in sector 1 could accept an offer of
employment in sector 2. Indeed, since the worker prefers sector 1, we have V(t)> 0. If the
job offer emanates from sectot 2, it will be acceptcd only if
V(t)in1_in2_R[E(TJ Tj >t)_t]<O. This occurs when
R[E(Tj T >t)-E(T2 T2 >t)1<Ïn[ in<R[E(T] Tj >t)-tl.
In this case the expected unemployment duration in sector 1 is too high as compared to the
income advantage in this sector.
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Resuit 4: A worker who at time t prefers employment in sector 1 could rationally prefer
unemployment to accepting employment in sector 2. This happens when
(j1(s) (j2(s)
in
R gj
— in
R g2
> R [E (Tj T1 > t) — t , i.e. when the log of discounted
income differential is very high, when the worker’ s discount rate is very low, or when the
worker expects to find employment in sector 1 soon. The worker can thus lengthen lis or
lier unemployment duration in hopes of finding a high-wage job. This is a rational choice
resulting in voluntary unemployment.
These resuits can be illusfrated using as example log-normal distributions for the
unemployment durations: 1 LN(6, 1.2) and T, LN(2, 1). figure 1.1 depicts the
functions [E(T1 1 > t)— E(T, T, > t)] and [E(T1 T1 > t)—tl. By defining the
lntln2
R-g1) R-g2
quantity A = , a worker prefers employment in sector 1 each
time A > [E(] 1 > t) — E(T, i > t)] and refuses employment in sector 2 cadi time
A>[E(1 i >t)—t].
In figure 1.1, workers witli A < A1 , aiways prefer sector 2 and will aiways accept
employment in this sector as long as they do not receive any offer from sector 1. On the
other hand, workers for whom <A <A 2’ initially prefer employment in sector 2,
followed by employment in sector 1. They prefer employment in sector 2 later as well, and
they will aiways accept an offer from sector 2 as long as they do flot receive any offer from
sector 1. Workers satisfying A > A3 start by preferring employment in sector 1, and it is
only afler a long period of unemployment that they prefer employment in sector 2. In the
same way, those whose A > A4 accept employment in sector 2 only after having spent a
long time seeking employment in sector 1 without success.
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1.3.2 Econometric Specifications
The theoretical model presented above is used to specifi the selection equation making it
possible to assign workers to the two employment sectors. This equation involves wages
and unemployment duration equations. We start by presenting ail these equations and late
develop the first one.
a. Wagc equatÏons:
We retain thc standard “Mincerian” equation for 10g of wages:
y=Xfi+8,j],2 (9)
y is the log of the hourly wage in sector j, X is a vector of covariates (education level,
experience, expenence square, sex, etc.), and is a random component. We should
mention that for the sake of simplification we have ignored the experience quadratic term
in the theoretical model, which means that 10g of wages were assumed to increase
(linearly) with years of experience. This is not the case in reality, since wages tend to
increase with years of experience at a deceasing rate. However, the discounted lifetime
income is mainly determined by income during first years of employment (i.e. when wages
are on the increase). Thus, the log linear relation between wages and experience assumed
in the theoretical model should not significantly affect the calculation of the discounted
lifetime income.
Estimating wage equation without taking into account the possible endogenous nature of
sector choice would produce biased results. We take to be the starting wage, i.e. when
the worker does not have any work experience:
y =X°fi+s,j=],2 (10)
X° = X I exp erience = O.
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Finally, we assume that N(o,), where: I
=[
p is the correlation coefficient between e, and E,.
b. Duration equations:
Let J represent the unemployment duration in sector j, jj (t) its density function and
S. (t) = Pr(T > t) its survival function. We assume that T, and T, have lognormal
distributions (i.e. TLN(p1,7rfl ). li this case we have:
ln(t)-p
t>o, S](t)l_[ht, t>O
o
E(Tj)e 2 and ,t>O
(cf Appendix 1.1)
çt5 and (I) are the standard normal density and distribution functions respectively. We
control for observed heterogeneity by assuming that in each sector, p is a linear function
of some observed characteristics: p1 = + % is a constant and H is a vector of
observed characteristics, while is the corresponding vector of coefficients.
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we adopt the non-paramefric method
suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984) by supposing this heterogeneity to be a discrete
random variable. For the sake of simplicity, we consider only two supporting (mass) points
forthisvariable: %e{%11 , %,}, Pr(%j)=p=]_Fr(%7), Opl.
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Let C. 5e a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the unemployment episode is
completed (uncensored observations) and the value O otherwise (censored observations).
When the selection bias due to the sector choice is ignored, the parameters %jj
,
p, ço and are estimated separately for each sectorj by maximizing the likelihood:
L1 =%) [p1s(tI% =%,)+(]_p)S (t% _2)](lC)
Finally, we assume that ] and T, are mutually independent, and are independent of
e and e, (random terms in the wage equations).
c. Selection equation:
As a worker’s preference could change over time during the unemployment phase, the
theoretical model presented above is dynamic. Thus, the same worker can be observed at
different times, each time expressing preference for one of the two employment sectors.
The empirical model would thus be useful for the freatment of panel data. However, it
should 5e mentioned that workers are observed only when they are unemployed. The last
possible point of observation for a worker is when he or she accepts an offer of
employment. ‘ Consequently, the sample is not necessarily balanced (the number of
observations is not necessarily the same for all workers.)
Let V’ (t) be the level of indirect utility corresponding to employment in sectorj at time t,
expressed as a linear relation ofthe log ofthe discounted lifetime income in this sector w,
the expected unemployment duration E(]) I TJ > t, Z), a vector of observed individual
characteristics Z (including a constant) and an unobserved random term rj:
(11)
The model can be generalized to take account of preferences while employed. Indeed, an
employed worker could re-evaluate his or her preference at any time by taking into account his or
her acquired experience, for example.
8 See Dolton, Makepeace and Klaauw (1989) for a similar approach. They estimate an occupational
choice model where the indirect utility from each alternative depends on the log of the expected
lifetime income.
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The coefficients a and 5 are assumed to be the same for both sectors. We expect a
positive sign for a and a negative sign for 8. The vector 9, however, is specific to each
sector. Furthermore, we suppose that sector 1 is the high-income sector, i.e. w1 > w,.
v (t) is not observed. Rather, we observe the worker’s preference given by a variable
d(t) asfoilows:
d(t)=l, if v (t) V, (t): at time t, the worker prefers employment in sector 1
d (t) O, otherwise: at time t, the worker prefers employment in sector 2
In the case of cross-sectional data, ail the workers are observed at the same time (and only
one observation per worker is available). In this case, the level of indirect utility in sectorj
at the time of investigation becomes:
V*+E(TIT>)+8Z+ (12)
For unemployed workers, t is the duration of time spent unemployed until the moment of
the observation (censored unemployment episode), whereas for employed workers, t
corresponds to the duration of unemployment before access to employment (uncensored
unemployment episode).
In the previous section, it was shown that w1 = y -ln(R -g) (12-bis), with y being the
starting wage in sectorj, R being the worker’s discount rate, and g. being the retum to
experience in sectorj. R is flot observable and specific to each worker. As shown earller, it
plays a decisive role in sector choice sinGe it represents the weight put on unemployment
(this weight corresponds to the coefficient ô in the indirect utility equation). Thus, the
coefficient ô may be different from a worker to another. As written, the equation (12)
supposes an average discount rate for ail workers, but this is likely to affect the quality of
the model if workers show dispersed values in the personal discount rate (see for exampic
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G Card, 1995 and 2000, for the analysis of a similar situation for estimating the retum toeducation). It would be more suitable to consider the same personal discount rate by a
group of individuals having some common characteristics correlated to this rate. For
example, with reference to the endogenous schooling models, investment in education is
strongly determined by the personal discount rate. Workers who achieve the same level of
education are likeiy to have close values ofthe individual discount rate. Equation (12) can
then be estimated for homogeneous groups of workers.
For a given homogeneous group, equation (12) is then written as follows, using Equations
(10) and (10-bis):
a[x0flj+Ej_ln(R_gj)+E(TjITj>t)+ojz+rj
(13)
where w = —ain (R
— gj) is a constant, and = aEj + T.
@ Then, the indirect utility differential between sectors 1 and 2 is:
=w1-w,+X°a(fl1 -fl,)+ô[E(1 I >t)-E(T, i >t)1+(0j-0,)Z+i71 -,,
=x°a(fi1 -fl)+4E(] I] >t)-E(T. T. >t)]+0Z+ (14)
where 0
= O -02, and =
- , =
a ( -62) + r - r,. The te w = w1 - w, is added
the constant ofthe model.
E* is not observed. A related dummy variable d is observed instead:
d = 1, if E* 0 : the worker prefers employment in sector 1
d 0, otherwise: the worker prefers employment in sector 2
We assume that r, - r, N (O, j) and is independent of ail other variables (1,, T,, E
and 62). Thus, , I and T, are mutually independent while (E,E,, T1 - r,)’ is a normai
vector: (81,E,,r1 _,)‘= N(O,) where:
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c2 o
:‘ o.
1
p is the correlation coefficient between e, and E, . The terms and (1 - ,) are
uncorrelated (so they are independent); however, E and = + r are correlated if
a O (i.e. when workers self-select into sectors).
If the theoretical model reflects the real behaviour of workcrs regarding sector choice, the
individual discount rate could be estimated by the ratio of weights put, respectively, on
unemployment and log of wages gap: f? /â. As shown before, this rate indicates the
length of unemployment period that a worker can bear while seeking employment in the
high-wage sector for each additional unit in the log wage gap. The lower this rate, the
longer the potential unemployment duration to bear.
Finally, we mention that wages are censored at least for one sector. They are censored for
one sector for employed workers and for two sectors for unemployed workers.
d. Estimate:
The structural model is composed of five equations: one selection equation, two wage
equations and two unemployment durations equations. In order to estimate the parameters
consistently, we simultaneously estimate ail five equations by maximum likelihood.
In the particular case of labour market in Morocco, stylized facts show that all workers
wish to obtain employment in the public sector. Those who prefer employment in the
private sector seek to minimize their unemployment duration, but are at ail times potential
candidates for employment in the public sector. In addition, facts show that many
unemployed workers seeldng employment in the public sector refuse employment in the
pnvate sector. $ince the data used in this study does not provide information on the
preferred sector before employment for employed workers, we will assume that ail public
sector workers were preferring and seeking employment only in the public sector, whereas
workers employed in the private sector were preferring employment in the private sector
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when they were unemployed, but were also seeldng employment in the public sector
without success. Conceming unemployed workers, the data provides information on the
preferred employment sector. The same as for employed workers, we assume that those
preferring employment in the public sector seek employment only in this sector, whereas
those preferring employment in the private sector seek employment in both sectors.
Our model concems sector choice during the unemployment phase. However, if a worker
accepts a job offer in a sector at time t, our assumption holds immediately before the
maldng of the job, say at the moment t —s, with s being enough small so that t — s t.
In Appendix 1.2, we present the likelihood function for estimating ail the parameters of the
structurai model simuitaneousiy. Two cases are considered. In the flrst one, the unobserved
heterogeneity in the unemployment durations equations is ignored, while in the second
case that heterogeneity is controiied for. Additionally, sector 1 refers to the public sector,
and sector 2 refers to the private sector.
C 1.3.3 Switching Mode! (SWM)
This modei is used when agents’ behaviour is described by two regression equations, and
when there is a criterion function determining which of these two equations is applicable.
The model aims at correcting the selection bias induced by the workers’ behaviour. In the
case of the estimate of wage equation per sector, the SWM is presented as foilows (see
Maddala, 19$3):
Wage equation in sector 1: y1 = +
Wage equation in sector 2: y2 = Xfi., + 8,
Unobserved criterion function: 1* = Zit + u (15)
Xand Z are vectors of exogenous variables, while 1* is a latent variable.
We define a dummy variable I as I = 1 if and only if 1* > O, and I = O if and only if
1* O. for each worker, the wage is observed in the sector where he or she is employed
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Q and is censored for the other sector. The observed wage is then defined as y = y1 if and
only if I = 1, and y y2 ifand oniy if I = O. By assuming that (61,E,,u)’— N(O,),
l 12 l3
where = u,3 , the likeiihood function corresponding this model is:
1
1—Ii
L(fi ,fi2,,j,j13,j23 )fl[ ftY [ÎfYi —Xfi,,UUI
where g and f are respectiveiy the joint densities of the pairs (e1 , u) and (e. , u).
By writing g(e1,u)=g(e1).g(ue1) and f(e,,u)=f(e,).J(ule,) , the likelihood
function becomes:
o — z + (y, — X1p,)
L(fl1,fi2,u1,u2,u13,u23)fl Oi J1
il—I,
_______
-
Parameter u1, cannot be estimated since it does flot appear in the above likeiihood
function.
The unemployment durations may also be invoived in the se]ection bias, but the presence
of censorcd data does flot make it possible to use iog linear equations as in the case of
wages. If ail observed durations were uncensored, their log would be expressed as a linear
relation of explanatory variables and a random term, as follows:
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Duration equation in sector 1: 111(t1) = VÔJ +
Duration equation in sector 2: ln(t,) = VÔ, + r,
t. > O is the uncensored unemployment duration in sectorj.
In this case, the likelihood function to be maximized becomes:
f J—J
L=fl[Î(Yi_XfliÏnQi)_Viui)dui]
where g and f are respectively the joint densities of the triplets r,, u) and
(,,r,,u) Some covariances are flot estimable. This is the case of cov(c,,2,)
cov(s1,r,), cov(r,,r1)and cov(T,,r,).
If we assume that 1 and T, are mutually independent, and are independent of e,, e, and
u , we can estimate the duration equations separately and then include estimated
[E( > t) - E (T. T, > t)1 as covariate in the vector Z (Equation 15). h this case, the
Switching model is simply a reduced form of the structural model presented in Section
1.3.2.
1.4 Application to Moroccan Labour Market
1.4.1 Overview ofthe Moroccan Labour Market
In 2000, the share of the labour force among the Moroccan population aged 15 years and
older was 52.9%, and its size was 10.3 million. 0f the total labour force, 26.8% were
women. The main characteristic of the Moroccan labour force is the preponderance of
uneducated workers. hdeed, in 1999 about one out of every two workers (46%) had neyer
attended school and 24% attended only elementaiy school (the first 5-6 years of
schooling.) Workers with post-secondary degree represent less than 7% of the total labour
force. This situation is reftected in the high rate of illiteracy, which is close to 50% in the
population sector aged 15 years and older.
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Table 1.1: Labour force (Aged 15 Years and Older) by Education Level in 1999
Education Level %
None or koranic school 46.3 6
Elementary, ySt stage (years 1-6) 23.83
Elementary, 2 stage (years 7-9) 13.45
Secondary 9.51
University 6.77
Other level 0.09
Labour Force size (in millions) 10.3
In the same year, the unemployment rate was 13.6%, which means that 1.4 million people
were seeking employment. In urban areas, the unemployment rate was high (21.5%),
particularly among educated workers (29.7% for workers who have completed at least
elementary school versus 13.1% among those who have neyer attended school or those
who have not completed elementary school). In addition, the unemployment rate was
higlier among women (26.7%) than among men (19.9%).
Rural areas post a low unemployment rate (only 5%), but they are dominated by non
remunerated employment9 which accounts for 50.9% of total employment (versus only
7.3% in urban areas).
The agricultural sector (including forestry and fishing) constitutes the most important
employment sector in Morocco, providing nearly 50% of total employment. This reflects
the low educational level of the Moroccan labour force. Indeed, 80% of workers in this
sector do flot hold any diploma and 75% are illiterate. The industrial sector (including the
handicraft industry) accounts for only 14% of aggregate employment. finally, the public
sector remains an important employer, particularly in urban areas (21%) and for educated
workers.
Unpaid family workers
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Table 1.2: Unemployment in Morocco in 2000 by Areas
Urban Rural Total
Labour Force Size (X 10) 5 345 4 940 10 285
Unemployment Rate 2 1.5% 5.0% 13.6%
Male 19.9% 6.5% 13.8%
Female 26.7% 1.7% 13.0%
Uneducated or yst stage of
elementaryschool(1-6years) 13.1% 3.5% 7.1%
not completed
. Elementary and up’° 29.7% 17.0% 27.5%
Two prominent facts have influenced the Moroccan labour market during the last two
decades: the worsening of the unemployment rate and the decline of recruitment in the
public service. The unemployment rate almost doubled between 1971 and 1994. The
number of unemployed workers increased by 84% between 1971 and 1982, and by 117%
between 1982 and 2000. This deterioration of employment affected urban areas in
particular, where the unemployment rate has been above 20% for many years.
Table 1.3: Evolution of Unemployment between 1971 and 2000 by Area
Urban Rural Total
1971 1982 1994 2000 1971 1982 1994 2000 1971 1982 1994 2000
Number of
unemployed 216 322 920 1,146 133 320 412 248 349 642 1,332 1,394
workers, i03
Unemploy- 15.0 12.3 20.3 21.5 5.2 9.5 10.8 5.0 8.8 10.7 16.0 13.6
ment rate ( /o)
The worsening of unemployment in urban areas affected mainly young people, especially
educated ones, holding a secondary school or university degree (i.e. highly educated). The
share of highly educated workers among the unemployed population increased
continuously over time, going from 3.1% in 1984 to more than 20% in 1996 and later. In
addition, since 1989 this share has been higher than the proportion of the same workers
among the employed population. Among university graduates, those holding Bachelor’s
degree were the most affected, as is illustrated in the following table.
‘° Having completed at least the first stage ofelementary education (1-6 years)
C
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Table 1.4: Urban Unemployment Rate among Highly Educated Workers in 199$
Degree Total Female
University, Below Bachelor’s 36.4 43.4
University, Bachelor’s 48.2 60.8
University, Above Bachelor’s 5.3 19.0
Technical $chools 5.6 9.7
Note: These rates were calculated by the author based on the 1998 Moroccan Labour Force Survey data fi]e.
In addition, workers experience long spelis of unemployment. In 1999, about 72% of
unemployed workers remained so for at least 12 months and 26.8% for at Ieast 60 months.
The second phenomenon which significantly affected the labour market in Morocco and
which is ofien quoted as one of the factors that precipitated the unemployment of highly
educated workers (almost non-existent in the 1 960s and 1 970s), is the reduction of the
number of new employment positions in the public sector.1’ Thus, because of the structural
adjustment policies adopted by the Moroccan govemment in August 1983 under the aegis
of the International Monetary Funds, there was a severe reduction in the number of new
recruits to public sector. This number has oscillated between 11,000 and 17,000 after 1983,
as opposed to 29,000 to 51,000 between 1976 and 1982. In 2000, the forecasts for
recmitment represented only 21% of the recmitment undertaken in 1976. Moreover, the
new jobs are assigned mainly to the departments of health, education and justice. In spite
of this significant change in government recruitment, highly educated workers (in fact, the
whole labour force) continue to express a great passion for employment in the public
sector, as is testified by their daily demonstrations claiming the “right” to employment in
the public sector. Data from the 1998 Moroccan urban Labour Force Survey shows that
about haif of unemployed workers holding university dcgrees desire employment
exclusively in this sector.
1.4.2 Data
Data used in this study is drawn from the Moroccan Labour Force Survey (LfS) conducted
in urban areas in 1998. The LFS is an annual cross-section survey aiming at collecting
principal information on activity, employment and unemployment, as well as socio
demographic data. The distinctive feature of the survey is that it provides information
Il
—The public sector rn Morocco mcludes education and health systems.
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about the employment sector preferred by unemployed workers (public or private), which
wiii iargely heip to identify our model. However, workers are flot asked why they prefer a
sector over another.
We limited our sample to workers with university degrees (including technical schools
degrees) for two main reasons, both related to our theoretical model. first, these workers
have the potentiai to be hired in both the public and pnvate sectors. Although the public
sector bas reduced the number of new jobs, it nevertheless remains an essential recruiter
for highly educated workers. These workers were also the ones who expressed a clear
preference for one of the two employment sectors. Second, having invested a long time in
getting an education, university graduates are likely to have doser discount rate values (see
for example Card, 2000). This allows us to estimate our model, assuming that the same
discount rate applies for this group of workers. In addition, the study retained only paid
workers and unemployed workers who expressed a clear preference for one of the two
sectors public and private. The Moroccan LfS provides eaming only for paid workers.
Self-employed are flot asked about eamings. Nonetheless, the proportion of self-employed
is only 7.4% among employed workers with university degrees, and 5.5% among those
with technical schools degrees versus 34.5% among uneducated workers.
With regard to the durations of unemployment, information was collected from ail
unemployed workers and from empioyed workers who started working within the 5 years
before the survey was taken. This probably aimed at reducing the lapses of memory which
occur when people are questioned on events that occurred in the remote past. However,
even for certain workers who began their employment during the 5 years prior to the
survey, information about the duration of unemployment is missing from the data file.
Nonetheless, the investigation provides information on the worker’s age at the start of
employment. Hence, we estimated the missing durations of unemployment for the
concemed workers by the difference between the estimated age at graduation and the age at
the beginning of employment. finaily, we kept only workers aged 64 years or younger,
with a duration of unemployment (censored or flot) less than 10 years.
Table 1.5 provides some descriptive statistics. The sample includes 1,607 workers. Women
represent 34.5% of that sample. The four types of degrees represented are (cf. Appendix
1.3 for an overview ofthe system of education in Morocco):
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- University degree below Bachelor’s: obtained afier two successful years of university
studies, 8.7%.
- Bachelor’s: requires four successful years ofuniversity studies, 47.4%.
- University degree above Bachelor’s such as Master’s and Doctorate, 7.2%.
- Technical School degree: generally obtained afier five years of post-secondaiy studies
in a teclmical school (engineering or specialized school, for example), 36.7%.
The unemployed constitute 23.8% of the sample, whereas the average duration of
unemployment (censored or flot) is 2.4 years, and is slightly higher among people worldng
or preferring to work in the public sector. The average hourly wage is 50.9 Moroccan
Dirhams (MAD),12 and it is 20% higher in the public sector as compared to the private
sector. In addition, the public sector workers accumulated more years of work experience
on average than did those in pnvate sector (about 4 years of difference). This can be
explained by the fact that in the past, the public sector constituted virtually the sole
employer of university graduates. The structural adjustment policies launched in 1983 have
largely reduced the role of the aforesaid sector in the employment. Yet, the passion for
employment in the public sector remains persistent. Indeed, more than four out of five
unemployed in our sample expressed the desire to obtain employment in the public sector.
finally, the changes in the recruitment policy for the Moroccan public sector after the
implementation ofthe structural adjustment policies in 1983 should imply a regime change
in the unemployment duration model in that year. This study did not take account of this
change in the estimated model, since approximately 80% of workers in our sample entered
the labour force afier 1983.
1.4.3 Empirical Resuits
One of our objectives is to compare the estimates obtained using the structural model
(STM) to those obtained using other possible models: the non-structural model (NSM)
where sector choice is exogenous13 and the Switching model (SWM). In the NSM, wage
Q ‘2l0MAD1$US13 As sector choice is assumed to be exogenous, this model does flot rnclude selection equation.
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equations and duration models are estimated separately for each sector. This implies biased
results if workers self-select into sectors. The SV4 takes this endogeneity into account but
includes only exogenous variables in the selection equation. The resuits of the estimates
are given in Tables 1.6 through 1.8.
1.4.3a Selection equation
Education level and gender are introduced as variables of confrol in order to reduce
possible heterogeneity in employment sector choice. The endogeneity of sector choice is
confirmed by all models (SWM and STM). In the Switching model (SWM), covariances
between the error terms of the wage equations and that of the selection equation (ai3 and
a23) are significantly different from zero. In the two structural models (unobserved
heterogeneity either controlled or flot) the coefficients a and are also significantly
different from zero, and their signs correspond to those predicted by the theoretical model
(a>O and <O). This confirms the effect of the wages and the unemployment duration gaps
on sector choice and leads to the rejection of the Switching model, which supposes the
correlation between the wage equations and the selection equation only concem the error
terms.
Similarly, the effect of the education level on the probability of preferring employment in
the public sector is flot the same in the two groups of models. Whereas the $witching
model implies this probability to be increasing with the risc in the education level, the
structural models imply the opposite . Also, the variable gender does flot have a
significant effect in the Switching model, whereas this effect is significant in the structural
models in which women are more likely to choose employment in the public service as
compared to men. The first structural model, which does not take into account the
unobserved heterogeneity, is also rejected, since the second structural mode! confirms the
existence of such heterogeneity in the unemployment duration equation for the public
sector (see Table 1.8). Consequently, we will mainly analyze the resuits of the last
structural model, which we will compare with those of the non-structural model and the
Switching model.
14 However, both models lead to sarne resuits regarding the effect ofgender and education when the
expected unemployment duration gap is included as a covariate in the SWM.
37
The constant in the selection equation is positive and significantly different from zero. It
might represent non-pecuniary factors as weii as factors unrelated to unemployment that
make workers appreciate employment in the public sector such as job stabiiity and the
prestige of being a civil servant in a developing society. The constant is higher for women
who value job stability and the worldng conditions in the public sector because such
conditions often enable them to reconcile professional and family life. Therefore, in their
desire to obtain civil servant employment women might consider risking long periods of
unemployment. The constant is also high for ail workers holding university degrees (beiow
Bachelor’s, Bachelor’s and above Bachelor’s) , whereas it is low for workers holding
technical school degrees who rclatively experience less difficulties in finding employment
in both sectors.
The high fixed value allocated to employment in the public sector implies that even at
equal wages and equal unemployment durations workers are likely to prefer employment
in the public sector. This agrees with the resuits ofBellante and Link study (1981), which
stipulates on the basis of American data that public sector workers arc more risk-averse
than pnvate sector’s workers and that same wages in public and private sectors will
involve an excess of labour supply for the public sector.
The risk of unemployment counterbalances the effect of the log-wages differential and the
fixed value granted to employment in the public sector. However, the cstimated coefficient
of the expected unemployment duration gap, expressed in years, only represents half of
that of the log-wages differential and less than a quarter of the constant (cf. Table 1.6,
column 3). Thus, workers seem to regard employment in the public sector as highly
privileged and are ready to bear long unemployment duration to achieve it. University
graduates and women are those who are potentially ready to wait longer for employment in
the public sector. This could explain the intense demonstrations carried out almost daily by
highly educated workers and the downright refusal by some of them to work in the private
sector. This also supports the affirmation that the first concem of Moroccan educated
workers is “to reach a permanent and stable job, preferably in the public sector”
(Bougroum, Ibourk and Trachen, 1999). for Orivel (1995), this extreme preference for
employment in the public sector is very common in Africa. Its consequence is the
assignment of highly educated workers to non-productive employment in the public sector.
5 The differences between the three degrees are flot significant.
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It also involves a high rate ofretum to education for individuals, confrasted with negligible
contributions of education to the economic growth.
According to the theoretical model, the personal discount rate can be estimated by the ratio
of the coefficients on the log-wage differential and the expected unemployment durations
gap (i.e. R = —6 / â). However, in the theoretical model, only these two gaps drive the
workers’ choices, whereas in the econometric model estimated for the special case of
public-private choice in Morocco, thc presence of the intercept and the error term have
probably modffied the weights given to the aforementioned gaps. Nevertheless, if we
suppose that the discount rate represents the weight of unemployment versus ail other
factors, this rate can be approached by the ratio —6 / (â + ). This implies an estimated
value of 0.15, a conclusion which is acceptable.
For the sake of easier interpretation of the effects of selected variables on the probability of
preferring employment in the public sector, results from the selection equation are
converted into marginal effects (see Table 1.6-bis). The marginal effect of having a
university degree (Bachelor’ s or higher) on the probability of preferring employment in the
public sector is not statistically significant. Conversely, being male or holding a technical
school degree reduce that probability. In addition, when the log-wages differential
increases or the expected unemployment durations gap decreases, the probability of
preferring employment in the public sector augments. The changes in the log-wages and
the expected unemployment durations differentials have the most significant effects on the
probability of preferring employment in the public sector. In Section 1.4.4, we discuss the
use of those results for policies aiming to atfract university graduates to the private sector.
1.4.3b Wage equations
The estimates obtained using various models are presented in Table 1.7. In ail models, it is
confirmed that the public sector pays notably higher wages as compared to the private
sector. The log-wage differential is high for university graduates, particularly those holding
Bachelor’s degrees or above. A comparison between the results obtained from the STM
(when confrolling for unobserved heterogeneity) and those obtained from OLS and the
SWM shows that the three models produce comparable results for the public sector,
whereas for the private sector wages are over-estimated by the OLS corresponding to the
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sample selection bias and underestimated by the SWM, probably because of the mis
specification of the selection equation. The small size of the sample selection bias in the
estimate of the public sector’s wage equation could be explained by two factors. Firstly,
sample selection bias in estimating the public sector’s wage equation is expected to be
limited since most workers in our sample are employed or prefer employment in the public
sector (see Table 1.5). Secondly, salaries in the Moroccan public sector are fixed
instimtionally on the basis of education level. Productivity does not play a significant role
in the setting of wage levels, as workers are generally freated in a homogeneous way,
particularly during the first few years of employment. This makes the public sector more
attractive for less productive workers. The small weight put on productivity in wage
determination in this sector is also reflected by the relative small estimated standard error
of the random component as compared to that obtained for the private sector (0.60 versus
0.86) and by the weak correlation between the random components of the two sectors’
wages equations (0.37).
On the other hand, the drop of the selectivity-corrected wages in the private sector could be
explained by the workers’ behaviour during job search. Jrideed, since the wage differential
bctween the two sectors is less significant for the skilled workers, these workers are
relatively more likely to seek employment in the private sector as compared to the less
skillcd ones. Furthermore, less skilled workers are likely to favour employment in the
public sector where thcy expect to be paid well despite low level ofabilities. This is not the
case in the private sector. The private sector then attracts more productive workers,
whereas the public sector attracts those who seek high wages due to their education level.
Another significant issue that emerges from the results in Table 1.7 concems the effect of
variable gender on wages. In ah estimated models, this variable does not have a significant
effect on wage levels in the private sector, whereas its effect is significant on wage levels
in the public sector. Thereby, women seem to be treated more equitably in the private
sector than in the public sector. However, as wage levels in the public sector are fixed
institutionally, regardless of gender, the “apparent wage discrimination” may mirror the
fact that promotions are more often given to men than women. Conversely, the private
sector does flot distinguish between workers with Bachelor’s degrees and those with lesser
university degrees (reference group) in terms of remuneration, although a Bachelor’ s
degree requires two years of additional university studies as compared to a lesser university
40
degree. Consequently, people who invest in a Bachelor’s degree probably have in mmd
employment in the public sector or perhaps they do it in order to avoid unemployment.
Finally, wages grow two times fastcr in the private sector as compared to the public sector,
resulting in the differential between the two sectors to become narrower over the time. fi
Figures 1.2 through 1.7, we represent the evolution of the estimated log-hourly wage for
each sector using results from three different models (OLS, SWM and STM), for men
holding Bachelor’s and men holding technical school degrees. As mentioned carlier, the
three models differ primarily with regard to the estimate of the private sector wages. The
wage differential between the two sectors is more persistent over timc with the SWM,
whereas it decreases in the two other models. For workers with technical school degrees,
the 0ES even predicts that wages wili be higher in the private sector after 10 years of
experience, which neyer occurs with the STM and the SWM.
The great preference for employment in the public sector, combined with the refusai of
employment in the private sector, should logically generate a shortage of highly educated
workers in the private sector, which, consequently, should cause the wages to rise in this
sector. This does not occur in the Moroccan labour market, however, in particular for
workers with Bachelor’s degrees. This situation could be explained by the great imbalance
of labour supply/demand in the private sector, which results in long unemployment
durations even for the fraction of workers seeking employment in this sector (see the
following Section). This imbalance also concems the quality of labour demand, since the
Moroccan economy is overshadowed by informal activities. Moreover, a significant part of
the labour supply does not match the labour demand in the private sector. This is the case,
for example, for graduates from some general universfty programs (languages, history,
philosophy, literature, etc.) who do not find any employment options in the private sector.
1.4.3c Unemployment duration equations
Duration equations are first estimated separately in cach sector (NSM, Table 1.8, columns
1 to 4), under the assumption that sector choice is exogenous. Table 1.8 also shows the
results obtained using two structural models (columns 5 to 8). As a matter of fact, workers
face a high risk of unemployment in both sectors, although this risk is relatively higher for
those secking employment in the public sector. Workers holding Bachelor’s degrees or
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beiow are the most concemed in this case. Though their situation is much iess precarious,
workers with technical schools degrees are also exposed to relativeiy long periods of
unemployment. The difference between men and women is limited especially in the private
sector. The probability of being hired is thus very low in the public sector, but it is also low
in the private sector, which includes the informaI sector supposed to be accessible for ail
workers who desire to work there. However, to account for the informai sector, we may
suppose that highly educated workers accept employment in this sector and, if this is the
case, report themselves employed. In fact, those workers generaiiy refuse employment in
the informai sector, while those who accept are likely to report themselves as unemployed
in the hope of being recruited in the public sector (Bougroum, Ibourk and Trachen, 1999).
Consequentiy, unemployment durations reported for the private sector may be inflated.
Moreover, our sampie does not include self-employed workers; however, their proportion
in the employed labour force is very iow as mentioned earlier.
Conceming unobserved heterogeneity, the STM reveals that this heterogeneity relates oniy
to the public sector, whereas the NSM recommends that it relates to both sectors. In the
public sector, the presence ofthis heterogeneity could have two explanations. On one hand,
new recruitments to the public sector are mainly intended to meet the needs for the
Departments of Health, Justice and Education. Workers who do not have profiles
corresponding to these needs (in particuiar in ternis of fieids of study) have a smail chance
of being recruited. On the other hand, some workers can reiy on personal relations (or
connections) to strengthen their chances of finding a job in public sector. Conceming the
private sector, the absence of unobserved heterogeneity could be explained by the
insufficiency of information that workers have on this sector since their main objective is
finding employment in the public sector or possibly by the fact that private employers do
flot provide workers with sufficient information to determine their types.
Workers holding Bachelor’s degrees are flot distinguished from those holding lower ievei
degrees (reference group) regarding access to employment. The same situation occurs for
wages in the private sector. Young people are flot encouraged to consider a Bachelor’s
degree as the objective of their educational investment, particularly if they know that only
the pnvate sector would recruit them. Jronically, the Bachelor’s degree is the most widely
heid university dipioma in Morocco.
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figures 1.8 through 1.15 represent the estimated density functions of unemployment
durations and the hazard rate functions for men holding Bachelor’s or technical school
degrees and using NSM and STM models. For the public sector, figures represent the type
with the highest probabiiity when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Generally, the
instantaneous probability of finding employment is high in the private sector for ail
workers, particularly during the first few years following graduation. This probability is
initially on the increase, but then begins to decrease slowly in the public sector. In the
private sector, on the other hand, it increases sharply in the beginning and then drops
quicldy as compared to the public sector. Once again, workers holding technical school
degrees experience a beffer situation as compared to those holding Bachelor’s degrees.
This advantage, combined with the wage advantage, resuits in many young people
coveting technical school degrees. However, the access to these schools is very restricted,
while access to university education is generally free for ail young people who successfully
complete their secondary studies.
Finally, the hazard rate in the public sector drops after correcting for the sample selection
bias (Figures 1.12 and 1.14). In the private sector, the selection corrected hazard rate is
higher during the first months after graduation and lower thereafter (Figures 1.13 and
1.15). The decrease in the hazard rate in the public sector is mainly due to the assumption
in the structural model that ail workers (preferring either the public or the private sector)
are seeking employment in the public sector. Consequently, the unemployment duration in
the private sector also concems the public one. In the private sector, the change can be
explained by the workers’ behaviour. In fact, workers first actively seek employment in the
public sector and show littie interest in the private sector, which results in long
unemployment duration between graduation and first employment in the private sector.
1.4.4 Policy Issues
Stiglitz (1974) stipulates that the govemment can reduce the wage gap between the
employment sectors and adapt the extent of its recmitment to lower the unemployment
rate. In the case of Morocco, employment in the public sector is very limited, SO the
govemment policy should aim at attracting university graduates to the private sector. This
is flot an easy task, however, due to the great fixed value allocated by workers to the
employment in the public sector and due to serious difficulties in finding employment even
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(N in the private sector. Using our resuits, the probability of preferring employment in the
public sector which is estimated at 0.75, could be lowered by reducing the starting 10g
wage differential between the public sector and the private sector andlor by increasing the
expected unemployment durations gap between the two sectors. As indicated in Table 1.6-
bis, reducing the starting log wage differential by one unit has the same effect on the
probability of preferring employment in the public sector as increasing the expected
unemployment durations gap by 2 units (unit = year). However, the marginal effects of
those changes are minor, a finding which suggests that a significant modification of the
workers’ behaviour will require extreme adjustments in the variables that drive that
behaviour. Jndeed, our results show that the average starting log wage differential is
estimated at 1.08, with all genders and degrees pooled (0.95 for workers holding technical
school degrees, 1.20 for those holding Bachelor’s degrees, 1.23 for those holding
university degrees higher than Bachelor’s degrees, and 0.82 for those holding lower than
Bachelor’s degrees). Therefore, if the starting 10g wage differential is reduced by one unit
(which means that the two employment sectors will be paying almost the same wage) and
holding the expected unemployment durations gap constant, the probability of preferring
employment in the public sector will only decrease by 0.16, going from 0.75 to 0.59.
Workers are still likely to prefer employment in the public sector even if the two
employment sectors pay the same wage and despite the high risk of unemployment in the
public sector. Similarly, each unit increase in the expected unemployment durations gap,
estimated at 3 years on average, will reduce the probability of preferring employment in
the public sector by 0.0$ only.
More precisely, if we suppose that the govemment’s objective is to reduce the probability
of preferring employment in the public sector at 0.20, which is the part of the public sector
in the total urban employment, the govemment must either increase the current expected
unemployment durations gap by about 7 years while holding the log wage differential
constant or remove the wage gap while at the same time increasing the expected
unemployment durations gap by about 5 years. Therefore, changing the workers’ behaviour
requires great adjustments; the weight put on non-observed variables is very large.
However, the govemment may still adjust the wages and employment in the public sector
to lessen the pressure from employment seekers on the public sector.
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A more effective poiicy should aim at reducing the segmentation of the labour market,
focusing on wages as well as non-pecuniaiy factors. It shouid also aim at improving
employment opportunities in the private sector. This necessitates a high level of economic
growth and the contraction of the informai sector unfavourabie to educated workers.
Economic growth wiii 5e more supported if highly educated empioyees work in the private
sector and then actively participate in development. The public sector used to be the main
employer of highly educated workers, engaging them in non-productive employment in
large numbers. Consequentiy, one can observe a high rate of return to education for
individuais contrasted with the negiigibie contribution of education to the overail economic
growth (Orivel, 1995). In 199$ (15 years after the implementation of the govemment
adjustment pohcies), the public sector stiH empioys more than 60% ofuniversity graduates
living in urban areas.
Finaliy, it is important to emphasize that the iiliteracy rate in Morocco is exfremeiy high
(48% in 1998) and that many schooi-age chiidren are deprived of formai education or drop
out of school prematurely. On the other hand, the high unempioyment rate among
university graduates suggests that there is an over-aiiocation of public and private
resources to university education. Allocating more resources to eiementary education (even
to the detriment of university education) wiii heip to improve the overaii level of education
of the labour force and, in retum, stimuiate economic growth. Furthermore, an
improvement in the labour force education levei wiil resuit in the tightening of the informai
sector unfavourable to education, inciting educatcd workers to seek empioyment in the
private sector.
1.5 Conclusion
The modeis deveioped at the end of the 1960s and in the beginning of the 1970s (for
exampie Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Stigiitz, 1974 & 1976; Eaton and Neher,
1975 and Fieids, 1975) have ail stressed the role of wage differentials on employment
sector choice. “Migration” from the iow-wage sector to the high-wage sector wili continue
as long as the expected wage in the second sector is higher than in the first sector. The
unemployment rate wiil then continue to increase until workers expect the same wage ievei
in both sectors, thus causing the migration to stop. The unemployed are voiuntarily SO
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since they refuse to work in the low-wage sector. Thus, “the unempÏoyed have onÏy
theinseÏves to bÏame” for their condition (Eaton and Neher, 1975). The efficient wage
theory developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) “blames” certain firms which, while
seeking to encourage their workers to make a greater effort, pay wages higher than those of
the market. This policy causes a reduction in employment demand and an increase in
labour supply, leading to involuntaiy unemployment. The labour market is segmented into
two sectors: a sector which pays efficient wages but with limited access, and a sector
which pays market wages with unlimited access. This affects workers behaviour, as seen in
the above models.
The model developed in this chapter fits within the same framework. Workers’
expectations about wages and unemployment duration determine their behaviour regarding
sector choice. However, in confrast to previous studies, we suppose that the two sectors are
exposed to unemployment, with lower unemployment risk in the low-wage sector. Workers
face a loss of income due to unemployment as well as an opportunity cost by forgoing
employment opportunities in the low-wage sector. This loss of income, which depends on
unemployment duration, is weighted by the discount rate. The length of the unemployment
period while waiting for employment in the high-wage sector depends on the value of this
rate. A worker with a low discount rate can withstand a long duration of unemployment in
order to obtain employment in the high-wage sector. 11e or she is likely to tum down offers
in the low-wage sector. A substantial wage differential between sectors also supports this
“waiting for employment” process which increases the aggregate unemployment rate.
The econometric model we estimated using Moroccan data yields estimates of parameters
that drive worker behaviour. These estimates can be used to establish a clear-sighted policy
aimed at reducing imbalances in the labour market. The empirical application to the choice
between the public and the private sector as occupational possibilities in Morocco is
motivated by the fact that in this country highly educated workers strongly prefer
employment in the public sector. One interesting conjecture is that this behaviour is
responsible for the excessive unemployment rate among highly educated workers. The
results indicate, however, that workers experience a great difficulty in finding employment
even in the private sector, which limits their choice to a large extent. The selectivity
corrected public-private starting hourly wage differential is very large, ranging between
82% on average for workers holding lower than Bachelor’s degrees and 123% on average
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for those holding university degrees higher than Bachelors’ degrees. Yet, the probability of
preferring employment in the public sector is flot vcry sensitive to wage or unemployment
duration variations. lndeed, a significant modification of the workers’ behaviour
necessitates extreme changes in those variables. Even so, the adjustment of the
remuneration policy in the public sector combined with further reduction of new
employment in that sector remains presently the best way for the govemment to deter
educated workers from remaining unemployed while waiting for employment in the public
sector. A general long-term policy should also aim at improving employment opportunities
and worldng conditions in the private sector. In this way, more importance should be given
to investment in human capital in order to eradicate illiteracy, which presently affects
about half of the adult population. The provision of elementary education to all chiidren
will improve the level of education of the labour force, stimulate the economic growth and
reduce the share of the informai sector in the economy. Then, educated workers will be
incited to seek employment in the private sector, where they will be able to find a large
number ofgoodjobs.
o
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Table 1.5: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean
# observations 1,607
Age (in years) (8.3)
female 0.345
Degree:
• Technical School 0.367
• University, Below Bachelor’s 0.087
• University, Bachelor’s 0.474
• University, Above Bachelor’s 0.072
Labour Force Stamte:
Employed 0.762
• Unemployed 0.23$
Employed x Sector:
Public 0.7 80
• Private 0.220
Unemployed x Prefened Sector:
Public 0.841
•Private 0.159
16 50.4Hourly Wage (in Moroccan Dirham) (60.43)
52.93
• Public (58.80)
43.91Pnvate (65.52)
13.6Years ofExpenence: (8.9)
14.5Public (8.6)
10.8Private (9.4)
2.4Unemployment Duration (years): (2.3)
2.5Public 7
2.1Pnvate 7 7
Notes: - The sample is from the 1998 Moroccan Labour Force Survey, and includes workers aged
64 years or younger and for whom unemployment duration is Iess thati 10 years. Missing
unemployment durations are estimated by age at starting first job minus estimated age at
graduation. In parentheses are standard-deviations.
161 MoroccanDirham l$US
4$
Table 1.6: Estimated Selection Equations
Structural Models 17
Switching Model Unobserved Unobserved
(1) heterogeneity not heterogeneity
controlled controlled
(2) (3)
Coef. S-E Coef. S-E Coef S-E
Constant(w) 02794b 0.1391 04244b 0.1871 17162b 0.6839
Log wage
- 2.0866 a 0.3482 07787b 0.3940differential (a)
Expected
unemployment
- -0.38$6 a 0.1477 -0.387 1 a 0.0809
duration gap ()
Male 0.0897 0.0946 -0.3920 C 0.232$ -0.2949 C 0.157 1
TechnicalSchool 0.6424a 0.1415 1.6148C 0.5548 1.2784C 0.6801
University, 0.2326 C 0.1399 -1.0085 0.7333 -0.417 1 0.5 186Bachelor s
University,Above 0.6471a 0.1913 2.5441a 0.7603 -1.1986 0.7448Bachelor s
5j3 0.5030 a 0.0574 - - -
0.6724c 0.3671 -
- -
0.1863 a 0.0647 0.4972 a 0.2073
Mean
-1.1307 -2.9114 -2.8609Log-Likelihood
# observations 1,2 16 1,607 1,607
Notes: The reference group for education is “University, Below Bachelor’s.” S-E: Standard Error.
(a), (b) and (C): significant at the level 1, 5 and 10 percent.
l
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Table 1.6-bis: Marginal Effects of Selected Variables on the Probability of Preferring
Employment in the Public Sector
Structural model with unobserved
heterogencity controlled
Marginal Effects Standard
(*) Errors
Log wage differential 0.1595(a) 0.0549
Expected unemployment o.o793(a) 0.0119durations gap
Male -0.0584 0.0309
Technical School -0.2881 0.1475
University, Bachelor’s -0.0860 0.1037
University, Above Bachelor’s -0.3 180 0.2028
Notes: (*) The marginal effect measures the effect of a unit change in a covariate X on the
probability of preferring employment in the public sector, holding ail else constant
(ÔP / X ). Marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means for continuous variables, and
the difference in the probability between O and 1 for dummy variables. The reference group
for education is “University, Below Bachelor’s.” (a), (b) and (c): significant at the level 1, 5
and 10 percent.
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ci figure 1.1: Example ofWorkers’ Behaviour
A4
A1
Time
Notes: T1 LN(6, 1.2), T. LN(2, J), T is the unemployment duration in sector j.
f1 (s)
- 1°j j2 (s)
A=
R—g1J
R
An unemployed worker prefers employment in sector 1 if
A > [E(T1 I ] > t) — E(T, i > t)] and refuses employment in sector 2 if
A>[E(T1 i >t)—t].
E(T11 T>t)- t
E(TI T>t)- E(T21 T,>t)
o
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figures 1.2 through 1.7: Evolution of the Estimated Log Hourly Wage by Degree Using
Different Models
o
1 2: OLS (A Vae witb o
Uvesiy .3çheios Degree)
Years of experience
Figure 15: OLS (A Male wtfl o
fechnicci School Degree)
Yecrs o’ exoerience
Eg.e .3: SWM (A Mc e wth o
..nivesity Bacheior’s Degree)
Yeors of experience
Figure 1.6: SWM (A Maie wth o
Technical School Degtee)
ecrs 0f expe’ece
Figjre
.4: 5M (A Mc e wV o
..nives:y Bccne ors Degree)
eors of experience
Cigure 1.7: 51M (A Moie wif o
‘ecbnicol Schoo 2egree)
Yeors o’ expeece
Note: OLS (Least Squares) corresponds to columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.7, SWM (Switching
Model) corresponds to columns (3) and (4), and STM (Structural Model) corresponds to
columns (7) and (8) in the same table.
Pbiic
— Phxcte
/
Fibhc
— Prvcte
______
/
/
/
Public
—
Priccte
Pucic
/
/
—
Public
—
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o Figures 1.8 through 1.11: Estimated Density Functions of Unemployment Duration by
Sector and Degree
flgure 1.8: Pubc Sector
(A Maie wth o University Bochelors Degree)
gJre 1.9: PHvote Sector
(A Male wth o Un!vers;ty Bactle!ors Degree)
Years
Figjre 1.10: Pjbhc Sector
(A Male w0h o ecrnical School Degree)
—
“ea rs
Notes: Density functions correspond to models controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, and using
constant 1, which is associated with the highest probability (Table 1.8). Non structural
model (NSM) corresponds to columns (3) and (4) in Table 1.8, and structural model (STM)
corresponds to columns (7) and (8) in the same table.
SM
— NS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
STtl
—
— NSM
Years
Figure 1.11: Pr:vate Sector
(A Male with o Technica School Degree)
o
Years
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o Figures 1.12 througli 1.15: Estimated Hazard Rate Functions by Sector and Degree
Q
Figure .12: Pub c Sector
(A Mo:e with o University Bacheor’s Degree)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
te
Figure 1.14: Public Sector
(A Mue wit o lechnical School Degree)
Figure 1.13: Private Sector
(A Mole wth o University Bocelors Degree)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Ye
Figure 1.15: Private Sector
(A Mole with o Technical Schoo Segree)
Notes: Hazard rates correspond to models controlling unobserved heterogeneity, and using
constant 1, which is associated with the highest probability (Table 1.8). Non structural
model (NSM) corresponds to colunms (3) and (4) in Table 1.8, and structural model (STM)
corresponds to columns (7) and (8) in the same table.
01M
—
— NSM
SM
—
— NOM
eors Yeors
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o Appendix 1.1: Conditional Expected Duration
Let T be a random variable having a log-normal density function: T LN(p, 2).
Thus,E(TIT>t) E(T)
Proof:
_ln(t)_P/f]_(in(t)—P1 forany t>O
)L J]
-
____
E(TIT>t)Ïxfdx= f ‘dx8(t) 8(t) 8(t)
Let the following variable change: y = in (x), so,
E(TT>t)= e’dy.Wehave:
J
/ N Ity—p -( y—p — Ïe -e
(__
)2
— S_3
2o
Ï tYePE(T[Y_P_J2
= E(T) -u
E(T)
_ ___ _
Therefore: E(TIT>t) f dy.8(t) ln(t)
Finally, through the following variable change z =
_____—
, we obtain:
E(TT>t) = E(T) S (z)dz = ET[8(t) it)p 8(t)
J
8(t) =
J
— in (t)— p
, and we have
dx
o
1 _(y+p2_2yp)÷y
e=e
J I()2 J
=e
1 _(y+p1_2.vp_2yJ)
(ï_p)—2u J
-e
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Appendix 1.2: Likelihood Function
Sector 1 (high wage versus high unemployment duration) refers to the public sector, while
sector 2 (low wage versus low unemployment duration) refers to the private sector.
The contribution to the likelihood depends on the worker’s situation (employed or
unemployed) and his or her preferred sector (sector 1 or sector 2). Therefore, four cases are
possible: (a) the worker is employed in sector 1, (b) the worker is employed in sector 2, (c)
the worker is unemployed and prefers employment in sector 1, and (d) the worker is
unemployed and prefers employment in sector 2.
Conceming the unobserved heterogeneity in the unemployment duration equations, we
consider two cases. In the first case we ignore that heterogeneity, while in the second case
we confrol for it.
Before constructing the likelihood, we can show that N(O,u) , where
=l?2 =a(61-E7)+r1-r, (cf.Equationl4)and o =]+a2(u+u_2puju,).
In addition, I ,j],2
07 7 7 7
where pci=aI]_p_I8z’
UI)
0
and Pc2 aI p—1 67, U, =1+OEu; (i-p).
U7 )
For the sake of simplification, the index j relating to the worker is omitted.
19 Using the result: if (xj,x2)’ N(,) where
=
(p)’ and
= [f11
I2]
thenx7x1N(p,1) where =j,+7I27J’(xJ—i,) and c777J1jj!J2.
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Model 1: Without unobserved heterogeneity
fi this model we assume that there is no heterogeneity conditional on observable variables.
Case 1: the worker is a sector 1 employee; lis or her wage and unemployment duration are
observed. His or lier contribution to the likelihood function is:
L1 = Fr(E* o
=
y1 - = t) g8 (y1
- xfl1) f (t)
We assume that the worker prefers employment in sector 1 immediately before the making
of the job, say at the moment t—8, with E being sufficiently small so that t — t and
E(1 1 > t
— e) E(1 I i > t). hi addition, , T1 and T2 are independent (Equation
14).
Fr(E*>OIci=yjXflj, =t)
=Pr{xoa(flj
-)+(E( I >t)-E( >t))+6Z+>OI, =y1
G
and: and
q5 and (I) are the standard normal density and distribution fùnctions, respectively.
Case 2: the worker is a sector 2 employee; lis or lier wage and unemployment duration are
observed. lis or lier contribution to the likelihood function is (following the same
reasoning as for case 1):
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L,
1+a2(]_p2)
ln(t)-,
Ïn(t)-p1
\ 1 J tic,
Case 3: the worker is unemployed and prefers employment in sector 1. His or her wage
and unemployment duration are censored. His or her confribution to the likelihood function
is:
L3 Fr(E*OI>t)S1Q)
1ln(t)—p1
J1+a2(u + _2pu17)
Case 4: the worker is unemployed and prefers employment in sector 2. His or her wage
and unemployment duration are censored. His or her confribution to the likelihood is:
L4 p,.(]’*<T >t, T, >t) S1(t)S,(t)
_X0a(/3,
-p,)—5[E(i ] >t)-E(T, T, >t)]_Z
+u _2pu1u2)
j(’ln(t)Pj 1(’ln(t)fl.
7C J
The parameter p appears in the hkelihood function, so it can be estimated; however, data
does not make it possible to identify this parameter, since for the employed workers the
wage is observed only for one sector. Its estimated value should flot be of great importance
in terms of interpretation.
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o
Model 2: Unobserved heterogeneity controlled
Since there are two different types of workers for each sector, four different types of
workers are involved when the two sectors are combined. The worker can for example be
of type 2 in sector 1, of type 1 in sector 2, and so on.
For a sector 1 employee, the contribution to the likelihood becomes:
L1 T)=t,%I=%]/,A=%k)x
i=I k=I
g, (y1 -Xfl1) fT (t1
where p =Prob(% =%fi) and Pfi =1,jl,2.
Similarly, the contribution to the likelihood ofa workcr employed in sector 2 is:
L, ?JjP,k&(E*<0I8,Y,fi,,T,t,>t,%j/i,%22k)x
i=1 k=I
g(y,-xfl,)s (t1 =;11)i (tI)., =‘.7k)
In the same way, the contribution to the likelihood of an unemployed worker prefeffing
employment in sector 1 is:
L3 = PP P. O > t, % = 2 = 2k) S (t
1=1 k1
Finally, the contribution to the likelihood of an unemployed worker preferring employment
in sector 2 is:
L3
PIiP2kP1(E*<0I >t, T, >t, %
=2Jj 2 2k) s (ti, =11)s (tH.. =).2k)
1=1 k1
By considering a dummy variable d which takes value 1 if the worker prefers sector 1 and
value O otherwise and a dummy variable C which takes value 1 if the unemployment speli
is uncensored and value O otherwise, the likelihood function to be maximized is:
L = [J LdC,Lo1_d,Ldo1_C)L_t1_C’) (1)
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Appendix 1.3: The Structure of Education in Morocco
1- Pre-school:
We distinguish two types of establishments:
- Koranic schools, which constitute the most frequent fonn of pre-school. They provide
a traditional education in a modem way.
- Nursery schools and kindergartens, which provide education on the basis of modem
methods.
2- Fundamental Education:
Composed of two cycles:
- A first stage of six years length where enrolment starts at the age of 6 years.
- A second stage of 3 years length, which receives pupils who finished the first cycle.
Ç At the end of the second cycle, pupils are oriented either towards general and technical
secondary education or towards vocational training. Those who do not reach the second
cycle of fundamental education could be oriented towards vocational training
(specialisation level, see below).
3- Secondary Education:
This three-year cycle receives pupils who succeed in fundamental education and who arc
oriented to continue their studies in a general or technical field. It leads to obtaining the
“Baccalaureate” certificate, which allows access to university or some higher vocational
training.
4- Higher Education:
Students who obtain the “Baccalaureate” certificate continue their higher studies in:
- Universities.
- Technical schools (called also higher institutes and schools).
- Teachers’ schools, or
- Universities and schools abroad.
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5- Vocational Training:
The system of vocational training is organized in 4 levels:
- Specialised technician: this two-year training program is accessible, afier competition
or testing, to students holding the “Baccalaureate” certificate.
- Technician: a two-year training program, which is accessible after competition to
students having entircly followed the last year of secondary education (without
necessarily obtaining the “Baccalaureate” certificate).
- Qualification: accessible, after competition, to pupils from the 9th year of fundamental
education, 1 st or 2nd year of secondary education. The length of training is generally 2
years.
- Specialisation: accessible, after competition, to pupils from the 7th and $th year of
elementary education or those who successfully complete the first stage of elementary
education. The length of training depends on the program, but most programs are 2
years in length.
o
C Chapitre 2
The Unemployment of Hïghly Educated
Workers in Morocco
2.1 Introduction
Theoretically, a high level of education improves the chances of employment and the
economic situation of individuals. Jndeed, Mincer (1991) stipulates that the major benefit
of education is the higher the educational level the lower the risk of unemployment.
Moreover, employed educated workers enjoy three additional advantages as compared to
less educated ones: high wages, great ascending mobility and job stability. This positive
relationship between education and employment is observed in the developed countries,
and had been consolidated during the 19$Os and 1990s. This pcriod was marked by a
modification in the structure of the labour demand putting at a disadvantage of the least
skilled workers. lndeed, the use of new technologies and the increasing competition from
the low-wage countries have stimulated the demand for highly qualified workers in the
developed ones, consequently reducing the demand for less qualified workers.
However, the above situation is not aiways the case. Some developing counfries,
particularly in Africa, have experienced an alarming rise in unemployment among their
educated workers, principally among those holding university degrees. Uneducated
workers continue to benefit from great employment possibilities, particularly in rural areas.
Morocco constitutes a typical example of such a country. The unemployment rate is high
(13.6% in 2000), particularly in urban areas (21.5%), and it concems mainly educated
workers. The unemployment rate among educated workers reachcd 27.5% in 2000 (29.7%
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in urban areas) versus only 7.1% among non-educated workers (3.5% in rural areas), each
group representing about haif of the Moroccan labour force. In 2000, the unemployment
rate exceeded 30% among workers holding secondary or university degrees and 40%
among those holding Bachelor’s degrees. This situation occurred despite the fact that only
10% ofthe Moroccan labour force has university degrees.
Several factors can be used to explain this situation in Morocco and other developing
countries. The most commonly evoked factors are related to the high growth of the
population and the weak performance of the economy. In the case of educated workers,
additional factors are also quoted, such as the rapid increase in the size of the educated
population and the imbalance of education and labour market needs. Likewise, in some
countries the slowdown in recruitment in the public sector seems to be a significant factor
in the deterioration of the employment of highly educated workers. Indeed, this
deterioration parallels the reduction of the number of new positions in the public sector
under structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund. In
Morocco, the number of new positions has dropped dramatically since 1983. It ranges now
between 10,000 and 15,000 new positions per year, as compared to 29,000 and 5 1,000 new
positions between 1976 and 1982. Consequently, the share of highly educated workers in
the urban unemployed labour force lias been increasing steadily, growing from 3.1% in
1984 to 23.2% in 1997. In 1990, the share of those workers in the urban unemployed
labour force exceeded their share in the employed labour force. This change of structure
lias been continuing, maldng the unemployment of highly educated workers a real social
phenomenon and a political puzzle in Morocco.
Admittedly, the private sector lias not been able to absorb all tlie workers that the public
sector cannot recruit. However, certain distortions related to the workers’ beliaviour with
regard to job search contribute to the maintenance of the unemployment rate at a high level
(Rama, 1998; Bougroum, Ibourk and Trachen, 1999). In 1998, four out often unemployed
workers with university degrees living in urban areas admitted seeking employment
exclusively in the public sector. As a result, many of them decline job-offers in tlie private
sector.
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The public sector generally offers job stability, high wages and good employment
conditions, whereas the private sector, dominated by informai activities, generally offers
worldng conditions that do flot meet the educated workers’ aspirations with regards to
remuneration and the nature of employment (Orivel, 1995; Gaude, 1997; Combamous,
1999). Jndeed, in the informai sector wages are low. In addition, the human capital
characteristics do not have a significant effect on wage determination, the possibilities for
promotion are very limited, and the monitoring is personalised and arbitrary (Off, 1997).
This segmentation of the labour market in the public and private (mainly informal) sectors,
which is very sfrong in the developing countries, contributes to the worsening of the
unemployment, particularly in urban areas. Harris and Todaro (1970) argue that the
substantial wage differential between urban and rural areas provokes a movement of
workers from rural to urban areas in a number that urban areas cannot absorb. This results
in a positive urban unemployment rate, which is an increasing function of the wage
differential between rural and urban areas. Thus, some rural workers seeking to improve
their economic situation find it rational to quit their employment in rural areas to seek weil
paid employment in urban arcas even though such a move is associated with a high risk of
unemployment. The same logic applies when trying to explain the situation of highly
educated workers in Morocco. As those workers strongiy covet employment in the public
sector, some of them prefer to remain unempioyed while waiting for employment in this
sector, and they do not intensively search for employment in the private sector. In addition,
those who accept “unsatisfactory” employment in the private sector are likeiy to report
themselves unemployed at the time of the labour force surveys. Consequently, the real
unemployment rate is overestimated. Such behaviour is so significant that Bougroum,
lbourk and Trachen (1999) consider Moroccan educated workers as potential and
permanent seekers of employment in the public sector.
We have empirically tested the idea of “unemployment while waiting for employment in
the public sector” for workers with university degrees using data from the 1998 Moroccan
labour force survey (sec Chapter 1). The results confirm the strong segmentation of the
Moroccan labour market in the public sector on the one hand and the private sector on the
other hand. The significant starting wage differential between the two sectors is very high
(estimated at over 80% to the advantage of the public sector), and the unemployment
durations are much higher in the public sector. However, workers seem to put great weight
on non-pecuniary factors such as job stability, working conditions, prestige in being a civil
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C.’ servant in a developing country, etc. Consequently, the preference for employment in thepublic sector ïs less sensitive to wage and unemployment duration changes. The
unemployment of highly educated workers in Morocco seems to result from the scarcity of
good employment opportunities in the private sector. Hence, policies aimed at fighting
unemployment should focus on improving employment opportunities in the private sector
both quantitatively and qualitatively. This could be done through encouraging a high level
of economic growth and, by concurrently creating firms dissociated from the informal
sector. Economic growth will be more favourable if the private sector takes advantage of
highly qualified workers. For a long time, the public sector lias been the exclusive
employer of graduates, who in this way engage massively in non-productive employment.
Consequently, one could at the same time observe a high rate of retum to education for
individuals, as confrasted with negligible contributions of education to the economic
growth (Orivel, 1995). In 1998 (that is to say 15 years after the implementation of
structural adjustment policies), the public sector still employs over 60% of university
graduates and more than 70% ofteclmical schools’ graduates living in urban areas.
Obviously, the public sector needs to continue recruiting new workers to ensure the high
quality of its services and to replace those who retire. However, the improvement of the
quality of those services (which concem the private sector directly or indirectly) requires
that the govemment reform its recruitment and remuneration policies. The labour needs
should be clearly identified and satisfied by skilled workers for the public sector exactly as
this would be donc in a private company. The dependence upon the diploma levels in
recruitment and remuneration in the public sector must be enfeebled in order to put more
weight on competence and productivity. At the same time, the recruitment policy in that
sector should aim at filling the real needs of the public sector, quantitatively and
qualitatively, as the replacement for the present policy mainly aimed at fighting
unemployment. Also, the actual remuneration system should be reformed in order to attract
and retain sldlled workers in the public sector and incite them to be productive.
furthermore, since many young people relate their investment in education to employment
in the public sector (Bougroum, Ibourk and Trachen, 1999), the above-mentioned policies
would help to remedy this socially inefficient behaviour.
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(‘. Finally, it is important to remember that fighting against unemployment in Morocco
remains a very complicated exercise due to some aberrant facts that slow down any durable
social and economic development. For example, weak govemment investment in education
is a problem. The rate of illiteracy among the adult population is far too high (48% in
199$), and yet many children of school-going age do not attend formal school or drop out
of school prematurely. Many studies highlight the benefits of education for economic and
social development. Jnvestment in human capital stimulates economic growth and thus
employment, which in retum encourages investment in human capital itself. Conversely, a
weak investment in human capital has a negative impact on economic growth, and low
economic growth does not improve employment. This maintains investment in human
capital at a low level (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 1996). Allocating additional resources to
elementary education (even to the detriment of university education) will help to improve
the overall level of education of the labour force, stimulating economic growth. In
addition, an improvement in the labour force education level will result in the tightening of
the informal sector (unfavourable to education), inciting educated workers to seek
employment in the private sector.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, we present some key figures on
Morocco. We then describe the situation of weak investment in human capital. In Section
2.3, we expose the evolution of the employment outlook and particularly stress the
unemployment of educated workers. Section 2.4 focuses on govemmental employment
policies during the last few years, whereas Section 2.5 analyzes the unemployment of
university graduates as a result of the behaviour of these workers with regard to job search,
and presents some solutions for this unemployment. Section 2.6 concludes the study.
2.2 Investment in Education in Morocco
‘A weak investment in hurnan capital has a negative efJect on growth; and weak growth
does izot improve ernpÏoyinent, which, in return, contributes to the reduction ofinvestment
in humaii capital. The economy can thusfaÏl into a “trap door” ofunempÏoyment and
stagnation, where unempÏoyrnent maintains the stagnation that itselfmaintains
unemployrnent. “Cahuc & Zylberberg (1996)
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2.2.1 Overview of the Moroccan Economy
In 2000, the size ofthe population in Morocco (sized 710,850 km2) was 28.7 million. The
population sector aged 15 years and younger represented 32.3% of the total population, as
compared to 7.3% of population sector aged 60 and older. The percentage of children aged
18 years or less was 37.4% in 2002, as compared to 43.6% in 1990. The share ofthe urban
population has grown significantly duting the last few decades, increasing from 35% in
1971 to 42% in 1982 and to approximately 55% in 2000. The life expectancy has also
improved substantially, increasing from 59.1 years in 1980 to 69.5 years in 1999. Thc
death rate among young people, which exceeded 20% at the beginning of the 1 960s, feli to
6% at the end of the 1 990s. The fertility rate remains relatively high, although it has
dropped considerably over the last three decades, from 6.97 in 1970 to 3.1 in 1997.
Consequently, the population rate of growth has dropped from 2.6% on average (yearly)
between 1960 and 1982 to 2.06% on average (yearly) between 1982 and 199420 and to
1.66% between 1998 and 1997. finally, the average size of a Moroccan household was 5.5
persons in 2000.
In 2001, the gross domestic product (GDP) was about 390 billion Moroccan Dirhams
(MAD). One US dollar is worth approximately ten MADs. The agricultural sector
(including forestry and fishing), which is a very important sector in the Moroccan
economy, represents 15.8% of the GDP and employs more than 40% of the total labour
force. The country strongly depends on the climatic conditions, since positive and high
growth rates ofthe GDP are ofien related to years with good crops.
Morocco is one of the major producers and exporters of phosphate. In addition, Morocco
has two coastlines, the Atiantic and the Mediterranean, 3,500 km in length. Moroccan
waters are rich in fish, and the fishing sector employs more than 200,000 people. The
foreign trade of Morocco records a permanent deficit with exports covering less than 70%
of imports. In 2001, the imports mainly included manufactured products (18.5%), ou
(11.7%), and cereals (7%). Exports primarily consisted of clothing (2 1.3%), articles of
hosiery (11%), fresh fish, crustaceans, molluscs and shelis (7.9%), phosphoric acid (6.7%),
and phosphates (5.8%).
20 The size of the population increased from 11.6 million in 1960 to 20.4 million in 1982 and 26
million in 1994.
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Table 2.1: Structure ofthe GDP in 2001
0/ Variation
0
compared to 2000
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 15.8 +27.3
Mines 1.9 +7.5
Energy 6.9 +8.1
Manufacturing Industries 16.9 +4.2
Construction Jndusfry 5.1 +5.8
Trade and Taxation on Imports 19.0 +3.3
Transportation and Communications 6.9 +1.0
Other Services 12.2 +0.7
Public Administrations 15.2 +4.6
Total 100.0 +6.5
In spite of the importance of the agricultural sector to the economy, the agricultural trade
balance is largely in deficit. In 1996, the value of agricultural exports represented only 54%
ofthe value ofagricultural imports.
To make up for the frade deficit, Morocco significantly depends on the remittances of its
citizens worldng abroad, whose number exceeds 2 million. In 2001, such fransfers
exceeded tee billion US dollars.
2.2.2 Education in Morocco
During the school year 2000-2001, Morocco counted 3.84 million pupils in the first stage
of elementary education (years 1-6), 1.04 million in the second stage of elementary
education (years 7-9), 484 thousand in the secondary stage (years 10-12), and 289 thousand
in higher education (universities and post-secondary) (see Appendix 1.3, Chapter 1 for a
short description of the educational system in Morocco). However, as compared to other
countries, Morocco continues to post significant a deficiency in schooling rates,
particularly at the secondary and highcr education level, in rural areas and especially
among girls (see Table 2.2).
The gap between boys and girls with regards to their schooling rate remains large at the
level of primary education, although this gap has significantly decreased over the last few
years: the gap was 23.7 points in 1995, as opposed to 43 points in 1965. Conceming
secondary education, the gap between the two genders has remained constant at 11 points
between 1965 and 1995, but it varied over the years (9.1 points in 1975 and 14 points in
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Q 1985, for example). This situation persists despite the fact that other countries comparableto Morocco have made spectacular progress in the area of education. for example, in Libya
the gap between boys and girls with regard to schooling rate at the primary educational
level decreased from 67 points in 1965 to -0.1 points in 1995. Tri Tunisia, the gap decreased
from 51 points to 6.9 points. At the secondary level, the gap between boys and girls feil
from 20 points to 6.8 points in Libya, and from 14 points to 3.6 points in Tunisia.
Table 2.2: Gross Schooling Rates by Sex in 1996 (%)
Elementary Secondary Higher education
M+F M F M+F M F M+F M F
Morocco 86 97.3 74.2 39.1 44.3 33.7 11.1 12.9 9.3
World 100.9 106.0 95.5 59.4 63.1 55.6 16.9 17.5 16.3
Africa 80.7 88.0 73.4 33.4 36.6 30.2 6.5 8.1 4.9
LDC 70.7 79.6 61.6 19.0 23.1 14.8 3.1 4.6 1.7
DC 100.7 106.5 94.5 50.9 55.6 45.8 9.8 11.4 8.1
Developed 102.3 102.6 101.9 99.5Countne s
Source: UNESCO statistics
Notes: M: male; F: Female; LDC: Less developed countries; DC: Developing counfries.
98.3 100.8 51.0 47.1 55.1
Moroccan rural areas post a serious deficiency in schooling of children, especially girls. Tri
1994, the rate of schooling among girls aged $ to 13 years hardly reached 26.6% in rural
areas, as opposed to 80.4% in urban areas. Among boys, the rate of schooling was 87.5%
in urban areas versus only 59.6% in rural areas. Thus, many chiidren of school-going age
still lack the right to basic education that has the potential to better their lives. The main
reasons for this under-investment in education are ofien related to the poverty, lack of or
distance to schools, particularly in remote areas, and the fact that elementary education is
not yet compulsory in Morocco. The child labour, which is related to the standard of living
of families, also remains an important factor for lack of schooling and high dropout rates
among young children. 21 Although prohibited by law, 22 child labour is tolerated in
Morocco. The 1982 general census of the population counted 46,230 employed children
aged between 5 and 9 and 367,782 employed chiidren aged between 10 and 14, including
259,303 worldng as unpaid family employees. The 1994 general census counted 356,530
children aged 15 or younger among the labour force, which represents 4.3% of the total
21 This is especially true in rural areas, where chiidren work as unpaid family workers.
22 The legal minimum age to work has been flxed at 12 years since 1947. The new project of a
labour code aims to raise it to 15 years.
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labour force and 5.1% of the employed population. Among those chuldren, 74% live in
rural areas and 7% are aged between 5 and 9 (Lahlou, 1999). In addition, detailed data
from the 1999 labour force suwey shows that in rural areas 92.2% of employed workers
aged less than 15 years are unpaid family workers (17.4% in urban areas). This percentage
is 73.1% among workers aged between 15 and 24 (14.6% in urban areas). This situation is
related to poverty, but also to the failure of the educational system and the absence of legal
protection for working children (Lahlou, 1999). Some socio-cultural factors also intervene.
for example, the likelihood that rural chiidren will accept agricultural employment is a
decreasing function ofthe schooling level. Orivel (1995) argues that this is especially truc
in Africa, since young people who attended school are lcss passionate for agricultural
work. They aim at employment in the formal sector, preferably in the public sector, in
urban areas. Awareness of this “negative” effect of education and desire to take advantage
of free labour (unpaid family workers) encourage parents to prevent their children from
attending school.
Pre-schooling also remains weak in Morocco. Hardly 40% of children aged between 3 and
5 benefit from this form of education, which is far from the govemment’s objective to
increase that percentage to 96% by 2004. The age of schooling has previously been
reduced to 6 years instead of 7 years, but still 48% of the children start school at 7 years of
age.
The provision of elementary education to ail children does not seem feasible in the short
term in Morocco. Even if enrolled, many chiidren do not remain in school for a long time.
The school dropout rate remains very high. In 1999, the dropout rate among children aged
between 7 and 15 was 14.5% (2 1.7% in rural areas). In addition, TTthe life expectancy at the
school” in 1999-2000 was 8.17 years (7.37 years for girls) in Morocco versus 11.52 years
in Algena (1998-1999) and 13.54 years in Tunisia (1999-2000). In addition, about 45% of
students who undertake university studies drop out before obtaining a Bachelor’s degree.
Those who succeed, spend on average nine years studying to obtain that degrec, which
normally should require only four years of university study.
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Table 2.3: Schooling and Reasons for Non-Schooling of Chiidren by Area (%)
Urban Rural Total
Attending school 83.7 48.0 65.4Schooling of Droppedoutofschool 8.9 13.3 11.1
children aged Neyer attended school 6.4 38.3 22.8bePveen 7 and 15
Unreported 1.0 0.4 0.7
Distance to school, geographical 1 2 15 2 13 5difficulties
Lackofplaceatschool 0.6 0.1 0.1
No school in the locality ofresidence 0.5 14.5 12.9
Helping parents in their professional 0 4 7 6 3
activities
Obliged to work 1.5 0.3 0.4Reasons of Lacking financial means to cover
non-schooling 46.9 34.4 35.9
expenses related to schoohng
Nointerestforstudies 2.0 5.4 5.0
Attitude of parents towards school 4.8 10.1 9.5
Family problems 2.4 1.9 1.9
Otherreasons 32.9 5.5 8.8
Unreported 6.8 5.5 5.7
Total 100 100 100
Chiidren aged between 7 and 12 years who drooped out 6.6 6.5 5.1
Lackoffinancialmeanstocover 29.9 18.9 22.6
expenses related to educationMain reasons of Children are flot interested indropout 41.6 41.1 41.2
education
Repetition of grads or failure at exams 15.1 6.2 9.3
Source: 199$-1999 National Standard Living Suwey, Direction de la Statistique, Morocco.
The socio-economic factors responsible for flot educating children and for a high dropout
rate still persist and have even worsened in some areas. The percentage of Moroccans
living in poverty grew from 13% in 1991 to 19% in 1998-99. In addition, the 1998-99 rate
of poverty was more than two times higlier in rural areas (27.2%) than in urban areas
(12.0%). Although the rural population accounted for only 46% of the total population in
199$-99, it included 65.9% ofthe population living in poverty.23 As mentioned above, it is
in rural areas that the rates of schooling are particularly low.
The weak rates of schooling in the past resulted in a high rate of illiteracy among the adult
population. This rate was 48% in 199$, 56% in 1995 (69% among women); and 80% in
1960. Currcntly, the fight against illiteracy is mainly undertaken through programs offered
through the mass media, courses in mosques and actions of non govemmental
23 Repères Statistiques, # 47, July 2000, Direction de la Statistique, Morocco.
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organisations. This situation of under-investment in education seems to contrast with the
financial means allocated to education by the govemment. The share of education
expenditure in the govemmental budget doubled over 20 years, growing from 12.5% in
1975 to 24.9% in 1996. In several countries comparable to Morocco, this share varied
between 8% and 17% in 1992 (14.8% in Korea, 12.9% in ChIe, 16.9% in Malaysia, 7.8%
in Nepal), as compared to very high rates of schooling in primary education in the same
year (105% in Korea, 96% in Chue, 93% in Malaysia, 102% in Nepal) •24
An abundant number of studies have documented the positive effect of education on the
economic growth and emergence of new technologies. In Morocco, the agricultural sector
stili constitutes the principal employer and remains the main sector affecting the activity
and employment in other sectors. The country strongly depends on its climatic conditions,
since the positive growth of the GDP aiways follows good crop years. Over the last 25
years, the share of the agricultural sector in the GDP oscillated between 15% and 20%,
whereas its share in employment, although dropping over time, stiil accounts for over 40%
(65.7% in 1960). By way of comparison, in South Korea, which achieved remarkable
levels of development, the share of the agricultural sector in the GDP feil to below 6%,
whercas this share was even higher than that of Morocco before 1979. Moreover, the share
of the agricultural sector in employment in South Korea dropped from 6 1.3% in 1960 to
18.1% in 1990. In Morocco, it feil from 65.7% to 44.7% over the same time period. In fact,
South Korea has first developed successively primary education, and then secondaiy and
university education in order to accompany its economic developmcnt. The importance of
the agricultural sector in employment is closely linked with the level of education, since
agricultural labour supply is supposed to decrease as the educational level increases. A
piece of evidence is that over seven out of ten workers in the Moroccan agricultural are
illiterate.
In 1995, the World Bank clearly pointed out that the low educational level of the
population and the failures of the educational system were the main sources of the
economic dysfunction in Morocco. The World Bank had then proposed that Morocco
implement many refomis, among which were the deveÏopment and fundamental reform of
the education and vocational training systems. The strategy proposed aimed at reaching the
following objectives over a 15-year period (that is to say, by 2010):
24 Source: World Bank Report on Morocco presented to theKingofMorocco in 1995.
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(N (j) Ail chuidren, including girls, must complete at least the first stage of
elementary education (years 1-6).
(ii) At ieast 75% of ail chiidren completing the first stage of elementary education
must enrol in the second stage of elementaiy education (years 7-9), while the
rate of schooling in secondary education (years 10-12) should reach at least
50%.
(iii) Vocational training should aim at teaching skiils required by companies, while
most of this training should be planned, financed and offered by employers
(directly or through contracts). At least haif of the vocational training should
aim at improving the skills of the employed labour force (continuing
education).
(iv) The rate ofhigher education enrolment has to double.
The situation in Morocco, marked at the same time by weak investment in education and
high unemployment rate (see Section 2.3), seems to match the situation described by
Cahuc & Zylberberg (1996). They argue that a weak investment in human capital bas a
negative effect on growth and that weak growth does not improve employment, which, in
retum, contributes to the slowing down of investment in human capital. Consequently, the
economy could fali into a cycle of unemployment and stagnation, where unemployment
maintains the stagnation, while stagnation maintains unemployment. On the confrary, a
high level of investment in human capital is favourable to growth, employment, and,
ultimately investment in human capital.
Education also contributes to the emergence of a civic society able to take part in making
good decisions. Friedman (1962) argues: “A stable and democratic society is impossible
without a minimum degree of Ïiteracy and knowÏedge on the part of most citizens and
without widespread acceptance ofsome common set ofvalues. Education can contribute to
both. In consequence, the gain from education ofa chiÏd accrues izot onÏy to the chiÏd or to
his parents but also to other inembers ofthe society.”
Ç
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Currently, the govemment’ s actions aim at decreasing the rate of illiteracy to less than 20%
by 2010 and to eradicating it completely by 2015. Unfortunately, a recent report published
by UNESCO on November, 2002 entitled “Report of Follow-Up on Education for Ail
2002. Is tue World on tue Good Way?” mentions Morocco among 28 countries that will
likely not reach (by 2015) any of the three measurable objectives laid down at the world
Forum of Education held in Dakar in 2000. These objectives are primary school for ah,
equality between girls and boys, and reduction by half ofthe rate ofilliteracy. According to
the report, achieving these objectives in countries such as Morocco remains a dream.
2.3 Moroccan Labour Market
“A major benefit ofeducation is the iower risk ofunemployment
at higher educationai levels.” Mincer (1991)
The principal data source on employment in Morocco is the ongoing labour force surveys
carried out by the Departrnent of Statistics. Data prior to 1999 mainly concems urban
areas.
2.3.1 Cliaracteristics of the Labour Force
In 2000, the size ofthe Moroccan labour force was 10.3 million, representing 52.9% ofthe
population aged 15 and older (56% in 1995). 0f the total labour force, 26.8% were women.
The share of the labour force among the population aged 15 and older was 47% in urban
areas versus 61.4% in rural areas, and 78.8% for men as opposed to only 27.9% for
women.
The main characteristic of the Moroccan labour force is the preponderance of uneducated
workers. Jndeed, in 1999, about one out of each two workers (46%) had neyer attended
school and 24% attended only the first stage of elementary school (years 1-6). Workers
with post-secondary degrees represented less than 7% of the labour force. This situation
results from the high rate of ilhiteracy, which is close to 50% in the population sector aged
15 and older (see Section 2.2.2). In connection with the nature ofjobs, uneducated workers
are naturally more present in rural areas, where they represent 69.1% of the total labour
force versus 24.8% in urban areas.
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Q The level of education ofthe labour force is, however, improving over time. Between 1995and 1999, the share of uneducated workers has declined by 9.5 points, while the share of
workers having completed the first stage of elementary education lias increased 5.7 points
(sec Table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Distribution ofthe Labour Force by Level ofEducation (%)
Educationlevels 1995 1999
None 55.9 46.4
Elementary, lst stage (years 1-6) 18.1 23.8
Elementary, 2nd stage (years 7-9) 12.1 13.4
Secondary 9.2 9.5
University 4.7 6.8
Labour force size (in millions) 9.4 10.3
2.3.2 Unemployment
In 2000, the unemployment rate was 13.6%, corresponding to 1.4 million people seeking
employment. In urban areas, the unemployment rate was higher (21.5%), in particular
among educated workers (29.7% for workers who have completed at least the first stage of
elementary education versus 13.1% among those who had neyer attended school or who
had flot completed the first stage of elementary education). In addition, the unemployment
rate was higher among women (26.7%) than among men (19.9%). Rural areas posted a low
unemployment rate (only 5%), but they were dominated by non-remunerated
employment,25 which accounts for 50.9% of total employment in these areas versus only
7.3% in urban areas. Finally, the unemployment rate among rural women was only 1.7%, a
fact which could be explained by the fact that in rural areas women are often either
employed or out ofthe labour force.
25 Unpaid family workers
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Table 2.5: Indicators ofEmployment and Unemployment in Morocco in 2000 by Area
Urban Rural Total
Labour force size (in thousands) 5,345 4,940 10,285
% Women 23.3% 30.5% 26.8%
Labour force participation rate 47.0% 61.4% 52.9%
Men 74.0% 85.4% 78.8%
Wornen 21.3% 37.5% 27.9%
Employed workers (in thousands) 4,199 4,692 8,89 1
Employment rate 36.9% 58.3% 45.8%
%unpaidworkers 7.3% 50.9% 30.3%
Unemployed workers (in thousands) 1,146 248 1,394
Unemploymentrate 21.5% 5.0% 13.6%
Men 19.9% 6.5% 13.8%
Women 26.7% 1.7% 13.0%
Uneducated or first stage ofelementary 13.1% 3.5% 7.1%
education (years 1-6) not completed
At least the first stage ofelementary 29.7% 17.0% 27.5%
education is completed
The unemployment rate almost doubled between 1971 and 1994. The number of
unemployed workers increased by 84% between 1971 and 1982, and by 117% between
1982 and 2000. This deterioration in employment particularly affected urban areas where
the unemployment rate has becn above 20% for several years. In addition, the worsening of
unemployment in urban areas involved mainly young people and especially educated ones,
in particular those with a secondary or university degrees. In rural areas, the unemployment
rate was almost the same in 1971 and 2000.
Table 2.6: Evolution ofUnemployment between 1971 and 2000
Urban Rural Total
1971 1982 1994 2000 1971 1982 1994 2000 1971 1982 1994 2000
Number of
unemployed 216 322 920 1,146 133 320 412 248 349 642 1,332 1,394
workers, i0
Unemploy- 15.0 12.3 20.3 21.5 5.2 9.5 10.8 5.0 8.8 10.7 16.0 13.6
ment rate ( /o)
Me,, 14.4 11.7 17.1 19.9 5.2 10.0 10.9 6.5 8.2 10.7 14.1 13.8
Wo,nen 19.1 14.2 29.6 26.7 5.3 6.5 10.5 1.7 12.1 10.7 23.1 13.0
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By level of education, practicaily ail levels between elementaiy school and university are
affected by unemployment more than uneducated workers. Those holding vocational
training diplomas are the most affccted, but workers with university degrees are also
involved in the crisis. Therefore, investment in human capital in Morocco is challenged by
a high risk of a progressive annihilation by the increasing unemployment duration, instead
of being consolidated within a job. This involves a dead loss of resources and human
means mobilised for this investment by the govemment as well as by individuals.
Table 2.7: Urban Unemployment Rate by Level ofEducation (%)
1997 1998 1999
None 11.6 11.9 15.2
Elementary education 25.2 25.6 29.2
Vocational training, specialisation level 38.2 40.4 39.0
Vocational training, qualification level 38.7 34.6 34.3
Secondary 31.1 35.8 33.1
Technicians 15.7 17.1 20.1
University 29.7 30.9 31.3
Total 18.1 19.1 22.0
Aggregated data can conceal large differences within the same level of education. This is,
for example, the case with university graduates. In 1998, the urban unemployment rate was
close to 50% among holders of Bachelor’s degrecs versus only 5.3% among those holding
higher university and 5.6% among those with technical school degrees (see Table 2.8).
Table 2.8: Unemployment Rate among Highly Educated Workers in 1998 (Urban Areas)
Degree
University, Below Bachelor’s
University, Bachelor’ s
University, Above Bachelor’s
Technical School
Note: These rates were calculated by the author based on the 1998 Moroccan Labour Force Survey
data file.
Total Female
36.4 43.4
48.2 60.8
5.3 19.0
5.6 9.7
Workers also experience long speils of unemployment. In 1999, about 72% of unemployed
workers have been unemployed for at least 12 months and 26.8% for at least 60 months.
These percentages were respectively 60.5% and 23.4% for uneducated workers versus
84.6% and 29% for highly educated ones.
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Table 2.9: Unemployment Duration by Education Level in 1999 (%)
None Medium(*) Higher(**) Total
39.5 23.3 15.4 28.3
23.7 28.6 32.2 27.3
13.3 18.8 23.3 17.5
23.4 29.2 29.0 26.8
Less than 12 months
12-3 5 months
36-59 months
60 months and up
() Elementary and secondary (flot completed)(**) Secondary (graduated) and university
finally, the agricultural sector (including forestry and fishing) constitutes the most
important employment sector in Morocco, providing nearly 50% of total employment. The
industrial sector (including the handicraft indusfry) accounts for only 14% of aggregate
employment, whereas the public sector remains an important employer, particularly in
urban areas (2 1%) and for educated workers (see Table 2.13 below).
2.3.3 Causes of Unemployment
The explanations given for the high level of unemployment in Morocco are many:
demographic factors, weak growth of the economy, distortions in the labour market, etc. In
the case of educated workers, other factors also confribute, such as the rapid growth in the
number of educated workers (in connection with the demographic factor, but also with the
govemmental policy aimed at inciting young people to invest in education), the imbalance
of education and labour market demand, and the reduction of employment in the public
scctor.
The rapid growth of the population is naturally one of the first factors blamed in
developing countries for the pressure on the labour market. The population ofMorocco lias
tripled over the last 50 years due particularly to a high birth rate and a low death rate. The
latter rate has decreased from 2.5% in 1950 to 0.51% in the early 2000s, due in particular
to the improvement in food quality and sanitary conditions.
The pressure on the labour market is high in urban areas, where the size of the population
lias increased from 3.4 million in 1960 to more than 16 million in 2001 (a total growtli of
381% versus only 56% in rural areas) (see Table 2.10). In addition, since 1994, the size of
tlie urban population lias been higlier than the size of tlie rural population. Tlie increase in
80
the size of the urban population lias also been reinforced by the transformation of some
rural zones into urban zones, and by the strong rural exodus caused by the aggravation of
climatic conditions and the deterioration of the farmers’ standard of living. Lane, Haldm
and Miranda (1999) argue that this high growth of the urban labour force has largely
confributed to the detenoration of employment in urban areas of Morocco.
Table 2.10: Evolution ofthe Size ofthe Moroccan Population by Area (in millions)
Urban Rural Total
1960 3.39 8.24 11.63
1971 5.41 9.97 15.38
1982 8.73 11.69 20.42
1994 13.41 12.67 26.07
2001 16.31 12.86 29.17
Variation between
+381.1% +56.1% +150.9%
Tri rural areas, where the unemployment rate is low in spite of a high labour force
participation rate as compared to urban areas, unpaid family employment prevails,
particularly among women (sec Table 2.5). Detailed data from the 1999 labour force
survey shows that unpaid workers constituted 52% of the employed labour force in rural
areas (36.8% among men and 80.2% among women) versus only 5.6% in urban areas
(5.4% among men and 6.2% among women).
The second factor usually quoted to explain the worsening of unemployment is the weak
performance of the Moroccan economy. Tndeed, the jagged economic growth over the last
few years did not make it possible for the urban labour market to absorb the large number
of newcomers. The GDP shows large variations over time (sec Table 2.11), but the high
growth rates are always observed for years marked by good pluviomefric precipitations,
which is in advantage to uneducated workers. In fact, high growth rates are mainly due to
the agricultural sector, for which production oscillates in very broad amplitudes over time.
$1
Table 2.11: Annual Growth Rate ofthe GDP in Morocco
Year Annual growth rate ofthe
GDP (%)
1992
- 4.0
1993
- 1.0
1994 + 10.4
1995
- 6.6
1996 +12.1
1997 - 2.0
1998 +6.3
1999 +0.2
2000 +0.9
2001 +6.5
Additionally, some distortions on the labour market contribute to amplifying the
unemploymcnt rate. Rama (1998), who studied the labour market in Tunisia, a country
comparable to Morocco, reports that high rates of unemployment result from some
problems of measurement and classification of individuals according to their status (out of
labour force, employed, or unemploycd). For example, it is flot easy to assign a label to
rural women who work on family farms (employed) and take care of their households (out
of the labour force) at the same time. For men, the line between being unemployed and
working in the informai sector is aiso very thin. Rama adds that some educated workers
seek employment only in the formai sector and refuse (or decline) employment in the
informaI sector. However, tliey are still classified among the unemployed, which
contributes to over-estimation of the reai unemployment rate. In the specific case of
women in Morocco, Bougroum, Tbourk and Trachen (1999) confirm the difficulty in
distinguishing between inactivity (out of labour force) and unemployment. For example,
women out of the labour force for matrimonial reasons can easily re-enter the labour
market, particularly when there are opportunities for employment in the public sector.
Conceming the unemployment of educated workers, which lias been increasing continually
since 1984, one of the explanations can be found in the rapid growth of the number of
educated people since Morocco gained independence from France in 1956. The
govemmental policy aims at increasing the rate of schooling among chiidren in order to
reduce the illiteracy rate and ensure a qualified labour force. Similarly, the fast growth of
school-going age children, and the growing interest of the parents to educate their chiidren
sfrongly stimulate the demand for education. Hence, the rates of schooling have
significantly increased over time. The average rate of schooling in primary education
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doubled between 1960 and 1995. Moreover, the rate of illiteracy among those aged 15 to
24 dropped from 66.9% in 1970 to 32.7% in 2000.
The discrepancy between the education provided in schools and the continually evolving
needs of the labour market is another contributor to unemployment of educated workers,
even though Lane, Hakim and Miranda (1999) reject this assumption and rather refer to the
failure of the system of production (insufficiency of the labour demand). There exists in
Morocco, an overwhelming perception that the Moroccan educational system does not
support the economic and social development of the country. The university is regarded as
a machine which merely produces civil servants instead of workers who are able to meet
the needs of the private sector and to confront economic realities. Furthermore, some
employers think that trainings provided in school are useless for their companies and
instead provide on-the-job training to their employees. In addition, instead of thinking
about the quality of education, the current educational system is based on the idea that
university contributes to individual growth and is not necessarily a springboard for
employment. Consequently, young people should not be deprived of education just because
they will not be able to find employment in the future. Thus, universities have become a
refuge for the potentially unemployed. lndeed, some young people go to university (or stay
there for years) simply because they have no other option (Bougroum, Ibourk and Trachen,
1999). This behaviour is also encouraged by the facts that education in public universities
is free and that students are allowed to repeat grades they fail (sometimes indefinitely).
Furthermore, the increase in demand for higher education (particularly since the reform of
1987, which resulted in the increase ofthe rate of success at the secondary level) as well as
the free access to university have caused the overpopulation of universities, the fali in the
quality of graduates, and the depreciation of the value of university degrees among
employers.
In addition, the switch of the language of instruction from french to Arabic in the public
elementary and secondary schools implemented in the early 1980s seems to have
contributed to an increase in the gap between education and employment. Indeed, Angrist
and Lavy (1997) find that the language change lcd to a substantial reduction in retum to
education for young workers affected by the change.
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Many employers, particuiariy those from the informai sector, express a sfrong preference
for an uneducated labour force, as such workers are inexpensive, easily accept their
worldng conditions and compiy with the organisationai and disciplinary norms of their
companies. Jndeed, illiterate or modestly cducated workers easily accept any ldnd of
employment and are less demanding conceming wages, conditions or duration of work. On
the other hand, highly educated workers have high aspirations for remuneration and the
nature of their work, which they cannot easily satisfy in the Moroccan labour market.
Indeed, the elevation of the educational level increases the preference for protected
employment (Orivel, 1995; Gaude, 1997; and Combamous, 1999), but the prevaience of
the informai sector (including agriculture) and the behaviour of some employers toward
educated workers make it difficuit for educated workers to find employment meeting their
aspirations especially in a labour market overshadowed by informai activities. Moreover,
some empioyers in the private sector seem to take advantage of the worsening
unemployment among educated workers by iowering wages even further, which serves to
repei educated workers from the private sector.
Due to ail of the above factors, the siowdown of recmitment in the public sector seems to
be the factor having a greatest responsibiiity in the worsening of unempioyment of
educated workers. The increased number of new positions in the public sector initialiy
marked the will of the govemment to fight against the worsening of the unemployment rate
reveaied by the 1971 census. However, the govemment couid flot maintain this poiicy
because of the financiai crisis of the cariy 1 980s, which continues stiii. In fact, because of
the adjustment and austerity poiicies adopted by Morocco since August 1983 under the
aegis of the International Monetary Funds (ilvIf), there was at first a canceilation of more
than 19,000 new positions in the public sector predicted in the budget of 1983, foiiowcd by
the limitation of recmitment for the subsequent years. In 2000, the number of new
positions in the public sector represented hardiy 21% ofthat in 1976.
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Table 2.12: Number of New Positions in the Public Sector in Morocco per Year
Year New positions
1974 14587
1975 12001
1976 51416
1977 33 274
197$ 29531
1979 40 120
1980 41173
1981 33 666
1982 45267
1983 to 1993 10 000 to 15 000! year
1994 17000
1995 12 700*
1998/99 12 000*
1999/2000 11 000*
2000 (2h1 semester) 13 000*
Source: Departinent ofFinance(*,) Estimates in the budget.
The payroil (total salaries) in the public sector is considered too high and weighs heaviiy
on the govemmental budget. The labour costs absorb 65% of the functioning budget
(project of the 1998-1999 budget), which the officiais consider too high as compared to
countries on the same level of development. It is then a question of reducing the
govemment rate of expenditure by reducing the number of new recruitments and by
creating oniy positions meeting the real needs ofthe public sector.
In a 199$ report on Morocco, the EVIF made international comparisons showing that the
share of the public sector’s payroli in the GDP was too high in Morocco, as compared to
similar counfries: 6% in Egypt, 7% in Malaysia, and 6.4% in Turkey versus 11.5% in
Morocco. The IMF suggested gradually bringing back this share to 9.5% by refusing any
raises in salaries and by freezing recrnitments except for priority fields (health, education,
and justice). This contrasts with the generous salary increases granted under the previous
govemment (199$-2002), particularly for engineers and teachers.
Regarding the size of the public sector, the number of civil servants in Morocco does not
seem to be plethonc. The share of the public sector in aggregate employment is
approximately 10% versus 23% on average in developing countries and 21% in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Even in urban areasÇ this share does flot exceed 21% in Morocco.
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Figure 2.1: Share of Public and Private Employment by Group of Counfries (Average of
National Percentages)
% in total % employed in the
Education level (*) labour force public sector
None 65.23 7.83
Elementary 23.8$ 20.47
Secondary 2.79 46.61
University 2.15 61.33
Technical school 0.80 71.07
Total 100.00 21.43
Notes: These rates were calculated by the author based on the 1998 Moroccan Labour Force Survey data
file. (*) Excluding vocational training, which is, however, included in the total
The sharp slowdown of recruitment in the public sector and the behaviour of educated
workers who prefer employment only in that sector have caused the increase in the number
of educated unemployed. As depicted in the following graph, the situation of highly
educated workers started to worsen immediately afier the implementation of structural
0.79 0.77
Total (54) OECDcountries (15) veIoping Countries in
countries (25) transition (14)
El Riblic
D Rivate
— __J
E..
Note: In parentheses is the number of countries suweyed.
Source: International Labour Office (1999)
Despite the sharp slowdown in recmitment, the public sector stiil remains the main
employer of highly educated workers (see Table 2.13). Moreover, educated workers are flot
sufficiently interested in employment in the private sector and often desire employment in
the public sector exclusively even if it is associated with high risks ofunemployment.
Table 2.13: Share ofthe Public Sector in Employment in Urban Areas in 1998
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adjustment policies in 1983. The share ofhighly educated workers among the unemployed
population increased continuously over time, changing from 3.1% in 1984 to over 20%
since 1996. In addition, this share lias been higher than the share of the same workers
among the employed population since 1990 (see figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Evolution of the Share of Highly Educated in the Employed and Unemployed
Labour Force
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Finally, the worsening of unemployment among highly educated workers has seriously
affected the image of education in society. This image is tamished further by the speeches
of politicians and the media which refer only to the case of unemployed educated workers
and report extensively on their demonsfrations. The society used to blame uneducated
unemployed for not having invested in education, but nowadays the same society does not
know what for to blame educated unemployed. Education lias paradoxically become
synonymous with unemployment in Morocco. fronically, a punch line of a popular
anecdote is that the day of graduation is that of admission into the “club for the
unemployed.”
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C 2.4 Employment Policy in Morocco
The recruitmcnt policy in the public sector adopted in the past has tumed this sector into
the exclusive employer of highly educated workers. This policy, launched shortly after the
independence from France in 1956, aimed at the moroccanization26 of the public sector, the
modernisation of this sector and the accompaniment of the development in social sectors
(education, health, etc.). It also aimed at making up for the large deficiency in these
sectors. As a result, the demand for educated workers increased sharply, while the majority
ofthe population was illiterate. The rate ofilliteracy ofyoung people aged between 15 and
24 years approached 70% in 1970. The demand for skilled workers was so high that ail
highly educated workers wcre for a long time guaranteed employment in the public sector,
particularly in education. To meet the enormous needs of the educational system, many
schools and training centres for teachers were open in all parts of the country, receiving
hundreds of secondary school and university graduates. In addition, the public sector used
to propose employment contracts to students from technical schools while they were still
studying. ilowever, the number of graduates desiring employment in the public sector
increased at the same time, which lead the govemment to tighten requirements for certain
positions. Nowadays, the education system is saturated and many of the teacher training
schools are inactive, but they are still open and their staff is still paid by the govemment.
On the other hand, in order to allow the public sector to benefit from an educated labour
force at a lower cost while at the same time weakening the pressure on the labour market
for highly educated workers, the govemment instituted civic service, which obliged ail
university graduates to work in the public sector for 24 months right following graduation
for modest salaries (approximately 50% of the ongoing salaries). The govemment also
aimed at allowing young workers to acquire professional experience useful for finding
employment in the private sector. The govemment also aimed at recovering a part of the
funds spent in educating those graduates (The govemment provides frec education and
scholarships for all students). However, workers rccruited within the framework of the
civic service were generally integrated into the public sector as permanent workers on a
full salary afier the 24-month period of service. Workers who desire employment in the
private sector must either serve the govemment for 24 months or undergo military service.
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This obligation sometimes constituted a great constraint for those workers. This is
particularly the case with doctors. The public sector had thus been made an obligatory
passage for all university graduates. The civic service was abolished at the end of the
1990s due to financial difficulties experienced by the govemment and on recommendation
of the IMF. However, in reality the govemment was not able to handle the increasing
number of graduates who coveted the civic service with the aim of integrating into the
public sector thereafter.
The above-mentioned policies (including the recruitment policy with the aim of fighting
against the unemployment among highly educated workers) resulted in university
graduates not being aware of any employer beside the public sector. Consequently, the
public sector still remains a key employer for university graduates even 15 years later the
implementation ofthe adjustment and austerity policies (see Table 2.13).
However, despite the slowdown of recruitment in the public sector since 1983, graduates,
in particular those holding university degrees, still consider employment as a right that the
govemment must guarantee them. Moreover, they require employment in the public sector
specifically and sometimes decline offers of work in the private sector. They regularly
protest continuing unemployment by any means possible (demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger
strikes, etc.) to reach that objective.
In order to validate their daims, in October 1991 unemployed graduates created The
National Association of Unemployed Graduates, and many other local associations of the
unemployed. Those associations lay the blame ofthe unemployment ofthe educated on the
govemment, by accusing it of not investing enough in the social sectors (particularly in
education and health), where Morocco shows an obvious gap as compared to developed
countries. They daim that investing in those sectors could create enough jobs for all
unemployed graduates. Their objective is stili employment in the public sector.
Facing these daims, the King of Morocco repeatedly emphasised that employment of
young people remains his concems, and that employment is flot synonymous with being
civil servant, as it is fraditionally conceived. In addition, the idea that any diploma or
degree guarantees employment and that employment in the public sector is a right for any
26 A policy designed to replace foreign workers with Moroccan workers
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unemployed educated worker should be abandoned. Employment in the private sector,
including seif-employment, should henceforth supercede employment in the public sector.
The King also intended to discourage young workers from seeking employment in the
public sector, claiming that this sector does not offer good careers for ambitious and
qualified workers: in the public sector, there is no place neither for adventitre norfor
imagination, as weÏÏ as there is no Ïiberty. In addition, the public sector does flot offer
opportun ities to young workers lookingfor adventure and wishing to dare their capacities
and to cariy oîtt their ambitions” (King Hassan II, speech in July, 1997).
In fact, one of the aims of the structural adjustment policies implemented in August, 1983
was to assign to private companies a more important role in the economy, especially in the
creation of employment. The private sector would thus substitute for the public sector with
regard to recruitment of educated workers. With this purpose in mmd, the Code of
Industrial Investments promulgated in 1983 provided encouragement for the creation of
jobs, such as grants of a premium of 5,000 MAD to industrial SME for each stable job
created during their first four years of establishment. However, while great theoretically,
this measure has neyer been applied on practice.
In the late 1 980s, the govemment promulgated two laws aimed at interesting young
graduates in self-employment. This form of employment is considered by the govemment
as an honourable option for those who cannot find paid work. In addition, self-employment
generates paid employment for others as well. The first law is Law 36/87, also known as
Young Entrepreneurs’ Loans and consisting of granting bans covering up to 90% of the
total cost of the project at preferential interest rates to graduates who wish to start their
own business. The second law was Law 16/87, which instituted tax exemptions in profit of
young entrepreneurs holding vocational training diplomas. In addition, Law 16/87 listed 20
frades that could be carried out only by graduates holding vocational training diplomas or
by experienced workers who succeed at professional aptitude tests. This regulation, which
aimed at protecting graduates from competitiveness from uneducated workers or those
frained on-the-job has neyer been implemented.
Years afier the implementation of the seif-employment project, its results are far less
encouraging than what the govemment had expected. The yearly average number of
C projects financed under the Young Entrepreneurs’ Loans did not exceed 1,000, whereas
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less than 100 projects on average are initiated annually under Law 16/87. Paid employment
obviously remains a priority for graduates.
In 1990, the Moroccan govemment created the National Council of Youth and Future
(CNJA) 27 in 1990. The principal mission of the council was to find viable solutions
capable of remedying the problem of unemployment among young workers in general and
among graduates in particular. The first and famous action carried out by the CNJA was
the census ofthe unemployed graduates. This operation aimed at determining the extent of
unemployment, but it had been interpreted by most people as a recruitment campaign for
the public sector, especially because of the great publicity that preceded it. Thus, the
unemployed participated the census enthusiastically. In fact, some private sector workers
(mainly from the informal sector) reported themselves as unemployed in the hope of
obtaining a better job in the public sector. Tens of thousands of job seekers had been
counted, most of them with Bachelor’s degrees. Bougroum, lbourk and Trachen (1999)
notice that 8.8% of workers reported as unemployed in the census were employed in the
private sector, but their employment conditions were not good enough as compared to the
standards of employment in the public sector. Bougroum, Ibourk and Trachen (1999) argue
that graduates are potential and permanent seekers of employment in the public sector, the
fact which leads them to report themselves as unemployed to profit from the govemmental
actions of recruitment. The census (and similar govemmental policies) might have even
resulted in some women moving from out of the labour force into the labour force in the
hope of being recruited to the public sector. Studies on the employment of vocational
training graduates support this behaviour (Direction de la PÏanfication de la Formation
Professionnelle, 1998). The proportion of employed recent vocational training graduates
who report themselves as unemployed ranges from 15% to 20%.
o
27 In French: Conseil National de la Jeunesse et de l’Avenir.
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In 1993, a new law was promulgated to promote employment for graduates in the private
sector through a program called Training for Employment. The govemment claimed that
graduates lacked professional experience required by finns. The program aimed at helping
those graduates to acquire experience through training in companies. The govemment
exempted companies that received or employed trainees from paying employer’s
contributions. The trainees received modest salaries during their period of training. At the
same time, 10 Orientation and Information Centres for Employment were opened in order
to match the labour demand with the labour supply.
These actions did not stimulate the acquisition of permanent paid work in the private
sector, a fact which drove the CNJA to reconsider the promotion of seif-employment by
modifying the already existing device (Young Entrepreneurs’ Loans) in order to provide
more incentives to educated workers to start their own businesses. A fund for promoting
the employment of young workers was instituted in 1994. In addition to granting bans to
young entrepreneurs and enlarging eligibility to these bans, the fund aimed at financing
the construction of professional premises to benefit young entrepreneurs. It also aimed at
providing more assistance for educated people in creating companies by young people.
Finally, it provided further trainings (of short duration) to young educated job-seekers in
order to adapt their profiles to the requirements of the labour market. One of the actions
financed by this fund was training about 100 unempboyed workers with Bachelor’s degrees
to become drivers of transportation vehicles (for goods and passengers). Many
transportation companies committed to recruit the trainees at the end of the program.
However, trainees experienced many difficulties integrating into their work environment,
since most of their co-workers were uneducated. As a matter of fact, the selected workers
were considered too educated to be teamsters. Some empboyers also realised that these
workers did not easily accept the working conditions and tended to request many changes
to their work environment. Consequently, many employers forfeitcd their commitment.
More surprisingly, the trainees initiated many actions in order to daim jobs in the public
sector. The same ldnd ofbehaviour had been observed in similar initiatives.
In 1997, the govemment reformed the existing program Training for Employment, with the
objective of helping between 20,000 and 25,000 young workers annually (over a 4-year
period) to find empboyment in the private sector. The idea was to facilitate the transition
between school and employment for recent graduates through training for 18 months in
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private companies. In the meantime, companies who receive trainees would profit from
skilled labour at a lower cost. The govemment pays halfofthe salaiy paid to each trainee 28
as well as ail expenses related to any further training in specific schools that the companies
would recommend during the period of training. Moreover, companies are flot obliged to
recruit the trainees at the end of the program, but if they do they are exonerated from ail the
employers’ and social Ioads (relating to this recruitment fora certain period oftime).
Lastly, in 2000 the govemment created the National Agency for Promoting Employment
and Competencies (ANAPEC 29) with the principal missions of prospecting and collecting
job offers from employers and matching the labour demand with the labour suppiy;
receiving, informing, and advising job seekers; and assisting young entrepreneurs with the
realization of their economic projects.
Currently, the government estimates the annual deficit of jobs to be between 30,000 and
40,000. The program of the new govemment appointed in November 2002 envisions
maldng up this deficit by promoting investments and refonning the educational system,
particularly the vocational training. Unemployed graduates were flot long in reacting by
accusing the govemment of not creating enough jobs in the public sector and of seeking to
push them out to the private sector, where they pretend to be exploited by employers.
The pressure exerted by the unemployed on the govemment is sometimes successful. Many
recruitment campaigns for the public sector are aimed solely at absorbing this pressure and
have no connections with the real needs of the sector. In 1990 (many years after the
implementation of the structural adjustment policies) and under the aegis of the CNJA, the
local communities (local elected councils) had been forced to hire 30,000 graduates. This
move was flot backed by any economic logic. Budgets allowed to investment were
converted into salaries. Currently, the over-staffing in these communities is estimated at
40,000.° In the mid-1990s, the govemment was also forced to recmit ail highly educated
unemployed holding degrees above Bachelor’s (about 2,700 workers). The problem of
unemployment in this category was temporarily solved. The recruits were often assigned to
tasks not corresponding to their fields of study, but they did not seem to object, since their
first objective was to obtain employment in the public sector. Thus, the educated
2$ The allowance varies from 800 to 1,300 Dirhams, according to the level ofthe trainee’s diploma.
29 Agence Nationale de Promotion de l’Emploi et des Compétences
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unemployed know that while forcing the govemment’s hand is flot easy, it is not
impossible.
The massive recruitment of graduates unconnected to the real needs of the public sector lcd
this sector into the paradoxical situation which it finds itself While the public sector is
over-staffed, it lias a need to fill particular profiles. Moreover, any recmitment with the
unique objective to fight unemployment only produces the opposite effect, since it incites
other unemployed to insist upon employment in the public sector.
2.5 Adjusting the Situation
2.5.1 Understanding the Workers’ Behaviour
The behaviour of highly educated workers unambiguously reflects their “exfreme’
preference for employment in the public sector. This is likely the source of the problem.
This behaviour is the result of the govemmental policies with regards to recruitment in the
public sector, as well as the strong segmentation of the labour market in the public sector
versus the private sector.
As mentioned earlier, the recruitment in the public sector is often aimed at fighting the
unemployment of educated workers, which nourishes the workers’ hope to be recruited
into this sector and thus reinforces waiting for employment in the public sector. This hope
is also consolidated by the promises made by the govemment to solve the unemployment
of educated workers each time the workers protest as well as by the speeches of the
politicians who, at the time of the elections, promise magical solutions to the
unemployment problem. Since recruitment is ofien based on the level of education (or
degree), with no distinction between fields of study and with limited concem for the
quality of the degree, it is flot surprising to see many young people seeldng high
diplomas/degrees regardless of their quality or subject of study. The diploma/degree is
simply a prop for the public sector and lias virtually no professional meaning in itself
(Bougroum, lhourk and Trachen, 1999).
30 The Moroccan daily newspaper, “The Economist.” Electronic publishing, 6/21/2002
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The labour market in Morocco suffers from a strong segmentation of the public and the
pnvate sectors. Orivel (1995) notes that salaries for certain professions, particularly in the
public sector, are too high and have no correlation to productivity. For example, salaries of
teachers in primary education, shortly after independence reached levels of up to 25 times
the GDP per capita in Africa (versus 1 to 1.5 times in the OECD counfries, less than 2
times in Asia, and 3.3 times in Latin America) (Edwards, 1985 quoted by Orivel, 1995).
The main consequence of this situation is to make careers in the public sector so attractive
that in several countries the public sector has long been the exclusive employer of highly
educated workers. The employment in the public sector had even become a right according
to the beliefs of some workers. This explains why one could at the same time observe high
retums to education and negligible contributions of education to the economic growth.
Highly educated workers massively engage in non-productive employment in the public
sector. The public sector’s wage premium seems to benefit all the categories of workers
because of the weight of the informal sector and because of the unreasonable remuneration
policy of the public sector. In Morocco, the nominal minimum hourly wage normally paid
to uneducated workers with no experience has increased 26 times during the last 52 years,
with an average increase every two years. The current minimum hourly wage is 29 times
that of 1948 and 6.3 times that of 1977 (see Table 2.14). Although it is mandatory, the
minimum wage is not necessarily paid even in the formal private sector (even less in the
informal sector). Indeed, to meet the legal conditions on the minimum wage, some
employers in this sector tend to declare full-time workers as part-time workers, while other
employers simply do flot declare ail their staff.
Table 2.14: Evolution of the Nominal Minimum Wage (Industry, Trade and Liberal
Professions)
1948 End 1962 1977 End 1996 20001950s 1980s
Nominal minimumhourly 0.30 0.80 0.85 1.40 4.76 7.98
$7$(*)
wage (Dh)
Number of increases ofthe
minimum wage during the ... 8 1 4 7 5 1
decade
(*) To give an idea about the evolution of the minimum hourly wage in constant MAD, we notice
that the nominal minimum hourly wage increased on average 2.4% per year between 1996 and
2000, as opposed to 1.9% for ifie inflation rate during the same period oftime (on average per year).
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Many studies argue that workers also prefer employment in the public sector for
nonpecuniaiy reasons (Blank, 1985; Gaag and Vijverberg, 1988; Smith, 19765; Ophem,
1993 and Stelcner, Graag and Vijverbeg, 1989). Employment in the public sector is
generally recognised as stable, which attracts risk-adverse workers (Bellante and Link,
1981). Even if the public sector and the private sector pay the same wages, there is an
excess of labour supply in the public sector. This is more true in Morocco than elsewhere
because of the weight of the informal sector and the prestige associated with the job of a
civil servant. Employment in the public sector also provides some very important indirect
benefits (easy access to credit, medical coverage, pension, etc.).
Significant wage differentials and differences in the working conditions motivate certain
workers to remain unemployed while seeldng employment in the sector where wages and
working conditions are better. This argument has bcen advanced by Hams and Todaro
(1970) and other researchers to explain the high urban unemployment rate in developing
countries. The substantial wage gap between urban and rural areas involves the migration
of rural workers towards urban areas in search of high-wage jobs. This migration will
continue as long as the expected wage in urban areas is higher than the wage in the
agricultural sector. The urban unemployment rate will increase until the expected wage in
urban areas is equal to the wage in rural areas. The larger the wage differential, the higlier
the urban unemployment rate at its equilibrium.
The model of employment sector choice developed in the first chapter uses the same logic.
We showed how the preference for employment in a high-wage sector is an increasing
function of the wage differential between sectors, a decreasing function of the expected
differential in unemployment durations, and a decreasing function of the individual
discount rate. When the wage differential is substantial andlor the discount rate is low,
some workers could rationally choose to remain unemployed instead of accepting
employment in the low-wage sector. We proceeded to test this argument using data from a
sample of workers holding university degrees (including technical schools) drawn from the
199$ Moroccan labour force survey. The selectivity-corrected hourly wage gap between
the two sectors is extremely high (over 80% in favour of the public sector), but the
unemployment durations are higher in the public sector as compared to the private sector.
Yet, workers who seek employment in the private sector also experience great difficulties
in finding employment in this sector. This could be partly explained by the fact that
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educated workers do flot necessarily accept any job offers from the private sector,
especially from the informai sector. In addition, workers put more weight on non
pccuniary factors such as job stability when selecting the employment sector, which resuits
in the modest sensitivity of the probability ofpreferring employment in the public sector to
wages and unemployment durations. Irideed, radically modifying the current worker
behaviour using wages and employment adjustments will require extreme changes in those
variables. In fact, workers would prefer employment in the public sector even if this sector
paid the same as the pnvate sector, even despite the high risk of unemployment.
Nevertheless, those adjustments are necessary to lessen the pressure on the public sector
from job-seekers.
2.5.2 Some Suggestions
A persistent modification of the workers’ behaviour could be achieved by simultaneously
improving the employment opportunities and the employment conditions in the pnvate
sector, as well as adjustment of the remuneration policy in the public sector. for this
purpose. it is essential to ensure a constant and high economic growth, while also reducing
the share of the informai sector in the economy through the emergence of firms aware of
the importance of the human capital, remunerating employees suitably and offering
acceptable employment conditions to cducated workers. Education wiIl contribute more
effectively to economic growth when the private sector takes advantage of the highly
educated labour force.
k is important, however, to stress that it is difficuit for any development policy to succeed
in thc Moroccan context, which is marked by weak investment in human capital. In 199$,
the rate of illiteracy among the adult population was 48%. Those who receive some
schooling often target non-productive employment in the public sector. In a report
presented to the King of Morocco in 1995, the World Bank economists argued that
investment in human capital is the most important problem for Morocco foliowing the
implementation of the structural adjustment policies. If this probiem is not addressed,
Morocco is unlikely to be able to compete in the world economy and will be subjected to
the aggravation of social and economic conditions.
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Consequently, the generalisation of the eiementary education to ail children (including
girls) and in ail areas must constitute the first national priority. This may require a re
allocation of public resources within the education system in order to put more weight on
elementary education. Jndeed, it seems that there is an over-allocation of public and private
resources to university education.
The public sector surely needs to recruit new workers in order to continue to ensure the
high quality of its services. However, the improvement in the quality of these services,
which concem the private sector directly or indirectiy, requires the govemment to reform
its recruitment and remuneration policies so that labour needs can be clearly identified and
filled by qualified workers exactly as in pnvate companies. The dependence on diplomas
should be stopped and focus should shift to competence and productivity. Moreover, a
policy aimed at ifihing the real labour needs in the public sector, both in quantity and
quality, shouid gradually take priority over the current policy aimed at creating jobs to
reduce unemployment among educated workers. In addition, since for many young people
the investment in education is directed mainly towards employment in the public sector,
the reform of the recruitment and remuneration policies in the public sector would help
stop this socially inefficient behaviour. Workers must be aware that only those possessing
required skiiis will be recruited to the public sector. Skilled workers recruited by the public
sector and assigned tasks that match their qualifications will efficiently confribute to the
setting up of infrastructure and high quality services. This will contribute to the
development of the private sector, which will in tum generate enough good employment
capable of reducing the unemployment rate among educated workers. The following
proposais may help achieve these goals:
(i) Make transparent the process of recruitment to the public sector. Workers must be
clearly informed of the objectives, procedures and limits of recruitment to the public
sector. The political speeches must also lie within this framework. Otherwise, the door will
remain open to speculations and false hopes.
(ii) Make the access to the public sector very competitive at ail levels in order to attract
skilled workers. The possibility for workers to use diploma/degree as a means of being
recruited in the public sector must be removed. So far, the same of diploma/degree level,
even for different fields of study, ensures access to the same level of salaries without the
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bond with productivity, in particular during the first years of employment. In some cases,
the public sector may even require that candidates have professional experience as a
prerequisite to recmitment. The phenomenon of unemployment whule waiting for
employment in the public sector will be thwarted if the workers are conscious that
unemployment reduces their competitiveness for employment in the public sector, as is the
case in the private sector.
(iii) Base the remuneration system on the output to favour highly sldlled labour. This will
encourage sldlled workers to accept employment in the public sector and to make a
continuous effort in their course of employment.
Measures (ii) and (iii) will also have the advantage of encouraging workers to use
education as a means of acquiring the competency required by the labour market instead of
merely obtaining an honorary titie.
(iv) Reconsider the concept of permanence of employment in the public sector for
undesirable workers. Workers must be aware that they are likely to lose their employment
if they do not meet (or keep meeting) the requirements of competence and productivity. To
date, the permanence of employment in the public sector is assured for all workers. Even if
workers enter the public sector as frainees during the first year of employment, they all
generally become permanent at the end of that penod. Factors leading to the dismissal of
workers are generally related to discipline or ethics. Even workers who are recruited on a
temporary basis keep their positions indefinitely (or until they become permanent). The
abolition of the permanence advantage will also reduce the gap between the public sector
and the private sector, since non-pecuniary factors significantly intervene in the workers’
employment sector choice.
(y) Allow the govemment departments to identify their own labour needs and fill these
needs freely through their own recruitment system. The current policy, which consists of
centralized recruitment of highly educated workers to the public sector, results in recruiting
workers with qualifications that do not correspond to the real needs of those departments.
In addition, the fact that workers accept employment in departments that have no
connection to their field of study supports the view that young Moroccans educate
themselves with the sole objective to be civil servants. It is also suitable for each public
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department to have its own remuneration system. The same worker will thus flot 5e
remunerated in the same manner in ail govemment departments, which currently occurs
regularly (a Commission of experts elected by the Prime Minister of Morocco
recommended that the opposite measures be taken to ensure compensation equity). As the
consequence, job-seekers will be aware that they are facing many public employers having
different needs, so they wili carefully select positions that match their sldlls, the same way
they would do when seeking employment in the private sector.
Evidentiy, the proposed measures xviii flot produce the desired effects with regard to the
modification of the workers’ behaviour if the govemment does flot express firmness when
executing those measures. Indeed, the govemment must be wholly credible, because
despite the sharp slowdown in recruitment to the public sector over the last two decades,
most highly educated workers stili act as if the slowdown in recruitment were only
temporary.
Finaiiy, in order to help young people to choose their education field efficientiy, detailed
information on the labour market must be produced and widely disseminated.3’ YoungÇ peopie must aiso have more freedom in their choice of meeting the needs of the labour
market. The fact that some young peopie are obliged to carry out some programs of study
because they have no other choice maintains the gap between education and employment
and makes graduates less responsibie for their future empioyment. Likewise, universities
and post-secondary schools (including vocationai training centres) should have more
flexibiiity in preparing their programs and determining the number of students per program
in order to meet the needs ofthe labour market.
li-i addition, the govemment ought to stop some inefficient behaviour (for example,
undertaidng higher education or remaining in university ionger than strictiy necessary
because of the iack of other options, or choosing fieids of study associated with high tisks
of unemployment), which results in a waste of resources invested both by the govemment
and the individuals. The rationalisation of resources ailocated to higher education will
make it possible to save human and materiai resources, which would be used to meet the
31 There are no specific studies on the labour outcomes of graduates in Morocco. There are,
however, some iimited studies done mainly by the Department of Vocational Training, which only
concem graduates of vocational training schools. However, the resuits of these studies are flot
published.
100
objective ofgeneralization of elernentary education in ail areas ofMorocco and to improve
the schooling rates in secondary education. It will thus be appropriate to limit the duration
that a student can spend at university by limiting the possïbility for him or her to repeat a
year of study afler failing. Ibis idea, which is applied in technical schools, should be
extended to universities. Lastly, the capacity of technical schools must be expanded,
because graduates of these schools behave much better in the labour market than university
graduates. Definitely, the entire system of post-secondary education has to be
reformulated, so that it relates to the labour market better and is more effective at
promoting economic growth.
2.6 Conclusion
The exorbitant unemployment of highly educated workers in some developing countries,
particularly in Africa, in spite of the low level of investment in education is very worrying.
This situation occurs despite the fact that the most obvious benefits of education are fast
access to employment and higli incomes. For a long time, university degrees had
guaranteed good jobs and a titie of prestige in society, but nowadays these degrees are
synonymous with unemployment.
In Morocco, the worsening of unemployment of educated workers seems to parallel a sharp
slowdown of recruitment to the public sector since 1983 caused by structural aUj ustment
policies imposed by the International Monetaiy Fund. The public sector has always been
the main employer for educated workers, particularly those holding university degrees.
However, since the implementation of the aUj ustment policies the unemployment among
educated workers has increased continuously, reaching alarming proportions and becoming
a social phenomenon and a political puzzle. In 2000, the unemployment rate among
educated workers (ail levels aggregated) was 27.5% versus only 7.1% among uneducated
workers. The graduates ofien believe that they have been sacrificed by the govemment for
monetary reasons and militate to recover what they consider to be their right to
employment in the public sector. They also sometimes decline employment in the private
sector. Jndeed, the public sector remains a coveted employer, particularly by highly
educated workers, even two decades after the implementation of the structural adjustment
policies. Employment in the public sector is known for its stability, high wages and good
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working conditions, whereas the private sector is dominated by informai activities and
precarious working conditions, which do flot atfract educated workers with high aspirations
(Orivel, 1995; Gaude, 1997; Combamous, 1999). This segmentation of the labour market
makes it rational for some workers to remain unemployed while waiting for employment in
the public sector instead of accepting employment in the private sector. The starting wage
gap between the two sectors is excessive, but Moroccan highly educated workers seem to
allocate great importance to non-pecuniary factors when choosing their sector of
employment. Since the workers’ behaviour is rational, the employment policy should target
the factors that drive it. Therefore, the policy should aim at stimulating the creation ofjobs
in the private sector, while at the same time reducing the segmentation of the labour
market. This could be donc through a high economic growth rate favourable to the creation
of jobs in the formai sector, but also through reforming the recruitment and remuneration
policies to the public sector. The govemment must put more weight on productivity and
less on diplomas when hinng.
It is also important for the government to remedy the inefficiency of investment in
education, which does flot support the economic and social development of the country.
The educational policy should aim at providing elementary education to ail social strata
without exception as well as improving the schooling rate at the secondary level.
Subsequent individual choices should aim at acquiring competency necessary to meet the
needs for the labour market. Moreover, the education system should be flexible in order to
make it possible for individuals to make the riglit choices with regards to employment.
The most important factor of change in the case of Morocco is that the govemment be firm
and credible in ail of its actions, because in spite ofthe change in govemment’s behaviour
with regards to recruitment over the two last decades, most young people stili do not
believe that the changes in attitude are permanent. On the contrary, they believe that
protesting is likely to shift the govemment from its positions and perpetuate the cycle of
irresponsible hiring.
o
C Chapitre 3
Earnings, Unemployment and College Field of
$tudy in Canada
3.1 Introduction
Human capital theory provides a rich set of empirical predictions about the relationship
between, schooling choices and labour market outcomes by viewing schooling (or on-the
job training) as an optimal choice based on comparing cost and benefits. The basic
principle is that indwiduals should keep investing in schoohng as long as marginal benefits
exceed marginal costs. A large number of studies show compelling evidence that schooling
is associated with higher eamings (see Card, 1999, for a recent review). Therefore,
empirical evidence strongly supports the view that investments in schooling yield positive
pecuniary retums, whicli is a key ingredient of the human capital approach. hiterestingly,
however, a mucli smaller number of studies have directly addressed the more central
principle human capital theory, namely that schooling (or other) investments are
determined by a comparison of marginal retums and marginal costs.32
A major obstacle in studying the determinants of schooling investment is the lack of
credible variation in the costs and benefits of schooling. Ideally, one would like to
estimate the effect of exogenous differences in both costs (tuitions, opportunity cost, etc.)
and benefits (marginal retum to schooling) on schooling decision in a cross-section of
individuals. While regional differences in tuitions (Kane, 1994) and other costs are
arguably exogenous to the schooling decision, individual-specific rates of retums are
32 Willis and Rosen (1979) estimate a structural probit model that links various costs and benefits to
t. the decision to attend college. See also Keane and Wolpin (1997) for a more recent example of
structural estimation of the schooling dec ision.
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plagued by a fundamental selection problem. The problem is that eamings are generally
only observed after the schooling investment lias been completed. Since eamings before
schooling is completed are generally missing, the eamings gain from extra schooling
(marginal retum) decision cannot be measured directly. Following Willis and Rosen
(1979), the standard solution to this problem is to estimate selection-corrected eamings
equations for different schooling levels and use these estimates to construct a predicted
retum to schooling for each individual. The reliability of this econometric approach
critically depends, however, on die availability of instruments that can predict differences
in rates ofretums across individuals without directly affecting the choice of schooling.
In this chapter, we use repeated cross-sections on the choice of field of study of Canadian
college students to identify the direct impact of retums to schooling on educational
choices. More specifically, we estimate how differences in retums in different fields affect
decision of choosing one field over the other. From an empirical point of view, there are
some important advantages in looking at choice of fields of study (intensive margin)
instead of the decision to pursue more schooling (extensive margin). First, we argue below
that both opportunity costs and direct costs (tuition) do flot depend on field of study. TheC cost of smdying in different fields is thus implicitly confrolled for when estimating the
impact of other factors on field of study. In a pure cross-section, however, the
identification of the effect of retum to field of study on field choice remains problematic.
The problem is that observed wage differences across fields may reflect selection of
workers instead of the causal effect of field of study on eamings for given individual. This
is a major drawback since most U.S. data sets that contain detailed information on field of
study are limited to relatively narrow coliorts of recent graduates (High School and
Beyond, NLSY, etc.)
One key contribution of our study is thus to exploit multiple cross-sections (and cohorts) of
young workers using the Canadian National Graduate Survey (NGS). More specifically,
we use data from two cohorts who completed college in 1990 and 1995. We argue that
combining cross-field and cross-time variation provides a credible source of variation in
tlie retums to field of study. The idea is that shocks that hit sectors can change the retums
to studying in a particular field and be used to see how field choice of new cohorts of
students respond to these changing conditions. The first half of the I 990s is an interestingÇ period to study since relative wage and employment prospects for different fields of smdy
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changed substantially during this period. In particular, budget crises at the federai and
provincial levels lead to dramatic cuts in health care funding starting in 1992 (Vujicic,
2003). By contrast, the labour market for graduates in science-oriented fields (computer
programming, etc.) was much stronger during this period. These kinds of sectoral shocks
provide useful leverage for evaluating how responsive are human capital investments (in
different fieids of study) to changes in labour market conditions.
Foliowing most of the existing literature, we analyze how fieid choice depends on wages in
different fields. Expected future eamings also depend, however, on the probability of
finding a job at this given wage. We thus analyze the effcct of both the duration of
unemployment and wages by fieid on the choice of fieid of study.
Our focus on coilege students in Canada is a consequence of severai factors. First, Canada
has a very large fraction of coilege graduates as compared to most OECD counfries.33
Understanding the educational decisions at this particular Jevel is thus essential to overali
educational policies in Canada. In most cases, college graduates will have completed two
or three years specialized program in a community coilege or a CEGEP (in Quebec).C Unlike universities where most students choose the fieid of study (major) after a year or
two of study, most college students first enrol into a specific program. Our model of choice
of field study is thus particularly wcll suited for the college-level decision. One final
advantage of studying college field of study in Canada is that relatively large samples of
college graduates are available in the NGS in both the 1990 and 1995 cohorts ofgraduates.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, we present a brief survey of
previous literature on the subject. In Section 3.3, we present a theoretical model of
endogenous choice of fieid of study. Expected eamings and unemployment durations as
weil as personal discount rate are the principal determinants of that choice. We then show
that the influence of unemployment duration relative to eamings is detennined by the
individuai discount rate. In Section 3.4, we present a multi-stage econometric model for
estimating in a dependent way the selection, eamings and unemployment duration
equations. Selection-corrected eamings are estimated for each field of study. The estimates
are then used along with estimated unemployment durations and a variety of covariates in
C In 2000. this fraction was 28.1% in Canada as compared to only 6.6% in U.S. and 9.4% ail OECD
countries pooled (OECD, 2002).
105
the estimation of the probability of selecting each field of study. The latter probabilities are
estimated by using a multinomial logit model. for the sake of comparison, the selection
corrected eamings equations are estimated following the new procedure suggested by
Bourguignon, Foumier and Gurgand (2001) and the widely used procedure suggested by
Lee (19$3). Section 3.5 describes the data used in this study. The sample is drawn from the
Canadian National Graduates Survey of 15,124 individuais who successfuliy completed
their programs at Canadian community colleges in 1990 and 1995. In Section 3.6,
we discuss the empirical resuits of the study. We find that expected eamings and
unemployment durations significantly affect the choice ofthe coliege field. The probability
of selecting “Business and Commerce” or “Sciences” is relatively the most sensitive to
eamings and unemployment durations variations, while “Social Sciences” is the least
sensitive. We also find that women are less influenced by eamings and unemployment
durations relative to men, the fact which supports the resuits of previous studies (see for
example Montmarquette, Cannings and Mabseredjian, 2002). In addition, individuals who
were empioyed prior to starting college put more weight on eamings and less weight on
unemployment when choosing their field of study. Our resuits also suggest that many other
factors (such as parents’ education, family affluence, ethnie group, spoken languages, etc.)
play a significant role in this choice. Concerning the estimates of selection-corrected
eamings equations, the procedure proposed by Bourguignon, foumier and Gurgand (2001)
suggests that students self-select themselves into ail fields of study, while Lee’s procedure
(Lee, 1983) recommends that students self-select only into the fieids of “Social Sciences”
and “Heaith.” This divergence has, however, a iimited effect on the estimates of the
selection equations, since both procedures lead to very comparable predicted eamings.
Section 3.7 concludes the study.
3.2 Brief Survey of Previous Literature
Many studies support the fact that monetary motives are important detemiinants of field of
study choice. Wiikinson (1966) shows that students tend to move into jobs and educational
levels associated with the largest present value of eamings. Likewise, Weiss (1971)
provides empirical evidence for the hypothesis that graduate students in the natural and
social sciences attempt to maximize the present value of lifetime eamings when they select
C their education and occupation. In addition, Polachek (197$) argues that students ioong
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for higli incomes tend to major in business and engineering. Also, Willis & Rosen (1979)
show that expected lifetime eamings are important for the decision to attend college. In the
same vein, Berger (1988), Paglin and Rufolo (1990) and more recently Montmarquette,
Cannings and Mahseredjian (2002) support that field choice is consistent with an eamings
maximization problem. Furthermore, Berger (198$) suggests that the differences in
discounted predicted future eamings stream between majors have more effect on the choice
of a major than differences in predicted eamings at the start of the j oh.34 Recently,
Arcidiacono (2002) has developed a three-period dynamic model of college and major
choice allowing more options for students, including the possibility of changing a major
(or college) and the possibilily of entering the labour force. However, the weight put on
expected eamings is shown to differ according to gender and race. For example,
Montmarquette, Cannings and Mahseredjian (2002) argue that females and whites are less
influenced by eamings as compared to males and non-whites when they select their field of
study.
Meanwhile, studies support the view that field choice also significantly depends on non
r—.. pecuniary factors such as probability of success in each field of study, gender, race,
individual preferences for particular fields, personal abilities, family background, etc.
(Polachek, 197$; Heam, 1980; Fiorito and Dauffenbach, 1982; Paglin and Rufolo, 1990;
Montmarquette, Cannings and Mabseredjian, 2002). Polachek (197$) suggests that
students with high quantitative aptitudes tend to major in quantitative fields (Math,
Sciences, Engineering), while those with high verbal aptitudes tend to choose verbal fields
(Humanities) over other fields. In addition, Paglin and Rufolo (1990) argue that students
consider their individual attributes and typical requirements of the field of study when they
make their choices. The quantitative ability is once again among the most important factors
in these choices. Polachek (1978) also suggests that expected labour force participation
influences the field choice. Individuals looking for intermittent labour force participation
avoid some fields (such as Sciences) requiring high level ofon-the-job training. Blakemore
and Low (1984) advance a similar argument suggesting that young female students with
higher expected fertility tend to select majors that are progressively less subject to atrophy
and obsolescence.
Ç Berger (1988) projects earnings srteam over the beginning 12 years ofthe career assuming a
discount rate of 0.05
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However, whule ail studies confirm that the choice of study field greatiy depends on
expected eamings, these studies ignore the fact that before eamings there needs to be
adequate access to employment. Students may flot only compare eamings, but they also
might consider job opportunities in each field. Finnie’s study (Finnie, 1999b) shows that
the unemployment rate for Canadian university graduates largely varies from one field of
study to another (from 3% to 15% in 1992 for 1990 male graduates and from 2% to 26%
for female graduates). Rational choice of field of study suggests that students are aware of
the unemployment risk associated with each field. In the literature, unemployment is oflen
used to explain education achievement. for instance, Card and Lemieux (2000b) found a
positive relafionship between the local unemployment rate and educational achievement.
The higher the unemployment rate, the higher the educational achievement.
Besides, most of North American studies use American data. Studies based on Canadian
data are more ofien descriptive, though they sometimes make connections between
educational choices and eamings. For example, Wilkinson (1966) uses data from the 1961
Canadian Census and finds that the increasing enrolment in the field of study “Education”
relative to the enrolment in “Engineering” between 1957 and 1961 may be partly due to the
rising in the discounted retums to teachers versus those to engineers. Similarly, Dodge and
Stager (1972) study the economic retums to graduate studies in science, engineering and
business using data from the 1967 Survey of Highly Qualified Manpower in Canada. They
argue that unless there are very large unmeasured extemal benefits arising from graduate
studies, there was an over-allocation of public and private resources to investment in
graduate training during the 1960s. Vaillancourt (1995) finds that rates of retums for
college- and bachelor’s-level studies are higher for women, the fact which probably
implies the steady increase in the number ofwomen carrying out studies at these levels. He
aiso finds that rates of retum to education vary across fields of university studies. The
highest private rates of retum are in “Health,” while the lowest rates are in “Humanities.”
Finally, Finnie (1999b) provides an interesting empirical analysis of post-graduation
outcomes by field of study based on three different cohorts of Canadian graduates (1982,
1986 and 1990). However, finnie also emphasizes that the study is of littie relevance for
policies aimed at changing the observed distribution of graduates by field of study, since
the of field choice process (by students and institutions alike) is not taken into account.
o
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3.3 Theoretïcal Framework
The model we present below is based on the endogenous schooling model as presented in
Card (2000). The model is also similar to the employment sector choice model developed
by Boudarbat (2003). Students choose fields of study (instead of employment sector or
level of schooling) among M competing fields. We assume a student bas an infinite
planning horizon starting when he or she enrols in a given field. The discounted lifetime
utility corresponding to enrolment in the field m (m=J M) and given a profile of
consumption c(t) is:
V(m,c(t))= (1)
l,, is the length of studies in field ni, bm is the disutility for smdying in this field, and p is
the personal discount rate.
Let } (t) denote the real eamings for a worker who graduated in field in and who has t
units of experience, and let p(t) denote eamings from a possible part timc job while
studying at time t. q,11(t) is tuition per unit of time. When entering the labour force after
graduation, workers face a risk of unemployment. Let T11, be the unemployment duration
prior to finding employment with field in. We also assume that individuals can borrow and
lend freely at a fixed interest rate R.
The discounted lifetime eamings conditional on enrolment in field in is given by:
m [p(t)—q,,1 (t)1 e_Rtdt + },, (t —ï,, _])e_?tdt. (2)
In contrast to previous studies either in the choice of schooling or the choice of field of
study, we account for the unemployment duration prior to starting the first job. This is one
ofthe major innovations ofour study.
G-
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The intertemporal budget constraint is then given by:
c(t)e_Rtdt
= JJ’ (3)
Conditional on emolment in field in, the individual’s optimal consumption path
maximizes:
fl(m,c(t),) V(m,c(t))_[c(t)e_Rtdt_] (4)
Assuming that u(c(t)) ln(c(t)) and p =R , first order conditions imply that an
individual’s optimal consumption path is e * (t) p Ï4”??. At each period t, the student
consumes a constant share of his or her lifetime eamings equal to bis or her personal
discount rate.
Ignoring the disutility while studying (q5,) , the optimal discounted lifetime utility
conditional on enrolment in the field in simplifies to:
u () = in(p)+ Wfl2
where wrn = in (ç).
Since the personal discount rate p is constant, maximizing the discounted lifetime utility
amounts to maximizing the log discounted lifetime eamings. Therefore, an individual will
choose a major with the highest log discounted lifetime eamings. However, the discounted
lifetime eamings depends, among others factors, on the unemployment duration afier
graduation in the chosen field (1), which is a random variable. Therefore, a student’s
decision will be based on maximizing the expected log discounted lifetime eamings
In order to model the individual choice in a simple and explicit way, we make some
additional assumptions. First, we assume that eamings in each field are an increasing
function of the number of years of experience as follows:
g,, (t) = ah,,, (t) in = 1 M, t O, h’,,, (t) o, h,,, (o) =1 (6)
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Moreover, earnings increase at a constant rate: h,,, (t) = et We impose that g,,, <p for
lifetime eamings be finite.
Second, we assume that students do not consider a possible retum to school after
graduation. The choice is assumed to be fmal.35 In addition, workers are assumed to keep
their jobs for the remainder of their life cycles. There is no risk of layoff in this case, and
50 the unemployment duration in our model merely concems the first job.
Finally and for the sake of simplicity, we ignore any possible income while studying and
tuitions,36 and assume that the iength of studies is the same for ail fieids: 1,,, = 1, nz] to M.
Under assumptions 1 to 4, the expected 10g of the discounted lifetime eamings conditional
on graduation in field in simplifies to:
a1
—p[Ï+E(Tm)1 (7)
p g,0
C Notice that in a,0
—
pi is the log of the discounted lifetime eamings without an
p — g,,, J
unemployment speil (i.e. when 7,, = O). Therefore, pE (i,,) O is the expected loss in the
log discounted lifetime eamings due to unemployment. This ioss is an increasing function
of the personal discount rate and the expected unemployment duration.
The log discounted lifetime eamings gap between two different fieids in and k (in k) is:
Vmk (8)
The student’s decision is to choose the field of study in that maximizes his or her expected
discounted lifetime eamings (i.e. V,,, O, k=] to M).
In the 1997 Canadian survey of graduates, only 5.56% ofcollege graduates expect to retum to
their studies within three years.
36 The differences between tuition amounts for various fields of study at the community colleges are
small, so tuition lias littie effect on the choice of the field of study.
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The log discounted lifetime eamings gap between two fields of study depends on both the
income differential once employed and the expected unemployment duration differential
prior to employment. The relative weight of each differential is determined by the personal
discount rate. For a student with a high personal discount rate, the discounted lifetime
income drops quickly as the expected unemployment duration increases. lndeed, for some
students a month of unemployment may seem like etemity. When discounted, low incomes
intervening in the short terni could be preferable to high incomes intervening in the long
term. In such case, some students find it rational to choose a field of study that allows fast
access to employment, even if it is associated with low earnings.
In addition, since p also represents the interest rate, the resuits above also suggest that the
student’s ability to endure an unemployment period will depend on bis or her access to
credit during this penod. Individuals from affluent families would thus care less about
unemployment when choosing a field of study.
Finally, we show that if p is small enough, continuous and discrete time frameworks lead
to comparable log discounted lifetime eamings. Indeed, if p is small enough, we have
in (J + p) p and then a, (1 + p) a,,,. Consequently,
E[Ïn[Zain
(j
= in -in (i+p)[Ï +E( )1
in[ a,
— p [ï + E( )
In this case, both frameworks lead to the same decision regarding the choice of the field of
study.
3.4 Econometrîc Specifications
We define the expected level of indirect utility corresponding to the choice of each field of
study as a linear function of log annual eamings in this field and the expected
unemployment duration afier graduation in the same field. We also control for some
observed characteristics and introduce a random component. More precisely, we define:
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U,’, = VO,,, +ay,, +5E(1,, z)+,,,, m=1.M (9)
as the expected level of indirect utility if the individual chooses the field of study in,
expressed as a linear relation of log annual eamings in field in (y,,,) the expected
unemployment duration after graduation in field ni (E(7,, I z)) , and a vector of
confrolling variables (V) as well as a random component (e,,,).
Notice that we use annual eamings instead of the lifetime eamings. Reasons for this are
that the calculation of the lifetime eamings requires the value of the annual growth rate of
eamings in each field and the value of the individual discount rate. The data we use in our
study (see Section 3.5) does not make it possible to estimate the annual growth rate of
eamings correctly, since observed eamings are from recent and young graduates. In
addition, the discount rate is unknown. 38 However, we can show that log of lifetime
eamings are an additive function of log eamings at the start of employment and p and g,,,.
The latter function of p and g,,, is constant for each field.
Ç
The eamings equation in each field ni is given by:
y11, = X,8,,, + ç, rn1 to M (10)
X is a vector of covariates and ç is a random component satisfying E (ç X) 0 and
çN(0, o-,,).
1,, is a random variable representing the unemployment duration before the first job after
graduation in field ni. We assume that 1,, has a Weibull distribution:
j11, (t) = %,,,p,,, (%,11t)”’ e_(2t)P” , t >0 and E(,,) ]f1±Pm rn=] toM (11)
f is the gamma function.
In the empfrical application we use the log aimual earnings two years afier graduation.
38 For an excellent application comparing the effect of the discounted predicted future earnings and
the predicted eamings at the start of the job on the choice offield ofstudy, see Berger (1988).
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In order to account for observed heterogeneity, we formulate 2m as a function of a vector
of observed characteristics Z : e,” . This parameterization makes it easier to give a
direction to the influence of the explanatory variables in Z on the hazard rate
t h,, (t) = (%mt)”” ). A variable with a negative coefficient increases the
instantaneous probability of finding employment and vice-versa.
Finally, the coefficients a and c5’ in Equations (9) are the same for ail fields of study,
while the vector
°m
is specific to each field. We expect a positive sign for a and a
negative sign for 5.
Indirect utilities U ,rn=] to M, are not observed. We rather observe the student’s choice:
d,,, =1, if U = Max (u , ut,..., u, ), the student selects the field in
= O, otherwise
=
Hence, the choice of field of study is jointly determincd by equations (9), (10) and (11),
that is to say three times in equations. hi order to simplify the estimation of the model we
shah assume that variables 7,,, m=] to M, are independent of variables and S , j] to
M. Thereby, unemployment equations are estimated independently from selection and
eamings equations. However, unemployment durations wihl have an effect on the choice of
the field of study if the coefficient ô (Equations 9) is different from zero. In addition, this
assumption should flot significantly affect our results, since most of the graduates in our
sample experience very short unemployment speils. A reduced form of equation (9) that
includes the vector of covariates Z instead of E(7 I Z)is not possible, since z) is
not linear in Z (cf. Equation 11).
Stochastic terms , in1 to M, are assumed to be independent and identically Gumbeil
(or Type I extreme-value) distributed, which leads to the conditional logit of Mcfadden
o
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(1973). The probability of choosing the field ni is therefore (sec, for exampie, Maddala,
1983, pp. 59-61):
exp(VO +ay +6E[T])
Frob(d, J V,{y } toM ,{E[ 1}s=i toM) M 10 In ° (12)
exp(VO5 +ay +c5E[Tj)
In order to identify the model, we arbitrarily set 6 = O. The remaining vectors of
parameters O,, , rn=2 to M, wiil measure the variation relative to the first field of study. We
also assume that ail parameters and distributions are known to the students.
The model is estimated in four stages:
Stage 1: We estimate the duration equations separately for each field of study. We mention
that for many graduates in our data file the reported unemployment durations are equal to
zero, whereas duration models require the durations to be strictly positive. However, since
unemployment durations are reported in months, we think that graduates likely rounded
their real unemployment durations up or down. Therefore, we assume that real durations
corresponding to nil reported ones likely range between 0 and 0.5 months.39
For each field, parameter Prn and vector of parameters are estimated by maximizing the
likelihood:
L,,,
=
flF,0 (O.5)e [L, (t1)c rn (t1)
‘
(13)
L and F,, are respectively the density and distribution functions of 7,,. $, is the survival
function given by: S,0 (t) = Fr (7,, > t), t > O. ej is a dummy variable taking value 1 if
the reported unemployment duration is equal to zero, and value O otherwise. c is a
dummy variable as well which takes value 1 if the unemployment episode is completed
(uncensored observations), and value O otherwise (censored observations).
Another way to deal with this situation is to use a spiit-sample model, like in Schmidt & Wifte
(1989). The sample is spiit mto two groups. The first has experienced unemployment, the other has
flot. The duration equations are then estimated conditional on experiencing unemployment. The
probability of experiencing unemployment is estimated using a probit or logit moUds, for example.
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Stage 2: from stage 1 we obtain estimated values of E(7, z) and then estimate the
reduced form ofthe Conditional Logit model given by equations (9) (i.e. we include Xand
estimated value of E(7,, z) as covariates instead of y,,, and E(7,, Z)).
Stage 3: We estimate the sclectivity corrected eamings equation per field (by introducing
selection correction terms from stage (2) using the method suggested by Bourguignon,
Foumier and Gurgand (2001). The widely used correction procedure is that proposed by
Lee (1983). However, in their recent paper, Bourguignon, foumier and Gurgand (2001)
show that a consistent estimate of /,,, in equations (10) should take into account ail
possible correlations between the disturbance term ç (Equation 10) and ail the
fransformed normaily distributed residuais of the selection equations (i.e. Equations 9)
= ‘(G()), fors=] toM, where Cl)(.) is the standard normal distribution function
and G (.) is the cumulative of the Gumbeli distribution function. If any of these
correlations exist, the selectivity bias must be corrected.
Let be the correlation between s,, and 4 , and v be the expected value of
conditional on field in being selected. Consistent estimate of fi,,, is obtained by the least
squares estimation of:
y,,, = Xfl,,, + J,,, p,,, 1v1 + u, p,,, 7v7 + ... + a,,, P,,, VM + e,,, (14)
where e,,, is an independent component. v, s=] to M, are computed from the conditional
logit in stage (2).
For the sake of comparison, we also estimate the selection-corrected eamings equations by
using Lee’ s procedure. On the other hand, one may argue that students base their choices
on observed eamings instead of self-selection corrected eamings, which are unobservable.
In order to test the robustness of our resuits to this self-selection issue, we also estimate the
conditional logit model (Stage 4) using uncorrected log-annual eamings.
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Stage 4: We re-estimate selection equations (9) using estimated values of the log annual
eamings (5’, = X,6rn) obtained from stage (3)40
In order to identify the multi-stage model above, we use some exclusion restriction in the
structural equation. Thus, some variables in the selection equation (vector V, Equations 9)
are excluded from the eaming equations (vector X Equations 10) and vice-versa.41 This
problem does not arise with the duration equations, since vector Z intervenes in a nonlinear
way in the selection equations.
The conditional logit coefficients (as well as those of a multinomial logit) have no simple
interpretations, as it is the case in a linear regression model. Marginal effects (or
derivatives of the probability function) and elasticities are, in this case, easier to interpret
directly.
If the coefficient a is positive and the coefficient 6 is negative, an increase in log annual
eamings in a field of study while holding all else constant will increase the probability of
choosing this field of study and reduce the probability of choosing any of the other fields.
In confrast, increasing the expected unemployment duration in a field of study and holding
all else constant will reduce the probability of choosing this field of study and increase the
probability of choosing a different field. Moreover, we can show that a proportional change
in the annual eamings or expected unemployment duration in a specific field of study will
have exacfiy the same proportional effect on the probability of choosing each of the
81n(F ) ôln(F )remaining fields of study ((“)= a(1 — O and 8ln() = aI O îfl’
The magnitude of the elasticities is an increasing function of the weights put on earnings
and unemployment durations.
40 Berger (198$) uses a similar approach using Lee’s correction procedure (Lee, 1983), but using
different specification and without accounting for unemployment durations. Indeed, Berger uses
eamings instead of log-eamings as explanatory variable in the selection equations and as the
dependent variable in the eamings equations.
41 For example, Vincludes parents’ education, province ofresidence before enrolment and the use of
smdent bans. On the other hand, X includes age-squared and some variables related to the job.
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Ç 3.5 Description of the Data
The data we use in this study is drawn from the Canadian National Graduates Survey
(NGS, 1990 and 1995 graduates) conducted by Statistics Canada in partnership with
Human Resources Development Canada. The survey concems graduates from Canadian
public post-secondaiy educational institutions (universities, colleges, trade schools) who
have successfully completed their programs during the reference calendar year. The survey
excludes graduates from private post-secondary educational institutions, completers of
continuing-education programs (unless these led to a degree, diploma or certificate), part
time trade course graduates and graduates of provincial apprenticeship programs and
graduates living outside of Canada at the time of the survey. The survey aims at
determining such factors as the extent to which graduates of post-secondary programs had
been successful in obtaining employment since graduation, the relationship betwecn the
graduates’ programs of study and the employment subsequently obtained, the graduates’
job and career satisfaction, the rates of under-employment and unemployment, the type of
employment obtained related to career expectations and qualification requirements as well
as the influence of post-secondary education on occupational achievement. NGSs were
conducted in 1978, 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1997, surveying individuals from the graduating
class of two years earlier. follow-ups of Graduates Suweys are conducted three years later
for the original respondents ofeach ofthe NGS (except for 1978).
For the empirical application, major groups (initially ten) are gathered into five broadly
defined fields as indicated in Table 3.1.
The sample used in this study is drawn from the 1992 and 1995 NGSs and includes only
graduates from community colleges (CEGEPs in Quebec). In addition, we retained people
aged 65 years or younger who graduated during the reference calendar ycars (i.e. 1990 and
1995) and did flot undertake any further studies thereafler.42 The final sample consists of
42 This is in order to meet our assumption that students do flot retum to school afler graduation and
to relate the early labour market outcomes (mainly earnings and unemployment durations) to initial
field choices.
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6,149 observations ofthe 1992 NGS pooled with 8,975 observations ofthe 1997 NGS, for
a total of 15,124 observations.43
Combining cross-field and cross-time variation provides a credible source of variation in
the retums to field of study. The idea is that shocks that hit sectors can change the retums
to studying in a particular field and be used to see how field choice of new cohorts of
students respond to these changing conditions. The first haif of the 1 990s is an interesting
period to study since relative wage and employment prospects for different fields of study
changed substantially during this period. In particular, budget crises at the federal and
provincial levels lead to dramatic cuts in health care funding starting in 1992 (Vujicic,
2003). By contrast, the labour market for graduates in science-oriented fields (computer
programming, etc.) was much stronger during this penod. These kinds of sectoral shocks
provide useful leverage for evaluating how responsive are human capital investments (in
different fields of study) to changes in labour market conditions. bdeed, the share of the
field “Health” in the population of graduates dropped by 3.11 points, while the share of
“Sciences” increased by 2.28 points between 1990 and 1995.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3.2. All statistics in this chapter meet Statistics
Canada’s data release criteria. The average age of college graduates is 27.4 years, and it is
slightly high for “Health” and “Social Sciences” graduates. hi addition, female graduates
are dominant in the population of graduates (5 9%), particularly in the fields of “Health”
(83%) and “Education, Fine Arts and Humanities” (73%). In contrast, they are rare in
“Sciences” (only 23%). This distribution is almost the same in 1990 and 1995. The scarcity
of women in “Sciences” could be related to their anticipated labour force participation.
Students looking for intermittent labour force participation or female students with higher
expected fertility would avoid fields (such as science) requiring a high level of on-the-job
training and tend to choose majors that are progressively less subject to atrophy and
obsolescence (Polachek, 1978; Blakemore & Low, 1984).
Members of visible minorities do not seem to privilege a particular field of study, based on
the fact that they are disfributed in a balanced way over the five fields. Jndeed, their share
ranges from 8 to 10% per field of study. On the other hand, about two out of three
‘ In each reported table we include only individuals with no missing information on any of the
variables used to produce that table. Consequently, the total number of observations in some tables
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graduates speak oniy Engiish of the two officiai languages. This share is 60% or over in ail
fields of study. A very large fraction of graduates corne from two provinces, Ontario (44%)
and Quebec (23%). Students frorn Ontario tend to graduate mainly in “Education, Fine
Arts and Hurnanities” and “Social Sciences,” while those frorn Quebec privilege “Health”
and “Sciences.” In connection with the spokcn languages, French speakers (mainly located
in Quebec) are significantly present in “Health” and “Sciences.” Moreover, for over 40%
of the graduates, parents’ education level is secondary, particularly for rnothers. The
second level in importance is university, especially for fathers, whereas less than 20% of
graduates’ parents carried out studies at the sarne level as their children (i.e. community
college). In view of this information, the choice of college studies does not seem to be
inherited from parents.
Conceming the funding of studies, student bans are reported as an important source of
funding (43% of graduates) ‘ especially in “Health” (50%) and “Social Sciences” (47%).
We use this variable as a proxy for the family income, which is not provided by the
surveys of graduates. Finally, our sample is characterized by the large fraction of graduates
who were worldng before enrolment in their programs (42%). This fraction is high over ail
fields, ranging between 39% and 45%. This information is useful in examining whether
working experience pnor to starting college studies influences the weiglits put on expected
eamings and unemployment durations when choosing the field of study.
The most important observation that emerges from the data is that graduates tend to
confirm the view that the choice of field of study is consistent with an eamings
maximization problem. Indeed, over two thirds of graduates reported that “booldng to
improve the chances of a good income” was a very important factor in their choice. Only
few graduates reported this factor as unimportant (see Table 3.3). There are no significant
differences on this issue between genders. Moreover, “acquiring the skills needed for a
particular job,” which is likely to lead to high incomes, is also reported as a very important
factor in the enrolment decision by about 73% of graduates. Finally, graduates express a
positive opinion about their programs, since the majority of them think that they improved
themselves through those programs.
is flot necessarily equal to the sample size.
The 1997 NGS provides detailed information on the sources of funding including student bans,
parents, employment eamings, spouse!partner, scholarships, etc., but the 1992 NGS does flot.
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With regard to labour market outcomes, the mean annual eamings (1997 dollars, fuli-time
and part-time workers pooled) two years after graduation dropped by about 10% between
1992 and 1997. This drop concemed ail fields of studies, but particularly “Health” (-
22.61%). “Sciences” are the least affected at this point (only -0.33%). On the other hand,
the extent of the fali in eamings is mainly for female graduates (-16.75% versus only -
1.73% for maie graduates). Focusing only on fuli-time workers, the drop in annual
eamings is less severe (-5.32%) and concems only females graduates. Annual eamings
increased by 0.55% for males. By field of study, “Health” is again the most affected since
annual eamings for fuli-time workers who graduated in this field decreased by 14.70%. On
the other hand, those who graduated in “Sciences” were in a much better situation, since
their annual eamings increased by 0.81% between 1992 and 1997. As a result, “Health”,
which had the highest mean annual eamings in 1992, has been downgraded by “Sciences”
(see Table 3.5). The median annual eamings also dropped by 8.30% in total, but the drop is
more extended for “Health” graduates and less for “Sciences” graduates. The two fields
weigh around 45% in the population of graduates.
In parallel with the fall in eamings, the share of graduates in “Health” dropped by 3.11
points between 1990 and 1995, while the share of graduates in “Sciences” increased by
2.28 points (see Table 3.5). However, the change in the share of other fields does not seem
to follow the same iogic. For example, the share of “Business and Commerce” in the
population of graduates droppcd by 1.46 points, whereas the mean annual eamings for
graduates in this ficld dropped by only 3.08%, as opposed to 5.32% on average for 1995
graduates. However, this drop is mainly due to females, for wliom the mean annual
eamings dropped by 4.92% versus only 1.66% for males. In addition, sub-fields show
contrasted evolutions. The number of graduates in the sub-fieid “Management and
Administration, Business and Commerce,” which represents about 41% ofthe total number
of graduates in “Business and Commerce,” increased by 6 1.7% as compared to 3 5.8% for
the total field and 44.75% for ah fields pooled. The field “Social Sciences” shows the most
contrasting evolution. The average annual eamings for full-time workers graduating in this
field of study dropped by 8.18%, while its share in the population of graduates increased
by 2.81 points between 1990 and 1995. The largest increases in the number of graduates
are observed in sub-fields related to “Security” and “Social & Chiid Care Services,” for
which the labour demand lias increased over the last years. This discordance between the
evoiution of eamings and the evolution of enrolment in some fields may arise from the fact
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that we ignored other options. Some students may prefer those fields of study to other
options, including entering the labour force or enrolling in vocational training or university
programs.
The worsening in eamings for 1995 graduates parallels the deterioration in their jobs
conditions as compared to 1990 graduates. In this way, the fraction of employed graduates
who hoid a job requiring a level of education bellow college level increased by 17.42
points between 1992 and 1997. This fraction increased by 21.26 for “Health” graduates
who experienced the most significant drop of camings. In addition, the proportion of
graduates holding permanent jobs decreased by 10.91 points for “Health” graduates, as
opposed to 3.65 points on average for ail graduates; it remained unchanged for graduates in
“Sciences.” furthermore, the mean number of weekly hours decreased by 2.41 hours for
graduates in “Health,” whereas it increased by 1.14 hours for graduates in “Sciences.”
Parallel to the drop in annual eamings and deterioration in employment conditions, 1995
graduates also experienced longer unemployment durations as compared to 1990
graduates. The mean number of months before the first job increased from 3 for the 1990
cohort to over 6 months for the 1995 cohort. All fields of study were affected by this
increase. However, “Health” is the most affected field, the fact which probably contributed
to making it less attractive for students. The decline in eamings for females is confrasted
with the relatively shorter unemployment duration as compared to males. Females
probably make concessions on wages in order to achieve employment rapidly.
3.6 Empirical Resuits
All resuits are reported in Tables 3.7 through 3.13. Our analysis will primarily focus on the
selection equations, while we wiil also comment on unemployment duration and wage
equations.
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C 3.6.1 Unemployment Duration Equations
Parametric estimates of the duration equation in each field assuming Weibull distributions
are reported in Table 3.7. We point out that in order to identify the direction ofthe effect of
the covariates on the hazard rate, one must consider the opposite sign of the estimated
coefficients of these variables. Subjacent iogic is that variables with negative coefficients
increasc the instantaneous probability of finding employment in each period (c.f Equation
11). On the other hand, the parameterp determines the shape of the hazard rate function
(hazard rate decreasing ifp<], constant ifp], and decreasing otherwise).
For ail fields of study the estimated value of the parameterp is far smaller than 1, ranging
between 0.38 and 0.43. Consequently, for ah fields of study, the hazard rate is very high
right after graduation and decreases very sharply thereafter.
The results also show significant changes in hazard rates between 1992 and 1997. Jndeed,
most of 1997 specific coefficients (Year 1997 and Year 1997 crossed with other variables)
C’ are significant at the level 1 percent. Results also show that younger graduates have a slight
advantage in finding employment as compared to older ones. This advantage increased
slightly in 1997 in ail fields except “Sciences.” Surprisingly, female graduates generally
performed well in 1997 in most fields of study and more precisely in “Sciences,” where
they are a minonty. On the other hand, male graduates are more favoured in “Business and
Commerce.” Furthermore, members of visible minorities are likely to be unemployed for a
longer period of time as compared to other graduates in ail fields of study. In 1997, this
disadvantage was eased only in “Education, Fine Arts and Humanities.” Finahly, bihingual
workers were hikely to expenence shorter unemployment durations in 1992 in “Social
Sciences” (probably in connection with employment in the public service) and in
“Business and Commerce” (possibly in connection with the hinguistic requirements ofjobs
in this field). Though this advantage was considerably reduced in 1997 in “Social
Sciences,” in the same year bihinguai workers did very well in ail the other fields. The
ability to communicate in both official languages thus seems to widen employment
opportunities for graduates in most offields.
C
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3.6.2 Earnings Equations
The estimated selection-corrected eamings equations using the B-F-G’s procedure
(Bourguignon, foumier and Gurgand, 2001) are reported in Table 3.8, including self
selection correction terms.45 Standard errors are bootstrapped based on 100 replications.
We have included in the regression a dummy variable for 1997, crossed with a variety of
other variables to account for possible changes in eamings equations between 1992 and
1997. The primary purpose of estimating eaming equations is to obtain self-selection
corrected log annual eaming estimates, which are thercafter included in the conditional
logit model (following stage). This allows estimating the weight that students put on
eamings when choosing their field of study (cf. Equation 14). The estimated coefficients
on the selection terms reflect the extent of self-selection in each field of study (i.e. the
differences in eamings betwcen the group of students who chose a given field of study and
a group of students who would be assigned at random to the same field).
The resuits provide evidence for self-selection in all fields of study, since at least one ofthe
five selection terms coefficients is significant in each field. In “Business and Commerce”
and “Sciences,” all five selection terms coefficients are significantly different from zero.
Results also indicate that students who choose “Education, Fine Arts and Humanities,”
“Business and Commerce” or “Health” on average eam higher wages (+18.6%, +20.8%
and +26.7% respectively),46 as compared to students drawn at random with identical
observed characteristics and assigned to the samc fields of study. In contrast, students who
choose “Social Sciences” or “Sciences” on average eam lower wages (-69.6% and -15.2%
respectively) than identical individuals selected randomly and assigned to these fields. The
self-selection bias is very large in the field “Social Sciences.”
Lee’s procedure (Lee, 1983) leads to different conclusions (see Table 3.8-bis). Resuits
from this procedure suggest that there is no self-selection in the fields of “Education, fine
Arts and Humanities,” “Business and Commerce” and “Sciences,” whereas students self
select only into the fields of “Social Sciences” and “Health.” Moreover, eamings are higher
‘ We thanjc Bourguignon, foumier and Gurgand for the program “selmlog” used in the estimation.
46 These estimates are calculated by multiplying minus each significant selection coefficient, times
( the mean value of the conesponding selection variable for graduates in each field of study and
summoning obtained values.
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for students choosing “Health” (+32%) and lower for those choosing “Social Sciences” (-
37%) as compared to identical students selected randomly and assigned to those fields.
Once again, these gaps look quite large. Humer (1999) applies Lee’s procedure to estimate
self-selection con-ected eamings equations for American males with baccalaureate and
beyond. His results suggest that students self-select into the fields of “Social Sciences”,
“Engineering” and “Sciences,” and do flot self-select into the fields of “Education and
Letters” and “Business.” These findings agree with ours when using the same correction
procedure. However, Humer finds that students who self-select into the field of “Social
Sciences” eam higher wages than random students assigned to the same field, whereas we
find the opposite.
In spite of the differences between Lee’s and B-F-G’s procedures with respect to the
sample selection bias, the two procedures produce very close predicted log annual eamings
by field of study. Consequently, we obtained comparable estimates of the weight that
students put on eamings when choosing their fields of study by using the two methods (see
the following Section and Table 3.11).
C other remark that can be made based on the results obtained by using B-F-G’s
procedure is that the estimated standard error of the residual term in the eamings equations
(u,,,) is greater than the estimated coefficient of the correction term (u,p,,,, in Equation
14) in many cases. As a resuit, the estimated correlation coefficients between the random
components in eamings equations and the random components in the selection equations
(i.e. p,,, in Equation 14) are higher than 1. This may suggest a problem of specification in
our model, especially with regard to the exclusion restrictions (i.e. variables included in the
selection equations but excluded from the eamings equations). Another potential
explanation is that correlation coefficients are not constrained between -1 and I in the
program “selmolg” provided by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2001). This problem
does flot occur when using Lee’s procedure (Table 3.8-bis).
The residual standard error is slightly high in “Education, Fine Arts and Humanities,”
(0.43) whereas it ranges between 0.35 and 0.38 in the other fields. On the other hand, since
we use data from recent young graduates, the coefficients on age and age squared do flot
necessarily respect the usual rules (positive coefficient for age and negative coefficient for
age square, and both coefficients are significant). This is, for example, the case of age and
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age squared coefficients in “Hea]th” in 1992 and in “Social Sciences” in 1997. Lee’s
procedure produces the same situation.
The coefficient on “Year 1997” is either negative or insignificant, the fact which supports
the downward trend of eamings between 1992 and 1997. In addition, the hypothesis that
eamings equations do flot change over time is rejected at the level 1 percent in each of the
five fields of study. However, the decrease in annual eamings contrasts with the increase in
the elasticity of anriual eamings relative to weekly hours in aIl fields of study, particularly
in “Social Sciences” and “Health.” In this way, the elasticity ofthe aimual eamings relative
to weeldy hours exceeds 1 in 1997 in “Social Sciences,” “Business and Commerce” and
“Health,” while being below 1 in ail fields of smdy in 1992. This suggests that the decline
in eamings is not due to the decline in the hourly wage, but to the reduction of the volume
ofwork and the deterioration ofjob conditions (sec Table 3.6).
female graduates generally eam less than male graduates in all fields of study even when
controlling for the number of hours worked wccldy. In 1992, the gap between males and
females was 57% in “Business and Commerce” and 38% in “Health” (only 15% and 18%C respectively when using Lee’s procedure, and 0.15% and 0.03% when the self-selection is
ignored, sec Tables 3.8-bis and 3.9). This gap increased over time in “Education, Fine Arts
and Humanities,” “Health” and “Sciences,” whereas it significantly droppcd in “Social
Sciences” (the share of this field in the population of female graduates incrcased from
10.53% to 14.18%) and slightly in “Business and Commerce.” The estimated eamings
gaps between males and females are very large when using B-F-G’s procedure. Once
again, this raises the question whether sample selection bias was adequately corrccted for.
We camiot answer this question since it is not easy to identify a variable that affects the
field of study choice without affecting eamings (Wooldridge, 2001)
Conceming visible minority groups, eamings advantage over other graduates in 1992 was
fransformed to a disadvantage in 1997 in all the ficlds except “Health,” where the gap (in
favour of visible minority groups) widened and “Education, Fine Arts and Humanities,”
where the gap remained insignificant.
The effect of the number of spoken languages on the eamings level is generally unstable
C over time. In 1992, employed graduates who speak English were disadvantaged only in
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“Education, fine Art and Humanities,” but advantaged in “Social Sciences,” as compared
to those who speak French only. However, those gaps were nearly eliminated in 1997.
Workers who speak English (in addition to french or not) generally eam more in
“Business and Commerce” and “Health,” as compared to those who speak French only. On
the other hand, speaking French seems to be an asset in “Sciences.”
Finally, eamings are higher when workers occupy jobs requiring the same level of
education with which they graduated (college in our case). Jobs requiring a lower level of
education are associated with low eamings, but those requiring a higher level of education
do not necessarily provide higher eamings. Tri addition, most important changes that
occurred betwecn 1992 and 1997 concem the field of “Health,” since the effect of the level
of education associated with jobs in this field became highly significant in 1997, whereas it
was non significant in 1992.
Table 3.9 presents estimated uncorrected field-specific earnings equations, which are
useful in examining the effect of seif-selection control. Generally, the effect is contrasted
when comparing 1992 with 1997. Thus, limiting our analysis to some specific variables,C we observe that seif-selection correction reduces the rem to age in 1992 but increases it
in 1997. Tri addition, log weeldy hours coefficients are underestimated in 1992 and
overestimated in 1997 in uncorrected estimates as compared to selection-corrected
estimates. Also, seif-selection control considerably increases the gap between males and
females in “Business and Commerce” and “Health,” and reduces it in “Social Sciences”
and “Sciences.” Conversely, controlling for seif-selection significantly increases the retum
for “Visible Minority Groups” who majored in “Business and Commerce” in 1990 or 1995
and in “Health” in 1995.
3.6.3 Determinants of College Field Choice
Table 3.10 reports the estimated conditional logit model using seif-selection conected
annual eamings and expected unemployment durations estimates (Stage 4, Section 3.4).
Selection equations are assumed to be stable (invariant) over time. Estimated coefficients
specific to cadi field should 5e interpreted as variations relative to the field “Education,
Fine Arts and Humanities.”C
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Resuits from the conditional logit model are flot easy to interpret directly. However, it is
“5— interesting to examine the coefficients on log annual eamings and expected unemployment
durations, since those coefficients are the same for ail study fields. Table 3.11 reports the
estimated weights (Column 2). for the sake of comparison, Table 3.11 also reports the
estimated weights when selection-corrected eamings are estimated using Lee’s procedure
(Column 3) and when assuming that students base their choices on observed eamings
(Coiumn 1). The signs of the estimated coefficients correspond to those anticipated:
positive sign for the coefficient on log eamings and negative sign for the coefficient on the
expected unemployment duration. In addition, ail those coefficients are statistically
significant at the levei 1 percent, a fact which provides an evidence for the noteworthy
effects of eamings and expected unemployment duration on the choice of the fieid of
study. By gender, female graduates put iess weight on both eamings and unempioyment
durations when choosing their field of study as compared to male graduates.
Montmarquette, Cannings and Mahseredjian (2002) find the same results conceming the
effects of eamings on the basis of Arnerican data.47 Our results also indicate that graduates
who were employed prior to starting college put more weight on eamings and less weight
on unemployment duration when choosing their fields of study. The weak sensitivity to
unemployment can be explained by the fact that some programs are sponsored by
empioyers, so the concemed graduates keep their jobs while studying. lii addition, having
working experience and the implied information on the labour market pnor to starting
college may be assets in finding empioyment quicldy after graduation. Moreover, those
individuals have probably accumulated enough wealth (savings, real estate, etc.) to bear
long unemployment duration while searching for high-wage employment. Conceming
women, they may expect to count on the support from their partners or relatives if they
encounter difficulties with frnding empioyment, which ieads them to put less weight on
unemployment duration.
When selection-corrected annual eamings are estimated using Lee’s procedure (Column 3,
Table 3.11), the weight put on log annual eamings by students who are not working pnor
to college decreases slightly, while ail the other weights remain almost the sanie as
compared to those obtained when using B-f-G’s procedure. Consequently, resuits seem to
Ouï results can flot be directly compared to those of Montmarquette, Camuings and Mahseredjian
(2002), since we use log of eamings instead of earnings in the conditional iogit. Moreover, we
account for the expected unemployment durations in the choice of field of study, whiie previous
studies do not.
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5e robust to the correction method. On the other hand, when the selection bias is ignored in
the estimation of eamings equations48, the weight put on 10g aimual eamings decreases
significantly for graduates who were not working pnor to college (going from 0.9525 to
0.6596 for males). Conversely, that weight only decreases faintly for graduates with work
experience pnor to college (going from 1.2317 to 1.1933 for males).
For easier interpretation, results from the conditional logit model are converted into
marginal effects (cf. Table 3.12). Resuits should be interpreted as effect that a unit change
in the independent variable lias on the probability of selecting a specific field of study over
other fields of study, holding ail else constant. for dummy variables, the marginal effect is
measured by the difference in the probability between the value O and the value 1. An
important point that is made obvious by Table 3.12 is that most of the marginal effects are
significant at the level 1 percent. In concordance with descriptive statistics, women are less
Iikely to select “Sciences” than any of the other flelds. Indeed, women only represent 23%
of graduates in “Sciences.” On the confrary, “Health” is likely to be the first choice for
women, followed by “Education, fme Arts and Humanities.” Indeed, 83% and 73% of
graduates in these two fields are women respectively. Iiicidentally, visible minority groups
are more likely to major in “Business and Commerce” and “Sciences,” where they might
expect to meet less discrimination in the access to employment. This might also 5e
explained by the fact that they are looking for a high income, since those fields of study
were the less affected by the drop in eamings between 1992 and 1997. On the other hand,
English speakers and bilingual students tend to major more in “Education, Fine Arts and
Humanities” and “Social Sciences,” as compared to french speakers. Bilingual individuals
are the most likely to select “Social Sciences,” possibly because they aim at employment in
the public sector. Also, speaking French increases the likeiihood of choosing “Health” as a
field of study. Descriptive statistics show that the share of graduates speaking French only
or living in Quebec is quite high among the graduates in this study field. Yet, tlie marginal
effects of the languages spoken are flot very large, though are significant. Students who are
supported by student bans are more likely to select “Health” or “Social Sciences.” This
resuit might 5e of relevance for policies aimed at attracting more young people towards
these fields. In confrast, results suggest that students who do not use student bans mainly
favour “Business and Commerce” and to a lesser extent “Education, Fine Arts and
Humanities.” Conceming the effects of employment experience, our results suggest that
48 One may argue that smdents predict their eamings based on obsewed earnings per field of smdy
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being employed prior to starting college significantly increases the preference for majoring
in “Education, fine Arts and Humanities,” whule significantly reducing the probability of
choosing “Business and Commerce.” In the latter fieid, on-the-job training seems to be
more profitable than school training.
It wouid be interesting to compare parents and chiidren with regard to the choice of the
fieid of study. Unfortunately, the data we use does flot provide information on the parents’
fields of study. Moreover, as shown in Table 3.2, around 60% of graduates’ parents have a
generai level of education (secondary or less). Nonetheiess, when controiling for both
parents’ education level, we obtain some attention-grabbing resuits. There is sometimes a
conflict between the mother’s and father’s level of education effects on the chiidren’s
choices of field of study. hdeed, the iikelihood of choosing “Health” or “Sciences” is iow
when the father’s education level is university, whereas it is high when the mother bas the
same level of education (i.e. university). The same contrasting effect is observed for the
likelihood of choosing “Social Sciences” or “Business and Commerce” for ail of the
parents’ ievels of education. The effects are the same only on the iikeiihood of choosing
“Education, Fine Arts and Humanities.” Universily-ievei education for both the father and
the mother increases that likeiihood, while ail other ieveÏs of education decrease it. The
positive effect of university-level education of both parents on the probabilfty of selecting
“Education, Fine Arts and Humanities” supports the resuit from “Use of Student Loans,” in
the way that chiidren from affluent families tend to major in the same field (i.e.
“Education, Fine Arts and Humanities”). On the other hand, low ieveis of parent education
(eiementary and secondary) often direct chiidren towards “Business and Commerce” if
related to mothers, and to “Heaith” or “Sciences” if related to fathers. Combining the
effects of both parents’ levels of education, the resuits suggest that the probabiiity of
choosing “Health” or “Sciences” becomes smali when both parents have the same level of
education, whereas the probability of choosing “Business and Commerce” remains high if
both parents have secondary or lower level of education. finaily, the probability of
choosing “Education, Fine Arts and Humanities” significantiy increases if both of parents
are highiy educated (i.e. with university ievei).
o
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Conceming the labour market variables (i.e. log aimual eamings and expected
unemployment durations), ail the marginal effects of those variables are significant at the
level 1 percent. Tncreasing the log of eamings in a specific field of study (while holding ail
else constant) significantly increases the probability of choosing this field and reduces the
probability of choosing any of the other fields of study. Additionally, men are more
influenced by eamings as compared to women. Also, individuals who were working prior
to starting college are more sensitive to eaming variations as compared to those who were
not working. While these effects are highly significant for ail fields, their extent varies
across fieids. The probability of choosing “Business and Commerce” is the most sensitive
to log annual eaming variations, both positively and negatively. Jndeed, when log annual
eamings increase in a specific field of study, the effect on the probability of choosing the
same field is the largest in “Business and Commerce.” Moreover, the probability of
choosing “Business and Commerce” is the most affected when log annual eamings vary in
other fields of smdy. “Sciences” is the second most sensitive field to earning changes. On
the other end of spectrum, “Social Sciences” is the ieast influenccd by log aimual eaming
variations.
The expected unemployment durations, which reduce the expected lifetime eamings, have
a negative effect on the probability of choosing a specific field of study. In this way, when
the expected unemployment duration in a specific field increases (while holding ail else
constant), the probability of selecting this fieid of study is reduced and the probability of
choosing a different field is increased. Once again, the field of study “Business and
Commerce” is the most sensitive to unemployment duration variations both in this field
and other fieids, whereas the field “Social Sciences” is the least sensitive to those
variations. Finally, students who are employed prior to college and women respond less to
expected unemployment duration variations.
Lastly, results from the conditional logit are also converted into elasticities for eamings
and unemployment durations. Estimated elasticities are reported in Table 3.13. The
elasticity should be interpreted as the percent change in the probability of choosing a
specific field of study relative to a percent change in annual earnings or expected
unemployment duration.4° So, it supplements the interpretation of the marginai effect by
Conceng eangs, the elasticities of the probabiii of choosg a specific fieid of study are
relative to a percent change in annual eamings rather than a percent change in log annual eamings.
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reflecting the extent of that effect relative to the initial probability of choosing each fleld of
study. As in the case of the marginal effects, ail estimated elasticities are significant at the
level 1 percent. The proportional rcsponsiveness to the increase in the annual eamings or in
the expected unemployment duration, is higher for men as compared to women.
Furthermore, for individuals who were employed prior to starting college the probability of
choosing a fleld of smdy is more sensitive to the change in annual eamings as compared to
those who wcre flot employed. Tri contrast, those individuals respond littie to the change in
the unemployment duration, relatively to those who were flot employed pnor to college.
These results go hand in hand with those found in interpreting marginal effects. What is
more, the probability of choosing a field of study is inelastic relative to the expected
unemployment duration (the proportional change in the probability of choosing a fleld is
less than the proportional change in the unempioyment duration). That probability is also
inelastic relative to eamings in the case of men who were not working prior to starting
college and women (worldng or flot prior to starting college). for individuals who were
employed prior to starting college, the elasticity of the aforementioned probability relative
to earnings is slightly higher than 1, which confirms the high weight that those individuals
put on eamings when choosing their fields of study. Finally, women who were working
pnor to starting college tend to respond to earnings variations in a way comparable to men
who were not working pnor to college. However, the two groups differ significantly with
regard to responsiveness to the expected unemployment duration changes. As mentioned
before, working prior to college significantly reduces the sensitivity to unemployment.
The comparison between the five fields of study is interesting when considering the effect
of proportional changes in earnings or expected unemployment duration in each field of
study on the probability of choosing each of the alternative fields of study. Changes in
earnings or expected unemployment duration in “Sciences” produce the most significant
effccts. For example, a 1 percent increase in annual eamings in this field of study, holding
ail else constant, will reduce the probabiiity of choosing each of the four remaining fields
of study by 0.34% in the case of men who were worldng pnor to starting college. The
probabilities of choosing each field of study are also significantly sensitive to earnings and
the expected unemployment duration changes in “Business and Commerce.” On the other
hand, eamings and expected unemployment duration changes in “Social Sciences” cause
only a modest responsiveness to the probability of choosing each of the alternative fields ofÇ smdy.
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C 3.7 Conclusion
In the present study, we use Canadian data to analyze the determinants of college field
choice. We specffically focus on the effects of the expected eamings and unemployment
durations on that choice. To this end, we develop a model of endogenous choice of field of
study, where the expected eamings and unemployment durations as well as the personal
discount rate are the principal determinants of that choice. The weight put on
unemployment relative to eamings in the choice of field is the individual discount rate.
The econometric models we estimated thereafter using data from the Canadian National
Graduates Survey for 15,124 individuals who successfully completed their programs at
Canadian community colleges (CEGEPs in Quebec) in 1990 and 1995 yielded estimates of
the parameters that guide student choice. Our resuits provide empirical evidence for our
view that the choice of a college field of study depends upon both expected eamings and
unemployment durations in ah fields of study. In addition, it was found that women are
less influenced by eamings and expected unemployment durations as compared to men.
C Also, individuals who were employed prior to starting college put more weight on eamings
and less weight on unemployment when choosing their fields of study. We also find that
the probabihity of selecting “Business and Commerce” or “Sciences” is relatively the most
sensitive to eaming and unemployment duration variations. Conversely, “Social Sciences”
is the least sensitive to monetary motives, including the expected unemployment duration.
While thc probability of choosing cadi field of study significantly depends on eamings and
expected unemployment duration, it is generally inelastic to those variables. This suggests
that only big changes in eamings and unemployment durations are able to produce
significant changes in the distribution of graduates over each field of study. In fact, the
choice of a field of study also significantly depends upon many other variables (gender,
parents’ education, family affluence, ethnic group, etc). On the other hand, thcse findings
are less affected by the ldnd of self-selection correction method used to estimate the
eamings equations (the procedure proposed either by Bourguignon, Foumier and Gurgand,
2001 or Lee, 1983). However, the two procedures lead to different results as regards the
presence of seif-selection and its extent. The procedure proposed by Bourguignon,
Foumier and Gurgand (2001) suggests that self-selection concems ahi the fields of study,
while Lee’s procedure suggests that seif-selection concems only the fields of “Social
Sciences” and “Health.”
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Finally, we should mention that some selection biases stili persist in our estimates. On one
hand, we focus only on people who choose a college field, and so we ignore those who
choose other options (entering the labour force or undertaldng university studies, for
example). On the other hand, wc assume that students who select a college field will
successfully complete their program. In fact, some students drop out or fail to complete the
requirements of their program. 50 hi addition, we assume that the observed choices
correspond to those originally (rationally) made by students, which is flot always the case.
hi fact, some students do flot end up in the fields they initially chose because they do flot
meet the requirements of their chosen fields of study or because the capacity in certain
coveted fields (fixed quotas) is limited. Unfortunately, the data we use does not allow us to
correct for these selection biases.
50 For a good application of the use of snident’s perceived probabi1i of success, see
Montmarquette, Cannings and Maliseredjian (2002).
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Table 3.1: Composition ofthe Fields ofStudy
Fields groups Sub-fields groups
- “Educational, Recreational and Counselling Services”,
Education, fme Arts and ,
- Fine and Apphed ArtsHumanities
“Humanities and Related Fields”.
Social Sciences - “Social Sciences and Related Fields”
Business and Commerce - “Commerce, Management and Business Administration”
Health
- “Health professions, Sciences and Technologies”
- “Engineering and Applied Sciences Technologies and
Trades”
Sciences
- Mathematics and Physical Sciences
- “Agricultural and Biological Sciences/Teclmologies”
o
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Table 3.2: Descriptive $tatistics
Health Sciences Total
o
Education,
Fine Arts,
Humanities
Age 26.72
(s.d) (7.15)
Female 0.73
(1995 graduates) (0.73)
Member ofa visible 0.08
minonty group
Spoken languages
English only 0.66
Bilingual 0.19
French only 0.15
Province of residence
Quebec 0.18
Ontario 0.54
Manitoba,Saskt. 0.03
Alberta 0.10
BC 0.11
Other provinces 0.04
Father’s education level (*)
Elementary 0.13
Secondary 0.40
College 0.15
University 0.32
Mother’s education level (*)
Social
Sciences
28.07
(8.34)
0.66
(0.66)
0.0$
0.67
0.19
0.14
0.19
0.55
0.03
0.09
0.09
0.05
0.15
0.41
0.16
0.28
0.14
0.45
0.20
0.21
0.47
0.41
Business,
Commerce
26.92
(7.24)
0.67
(0.66)
0.10
0.64
0.1$
0.18
0.23
0.42
0.05
0.13
0.13
0.04
0.18
0.43
0.14
0.25
0.17
0.49
0.16
0.18
0.39
0.39
28.6
(7.78)
0.83
(0.84)
0.0$
0.62
0.1$
0.20
0.26
0.35
0.09
0.09
0.13
0.0$
0.19
0.43
0.14
0.24
0.16
0.47
0.17
0.20
0.50
0.45
27.39
(6.97)
0.23
(0.23)
0.09
0.60
0.20
0.20
0.26
0.39
0.06
0.14
0.0$
0.07
0.17
0.43
0.15
0.25
0.14
0.47
0.17
0.22
0.43
0.43
27.43
(7.4)
0.59
(0.58)
0.09
0.63
0.19
0.18
0.23
0.44
0.05
0.12
0.11
0.05
0.17
0.42
0.15
0.26
0.15
0.47
0.17
0.21
0.43
0.42
0.12
0.44
0.18
0.26
0.43
0.43
Elernentary
Secondaiy
College
University
Used student bans
Working pnor to
starting college (**)
Number of observations
1992
1997
$87 514 1380 1142 2226 6149
139$ 736 1947 1102 3792 8975
Total 2,285 1,250 3,327 2,244 6,018 15,124
Notes: s.d: Standard-Deviation. (*) “Elementary” includes “No schooling”. “Secondary” also
includes “Vocational training”. (**) Also includes those who were working and studying.
1—,
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Table 3.3: The Determinants of Enroiment Decision (%)
Very Somewhat Not very Not at ail
important important important important
Male 67.41 26.85 4.89 0.85
To improve chances
Female 66.79 26.41 5.58 1.21
ofa good mcome
Bothgenders 67.05 26.59 5.29 1.06
To acquire the Maie 69.32 26.73 2.93 1.02
sldlls needed fora Female 75.2 21.21 2.74 0.85
particularjob Bothgenders 72.76 23.51 2.82 0.92
To acquire an Maie 68.74 28.2 2.72 0.33
in-depthlmowledge Female 74.41 23.32 1.93 0.34
ofa field ofstudy Both genders 72.06 25.35 2.26 0.34
To improve yourself Male 70.09 26.65 2.72 0.54
Generally (only female 77.55 20.06 1.88 0.51
1990 graduates) Both genders 74.52 22.74 2.22 0.52
Table 3.4: Proportion of Graduates who Would Have Seiected the Same Field of Study
Given thcir Experience Since Graduation
Gender Year of graduation
Total
Male Female 1990 1995
SameField 73.08 69.99 74.35 69.17 71.27
DifferentField 23.96 26.47 21.54 28.08 25.43
Don’tknow 2.96 3.54 4.11 2.74 3.3
Q
o
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O Table 3.5: Mean Annual Eamings (Full Time Workers*), Mean Number of Months beforeFirst Job after Graduation and the Distribution of Graduates by Field of Study
Education, Social BusinessYear Fine Arts, Health Sciences TotalSciences CommerceHumarnties
1992 26.44 30.62 30.64 36.1 30.81 30.81(12.06) (11.12) (13.07) (7.46) (12.26) (12.15)
1997 28.04 28.59 30.13 31.27 32.18 30.98(16.62) (11.31) (14.17) (10.7) (13.75) (13.84)
__________
Var. 97/92 +6.05% -6.63% -1.66% -13.38% 4.45% +0.55%
3.31 2.73 3.68 1.6 3.23 3.16
Number of 1992 (6.16) (5.28) (6.49) (3.46) (6.03) (5.94)
months 6.61 6.83 5.88 6.25 6.39 6.35beforefirst 1997 (8.42) (8.73) (8.12) (8.0) (8.66) (8.5)
Var. 97/92 99.70% 150.18% 59.78% 290.63% 97.83% 100.95%
1992 (1) 11.84 8.08 20.74 8.08 51.26 100.00
1997(2) 11.53 9.86 19.89 5.83 52.89 100.00
(2)-(1) -0.31 1.78 -0.85 -2.25 1.63
24.85 27.34 24.18 34.05 30.28 27.851992 (14.33) (15.82) (9.59) (9.95) (37.93) (17.16)
21.72 24.77 22.99 29.01 26.35 24.621997 (7.16) (10) (8.69) (11.53) (12.44) (10.13)
_
Var. 97/92 -12.60% -9.40% -4.92% -14.80% -12.98% -11.60%
3.1 3.69 3.39 1.66 3.52 2.92
Numberof 1992 (5.86) (6.84) (5.82) (4.2) (6.46) (5.7)
months 6.06 6.45 6.1 5.66 5.63 5.98before first 1997 (8.63) (8.7) (8.57) (8.05) (8.08) (8.43)job
Var. 97/92 95.48% 74.80% 79.94% 240.96% 59.94% 104.79%
1992 (1) 23.42 10.53 29.9 25.99 10.16 100.00
1997 (2) 23.09 14.18 28.28 22.79 11.67 100.00
(2)-(1) -0.33 3.65 -1.62 -3.2 1.51
25.26 28.6 26.31 34.48 30.7 29.141992 (13.78) (14.27) (11.28) (9.52) (20.43) (15.24)
23.46 26.26 25.5 29.41 30.95 27.591997 (11) (10.68) (11.45) (11.42) (13.69) (12.42)
Var. 97/92 -7.13% -8.18% -3.08% -14.70% +0.81% -5.32%
3.16 3.36 3.49 1.65 3.3 3.02
Numberof 1992 (5.94) (6.36) (6.05) (4.07) (6.13) (5.8)
months 6.21 6.58 6.03 5.75 6.21 6.14before first 1997 (8.57) (8.71) (8.42) (8.04) (8.53) (8.46)job
Var. 97/92 96.52% 95.83% 72.78% 248.48% 88.18% 103.31%
1992 (1) 18.72% 9.54% 26.18% 18.71% 26.86% 100%
1997 (2) 18.19% 12.35% 24.72% 15.6% 29.14% 100%
(2)-(1) -0.53 +2.81 -1.46 -3.11 +2.28
Annual
eamings
(Full time
workers*)
1997$, l0M
A
L
E
S
Distribution
of graduates
Q
Annual
eamings
(Full time
workers*)
1997$, loiFE
M
A
L
E
S
Distribution
of graduates
Annual
eamings
(Full time
workers*)
1997$, loi
B
o
T
H
G
E
N
D
E
R
S
Distribution
of graduates
Notes: (*) 30 hours and up weeldy. In parentheses are standard-deviations.
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TabLe 3.6: Evolution of Some Jobs’ Characteristics
Education,
. Social Business,fine Arts Health Sciences Total
. Sciences CommerceHumamties
Education level required for thejob compared to current level:
Lower level
1992 38.02 26.21 30.98 7.99 27.4 26.43
1997 53.95 44.05 47.76 29.25 41.78 43.85
Same level
1992 38.57 45.15 37.95 76.01 46.36 48.33
1997 22.93 31.95 26.33 49.55 34.13 32.25
Higher level
1992 23.41 28.64 31.07 16.00 26.24 25.24
1997 23.12 24 25.91 21.2 24.09 23.9
Permanent job:
1992 58.96 70.72 69.91 80.49 67.23 69.31
1997 56.42 67.12 67.49 69.58 67.26 65.66
Mean number of weekly hours:
36.46 37.32 38.41 34.21 40.79 37.7
1992
(10.2) (9.06) (8.44) (8.67) (8.91) (9.29)
37.14 35.18 37.87 31.8 41.93 37.61
1997
(11.98) (9.69) (10.22) (11.98) (10.68) (11.43)
Notes: In parentheses are standard-deviations.
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C Conclusion Générale
Les modèles de choix de secteur d’emploi développés à la fin des années 1960 et début des
années 1970 (Todaro, 1969; Harris et Todaro, 1970; Stiglitz, 1974 et 1976; Eaton et Neher,
1975; et Fields, 1975 à titre d’exemples) ont mis l’accent sur l’effet des écarts de salaire
entre secteurs sur le comportement des travailleurs en matière de recherche d’emploi ainsi
que le chômage qui en découle. Le taux de chômage d’équilibre est celui qui égalise le
salaire espéré dans le secteur à salaire élevé au salaire dans le secteur opposé. Les
travailleurs qui se trouvent en chômage le sont volontairement puisqu’ils refusent l’emploi
dans le secteur à bas salaire: ‘fie uiieinptoyed have onïy thenisetves to bÏame” (Eaton et
Neher, 1975). La théorie du salaire efficient développée par Shapiro et Stiglitz (1984)
blâme plutôt certaines entreprises qui, en cherchant à inciter leurs travailleurs à l’effort,
payent des salaires supérieurs à ceux du marché. Cette politique a pour effet de réduire la
demande de travail et d’augmenter l’offre, ce qui entraîne un chômage involontaire.
Toutefois, certains travailleurs cherchent l’emploi uniquement dans les entreprises qui
paient le salaire efficient et déclinent les emplois rémunérés au taux du marché.
Le modèle que nous avons développé dans le premier chapitre s’inscrit dans le même
cadre. Les espérances des travailleurs concernant les salaires et les durées de chômage
déterminent leur comportement quant au choix de secteur d’emploi. Cependant, à la
différence des premiers modèles qui supposent toujours l’existence d’un secteur accessible
à tous les travailleurs, nous supposons que les travailleurs sont exposés au risque de
chômage dans les deux secteurs d’emploi. L’emploi le mieux rémunéré est associé au plus
grand risque de chômage. Un travailleur préfère l’emploi dans le secteur qui maximise son
revenu à vie escompté. Le poids du facteur chômage dans cette préférence est représenté
par le taux d’escompte personnel. Quand l’écart salarial entre les deux secteurs est
substantiel, les travailleurs préfèrent endurer le chômage plutôt que d’accepter un emploi à
bas salaire.
L’application empirique dans le cas particulier de choix entre le public et le privé comme
secteurs d’emploi au Maroc est dictée par le fait que dans ce pays, le taux de chômage des
diplômés est très excessif et qu’en même temps, ces diplômés convoitent fortement
l’emploi dans le secteur public. Cette situation semble se produire dans plusieurs autres
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pays en voie de développement, notamment en Afrique. Nous avons alors suspecté le
comportement des travailleurs comme étant une des causes de leur chômage. Les résultats
empiriques montrent que le salaire horaire payé par le secteur public au Maroc est presque
le double de celui payé par le secteur privé. Toutefois, les travailleurs semblent moins
attirés par cet avantage. Ils privilégient plutôt les facteurs non pécuniaires tels la stabilité
de l’emploi et le prestige d’être fonctionnaire dans la société marocaine. En effet, même si
l’écart salarial entre les deux secteurs est éliminé, les travailleurs continueront
vraisemblablement de préférer l’emploi dans le secteur public malgré le grand risque de
chômage qui est associé.
Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous avons présenté une analyse détaillée du chômage des
diplômés au Maroc. Dans ce pays, l’éducation est paradoxalement devenue synonyme de
chômage. L’aggravation du chômage des diplômés au Maroc s’est produite en parallèle
avec la réduction draconienne de l’emploi dans le secteur public depuis 1983 dans le cadre
du programme d’ajustement structurel. Les diplômés pensent avoir été sacrifiés par le
gouvernement pour des raisons budgétaires et militent pour récupérer ce qu’ils considèrent
le droit à l’emploi dans le secteur public. Il arrive souvent qu’ils déclinent des offres
d’emploi dans le secteur privé. En effet, la forte segmentation du marché de l’emploi au
Maroc ainsi que la politique d’emploi poursuivie par le gouvernement ont pour résultat
d’encourager les diplômés à demeurer en chômage en attente d’un emploi dans le secteur
public plutôt que d’accepter l’emploi dans le secteur privé éclipsé par les activité
informelles.
L’amélioration des chances et des conditions d’emploi dans le secteur privé à travers un
niveau de croissance économique soutenue favorable à l’émergence d’entreprises
dissociées du secteur informel, paraît être une solution logique et durable au problème de
chômage des diplômés au Maroc. La croissance économique sera davantage favorisée si les
travailleurs qualifiés s’insèrent dans le secteur privé plutôt que de s’insérer dans des
emplois non productifs dans la fonction publique. Enfin, un plus grand investissement de la
part du gouvernement dans l’éducation primaire permettra d’améliorer la qualité de la
force de travail, stimuler la croissance économique et réduire la part du secteur informel
dans l’économie. Les diplômés seront alors davantage incités à chercher de l’emploi dans
le secteur privé où ils trouveront des d’emplois décents.
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Dans le dernier chapitre, nous avons adapté le modèle développé dans le premier chapitre
pour le cas de choix de filière d’études. Ensuite, nous avons utilisé des données
canadiennes pour analyser les déterminants du choix de filière d’études par les diplômés du
collège. Le modèle économétrique a été estimé sur la base des données d’un échantillon de
15124 travailleurs ayant obtenu un diplôme d’un collège communautaire canadien
(CEGEP au Québec) en 1990 et 1995. L’échantillon est tiré de l’enquête nationale
canadienne auprès des diplômés. Cet échantillon permet de combiner les variations de
rendements marginaux (revenu et durée de chômage) à la fois entre les filières d’études et
dans le temps.
Nos résultats appuient les études précédentes quant à l’effet significatif du revenu sur le
choix de filière d’études. Ils appuient également note idée selon laquelle la durée de
chômage affecte ce choix. Par ailleurs, il ressort des résultats que les femmes mettent
moins de poids sur le revenu et la durée de chômage comparativement aux hommes. De
plus, les étudiants qui détiennent un emploi avant de commencer leurs études favorisent le
revenu au détriment de la durée de chômage dans leur choix de filière d’études. D’autre
part, le choix de la filière «Affaires et Commerce » ou « Sciences » est le plus sensible aux
changements de revenus et de durées de chômage, alors que le choix de la filière
«Sciences Sociales» est le moins sensible. Le choix de filière d’études est également
déterminé par plusieurs autres variables (sexe, éducation des parents, groupe ethnique,
langues parlées, etc.).
Enfin, nous mentionnons que nos approches, aussi bien dans le choix du secteur d’emploi
que dans le choix de filière d’études, sont loin d’être parfaites. En effet, certains biais de
sélection sont toujours présents dans les résultats. Dans le cas du choix de secteur
d’emploi, nous ignorons le choix d’éducation qui pourrait bien être corrélé avec le choix de
secteur. Les étudiants qui poursuivent des études universitaires le font probablement
uniquement pour trouver un emploi dans le secteur public. Dans le cas du choix de filière
d’études par les étudiants canadiens, les résultats sont conditionnels au choix et à la
réussite des études au collège. Nous ignorons les individus qui choisissent d’autres options
(par exemple, intégrer le marché de l’emploi ou poursuivre des études à l’université) ainsi
que ceux qui ne réussissent pas leur programme au collège (échec ou abandon).
Malheureusement, les données utilisées ne permettent pas de remédier à tous ces biais de
sélection.
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